5,000 developers
A multi-stage supply chain attack has impacted users of the developer tool Cursor after a breach at its third-party AI model provider, Fireworks AI. Attackers leveraged a stolen API key to access sensitive data at Fireworks AI, which they used to pivot and compromise Cursor's infrastructure. They successfully replaced a legitimate Visual Studio Code extension, Claude Code, with a trojanized version containing an SSH backdoor. An estimated 5,000 developers downloaded the malicious extension, unknowingly installing persistent remote access malware on their development machines. The incident, which also affected other Fireworks AI customers like Uber and Notion, underscores the significant and interconnected risks of integrating third-party AI services into software development pipelines.
The attack unfolded in several distinct stages, demonstrating a cascading failure across multiple organizations. The initial point of compromise was Fireworks AI, a company that provides AI model inference services. Attackers obtained an API key belonging to Cursor that was stored within Fireworks AI's systems.
Using this key, the threat actor gained access to a shared storage bucket containing unredacted session traces from Cursor's coding agents. By harvesting credentials embedded in these logs, the attackers escalated their privileges and gained access to Cursor's internal SaaS tools and source code repositories.
Their ultimate goal was to compromise Cursor's developer user base. They used their internal access to pivot to the extension marketplace cache infrastructure. On October 29, 2026, for a period of approximately 11 hours, they replaced the legitimate Claude Code VS Code extension (provided by Anthropic) with malicious versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. These versions contained a backdoor designed to establish a persistent SSH connection back to an attacker-controlled server, giving them remote control over the compromised developer workstations.
This incident is a textbook example of a modern software supply chain attack, leveraging trusted relationships and development infrastructure.
T1199 - Trusted Relationship. The attackers then used this key to access logs containing embedded credentials, aligning with T1552.006 - Stored Information.T1078 - Valid Accounts.T1195.001 - Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools.T1059.004 - Unix Shell for execution and T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer for delivering the backdoor.The impact of this supply chain attack is significant and multi-faceted:
The source articles mentioned the malicious versions of the Claude Code VS Code extension.
other2.1.312other2.1.313Security teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect related activity:
process_namesshssh processes spawned by VS Code or its child processes, especially those connecting to unknown external IP addresses.network_traffic_patternOutbound TCP/22 from developer endpointsfile_name~/.vscode/extensions/anthropic.claude-code-*2.1.312 and 2.1.313 are confirmed malicious.command_line_patterncurl or wget executed by VS CodeCode -> bash -> ssh.D3-SFA: System File Analysis is relevant here.TCP/22) to the internet and only allow it to specific, approved jump hosts or servers. This is an application of D3-OTF: Outbound Traffic Filtering.M1016 - Vulnerability Scanning of your supply chain.M1026 - Privileged Account Management.M1045 - Code Signing.Strictly manage and rotate API keys and other credentials, treating them as privileged accounts.
Enforce policies to only allow installation of digitally signed and verified software extensions.
Implement egress filtering to block unauthorized outbound connections from developer workstations.
Run development tools and their extensions in sandboxed environments to limit their access to the underlying system.
To mitigate the impact of a compromised developer workstation, organizations must implement strict outbound traffic filtering. In the context of this attack, the SSH backdoor needed to connect to an external C2 server. A default-deny egress policy on developer endpoints would have blocked this connection. Security teams should configure perimeter firewalls and endpoint security solutions to block all outbound traffic by default, only allowing connections to known-good, business-required destinations on specific ports. For SSH, outbound access should be restricted to a corporate jump host or specific code repositories, not the open internet. This countermeasure effectively contains the threat by preventing the backdoor from establishing its C2 channel, rendering it useless.
To prevent the execution of trojanized components, organizations should implement service binary verification for development tools and extensions. This involves creating a manifest of known-good file hashes for all approved VS Code extensions and their constituent files. An EDR or file integrity monitoring (FIM) solution on the developer workstation can then continuously compare the hashes of installed extension files against this manifest. Any mismatch would trigger an immediate alert, indicating that a file has been tampered with or replaced, as was the case with the Claude Code extension. This provides a high-fidelity detection method for software supply chain attacks where attackers modify legitimate software.
The SSH backdoor likely created or modified local user accounts or SSH authorized_keys files for persistence. Continuous monitoring of local account activity on developer workstations is a crucial detection strategy. Security teams should use an EDR or SIEM to monitor for and alert on the creation of new local user accounts, modifications to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file, or changes to SSH daemon configurations (sshd_config). Establishing a baseline of normal account configurations and user SSH keys allows for the rapid detection of anomalies that could indicate an attacker establishing a persistent foothold.
The trojanized Claude Code extension was served to users for approximately 11 hours.
Attackers leverage stolen API key from Fireworks AI.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
CyberNetSec.io uses automation to assist source monitoring, deduplication, observable extraction, and structured intelligence generation. Published analysis follows human-defined editorial standards and adds defensive context including MITRE ATT&CK, D3FEND, STIX, and Sigma where applicable. Read our editorial policy.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
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