A severe supply chain attack has impacted users of SmartTube, a popular open-source YouTube client for Android TV. Threat actors compromised the developer's signing keys, allowing them to distribute a malicious version of the application through the app's official update channels and its GitHub repository. The malicious payload, a surveillance-style malware, was designed to fingerprint infected devices and exfiltrate data to a remote server. Google's Play Protect service has taken action by disabling the compromised app on user devices. The developer has issued a new, clean version signed with a new key, necessitating a full uninstall and reinstall by all users.
The incident came to light when users reported that Google Play Protect was automatically disabling their SmartTube app, flagging it as a risk. The developer, Yuriy Yuliskov, confirmed that his development machine was infected with malware, leading to the theft of his digital signing keys in late November 2025. This compromise enabled the attacker to inject malicious code into official application packages (APKs) for versions 30.43 through 30.55.
The attacker leveraged the app's built-in updater and its official GitHub repository to distribute the compromised versions. This method ensured that users received the malicious update through what they believed were trusted channels, a classic hallmark of a sophisticated supply chain attack.
Forensic analysis of the infected APKs revealed a malicious native library, named libalphasdk.so or libnativesdk.so. This component was not part of the legitimate open-source code. The malware was designed to initialize automatically upon the app's launch without any user interaction.
Once active, the malware performed device fingerprinting, collecting a range of data, including:
This data was then encrypted and exfiltrated to a remote command-and-control (C2) server. While immediate destructive actions were not observed, the malware established a persistent backdoor on infected devices, granting the attacker the capability to launch further attacks, such as stealing more sensitive data or incorporating the device into a botnet.
T1195.002 - Compromise Software Supply Chain: Compromise Software Development Environment: The attacker compromised the developer's machine to steal signing keys.T1645 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution: The malicious update was signed with legitimate, albeit stolen, keys to bypass security checks.T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: The malware transmitted collected device information to an attacker-controlled server.T1518.001 - Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery: The malware's stealthy nature implies it was designed to evade detection by security tools like Google Play Protect.The primary impact is the erosion of trust in a widely used open-source application. All users who updated to the compromised versions had their device information exposed, creating a significant privacy risk. The backdoor established by the malware left tens of thousands of users vulnerable to follow-on attacks. The incident also forced the developer to take drastic measures, including revoking the old signature and requiring a manual reinstallation, causing significant disruption and inconvenience for the user base.
Security teams and technically savvy users can hunt for signs of compromise by looking for the following:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| File Name | libalphasdk.so |
Malicious native library found within the SmartTube application package. |
| File Name | libnativesdk.so |
An alternative name for the malicious native library. |
| Network Traffic Pattern | Unusual outbound connections | Monitor for connections from the SmartTube app process to unknown or suspicious IP addresses, especially shortly after app launch. |
libalphasdk.so or libnativesdk.so within the SmartTube app's data directory.Defensive techniques from the D3FEND framework that apply include:
D3-FA - File Analysis: Analyzing the APK to identify malicious embedded libraries.D3-NTA - Network Traffic Analysis: Detecting the malware's C2 communication by monitoring for unusual network patterns.For Users:
For Developers (Strategic):
D3-ACH - Application Configuration Hardening: Secure the development and build environment. Use dedicated, isolated machines for signing releases.D3-SBV - Service Binary Verification: Implement processes to verify the integrity of release binaries before publishing, comparing them against builds from a clean, trusted environment.While code signing was used, the theft of the keys highlights the need for securing the keys themselves, for instance in an HSM.
Hardening development environments to prevent initial compromise is critical to protecting signing keys and build pipelines.
The Android OS sandbox and Google Play Protect played a key role in containing and disabling the malicious app, preventing further damage.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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