Ransomware Attacks on Critical Industries Skyrocket by 34%, KELA Reports

KELA Report Finds Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Surged 34% in 2025, with U.S. as Top Target

HIGH
October 21, 2025
October 25, 2025
5m read
RansomwareThreat IntelligenceCyberattack

Related Entities(initial)

Threat Actors

QilinClop AkiraPlaySafePay

Organizations

Full Report(when first published)

Executive Summary

A new threat intelligence report from KELA, titled "Escalating Ransomware Threats to National Security," reveals a dramatic escalation in ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure. Between January and September 2025, attacks on these sectors surged by 34% compared to the same period in 2024. Critical industries were the victims in 50% of the 4,701 total ransomware incidents recorded globally. The United States was the most impacted nation, suffering approximately 1,000 attacks. The report underscores a significant trend where a small number of prolific ransomware groups, including Qilin, Clop, Akira, Play, and SafePay, are responsible for a disproportionate share of the attacks, indicating a consolidation of power in the cybercrime ecosystem.

Threat Overview

The report paints a grim picture of the current ransomware landscape. The total number of attacks rose from 3,219 in 2024 to 4,701 in 2025 for the same nine-month period. Of these, 2,332 targeted critical infrastructure sectors. The manufacturing sector was hit hardest, with a 61% increase in attacks, highlighting its vulnerability to operational disruptions. Other heavily targeted sectors include healthcare, energy, transportation, and finance. KELA's analysis suggests these incidents should be treated as threats to national security, not just financial crimes, due to their potential to disrupt essential services and erode public trust. The geographical distribution of attacks shows a clear focus on Western nations, with the U.S. followed by Canada, Germany, the U.K., and Italy as the most targeted countries.

Technical Analysis

While the report focuses on trends rather than specific TTPs, the activities of the top groups provide insight into common attack methods:

Impact Assessment

The 34% surge in attacks on critical infrastructure has profound implications for national security and economic stability. A successful ransomware attack on a manufacturing plant can halt production, causing supply chain disruptions. An attack on a hospital can lead to canceled surgeries and risk to patient lives. An attack on an energy provider could cause power outages. The financial costs are immense, including ransom payments, recovery expenses, and regulatory fines. The report's finding that five groups are responsible for 25% of attacks suggests that focused threat intelligence and law enforcement action against these key players could have a significant impact on reducing the overall threat.

Cyber Observables for Detection

General observables for ransomware activity include:

Type
file_name
Value
*.[ext]
Description
Monitor for mass file renaming with a new, unknown extension (e.g., .akira, .qilin).
Type
file_name
Value
*readme.txt
Description
Monitor for the creation of ransom notes in multiple directories across a file system.
Type
command_line_pattern
Value
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
Description
Command used to delete volume shadow copies to prevent easy recovery.
Type
process_name
Value
PsExec.exe, wmic.exe
Description
Tools commonly used by ransomware groups for lateral movement and remote execution.

Detection & Response

  1. Behavioral Analysis: Deploy EDR solutions that use behavioral analysis to detect ransomware activities. This includes monitoring for rapid file encryption, deletion of shadow copies, and attempts to disable security tools. This is a core function of D3-PA: Process Analysis.
  2. Decoy Files: Place decoy files (honeypots) on file shares and endpoints. Use file integrity monitoring to create a high-priority alert if these files are modified or encrypted, as no legitimate process should ever touch them. This is a form of D3-DO: Decoy Object.
  3. Network Segmentation: Monitor traffic between network segments. A sudden increase in SMB/RPC traffic from a workstation to multiple servers can be an indicator of a ransomware worm spreading. This falls under D3-NTA: Network Traffic Analysis.

Mitigation

  • Data Backup and Recovery: The most critical defense is a robust backup strategy. Maintain offline and immutable backups of critical data so that you can recover without paying a ransom. Regularly test your restoration process. This is the primary goal of D3-FR: File Restoration.
  • Patch Management: Proactively patch vulnerabilities, especially on internet-facing systems, to prevent the initial access methods used by groups like Clop (M1051 - Update Software).
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA on all remote access points, such as VPNs and RDP, to defend against stolen credential attacks (M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication).
  • Network Segmentation: Segment networks to contain the spread of ransomware. Prevent workstations from communicating directly with each other and restrict server-to-server communication to only what is necessary (M1030 - Network Segmentation).

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2025
Start of the nine-month period analyzed by KELA for its ransomware report.
2
September 30, 2025
End of the nine-month period analyzed by KELA for its ransomware report.
3
October 21, 2025
This article was published

Article Updates

October 25, 2025

Ransomware attacks surged to 50% increase with over 5,000 incidents; Qilin group now leads, and PowerShell is a dominant attack tool.

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Maintain regular, tested, and immutable backups to ensure recovery without paying a ransom. This is the most effective countermeasure against the impact of ransomware.

Enforce MFA on all remote access points (VPN, RDP) to prevent initial access via compromised credentials.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Implement a rigorous patch management program to close vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by ransomware groups.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Segment the network to limit the lateral spread of ransomware, containing an infection to a smaller part of the environment.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The ultimate defense against ransomware's impact is the ability to restore operations without paying. This requires a robust and tested backup strategy. Implement the 3-2-1 rule: three copies of your data, on two different media types, with one copy off-site and immutable (unalterable). For critical industries like manufacturing and healthcare, this should include not just data but full system images for critical servers to enable rapid rebuilding of infrastructure. Restoration plans must be tested quarterly at a minimum to ensure they are effective and meet Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs). This makes the ransomware operator's primary leverage—data encryption—ineffective.

Deploy an EDR solution configured for behavioral detection of ransomware. Create rules to detect and block common ransomware TTPs in real-time. Key behaviors to monitor for include: a process rapidly reading and writing to a large number of files, the execution of vssadmin.exe delete shadows, attempts by a non-system process to disable security agent services, and mass file renaming. Combining these heuristics into a single high-severity alert can detect a ransomware attack in its earliest stages, allowing for automated isolation of the infected host before the malware can spread laterally.

Seed file servers and network shares with decoy files and folders that appear valuable (e.g., 'Financial_Projections_Q4.xlsx', 'CEO_Passwords.txt'). These files should not be accessed by any legitimate user or process. Use a File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) system to place a high-priority, real-time alert on any read, write, or encryption activity on these decoy objects. Because ransomware enumerates and encrypts files indiscriminately, it will interact with these decoys, providing an extremely high-fidelity and early warning of an attack in progress, often before significant damage is done to real data.

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2025

Start of the nine-month period analyzed by KELA for its ransomware report.

2
September 30, 2025

End of the nine-month period analyzed by KELA for its ransomware report.

Sources & References(when first published)

Global Ransomware Attacks Against Critical Industries Surge 34% in 2025
Morningstar (morningstar.com) October 21, 2025

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

RansomwareKELACriticalInfrastructureQilinClopAkiraCyberattack

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