Q2 Ransomware Attacks Rise 3%, VPNs Targeted

Q2 Ransomware Attacks Up 3%; VPNs Remain Top Initial Access Vector

HIGH
July 22, 2026
5m read
RansomwareVulnerabilityThreat Intelligence

Related Entities

Threat Actors

Qilin The GentlemenDragonForceKryBitAkira

Organizations

Other

NCC Group

Full Report

Executive Summary

Global ransomware attacks continued to climb in the second quarter of 2026, increasing by 3% to a total of 2,229 incidents, as reported by NCC Group. The Qilin ransomware group maintained its position as the most prolific threat actor. A critical finding from the report is the continued dominance of corporate **VPN**s and other edge devices as the primary initial access vector for these attacks. Threat actors are systematically exploiting vulnerabilities in widely used VPN products to bypass perimeter defenses and gain an initial foothold in target networks. This underscores the urgent need for organizations to prioritize patching and hardening of all internet-facing infrastructure.

Threat Overview

The second quarter of 2026 saw a sustained high tempo of ransomware operations. NCC Group recorded 2,229 attacks, with 665 in June alone. The industrial sector was the most heavily impacted, accounting for 30% of all incidents, followed by consumer discretionary and information technology.

The key players in Q2 2026 were:

  1. Qilin: 301 victims (14% of total)
  2. The Gentlemen: 238 victims
  3. DragonForce: 145 victims

A new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group named KryBit also made its debut, claiming 56 victims. Geographically, North America was the most targeted region, suffering 44% of the attacks.

Technical Analysis

The report's most actionable intelligence for defenders is the focus on edge devices as the primary initial access vector. Ransomware groups including Qilin, Akira, and The Gentlemen are actively exploiting vulnerabilities in VPN products from major vendors such as Fortinet, SonicWall, Citrix, and Check Point. This tactic aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application.

By exploiting a flaw in a VPN appliance, attackers can often bypass authentication mechanisms, including MFA, and gain direct access to the internal corporate network. This corresponds to T1133 - External Remote Services. Once inside, they proceed with standard ransomware TTPs: reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and eventual data exfiltration (T1048 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel) and encryption (T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact). NCC Group noted that VPN vulnerabilities accounted for roughly 15% of its high-priority threat alerts in 2026, indicating the severity and frequency of this attack vector.

Impact Assessment

The reliance on VPNs for remote work makes their exploitation a high-impact event. A successful breach can provide an attacker with a significant foothold inside the network perimeter, effectively neutralizing a key layer of defense. For the industrial sector, this is particularly dangerous as it can lead to attackers moving from the IT network to the OT network, potentially causing disruption to physical processes, production downtime, and safety risks. The financial and reputational damage from a successful ransomware attack remains substantial.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were mentioned in the source articles.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

Security teams should hunt for signs of VPN exploitation and compromise:

Type
log_source
Value
VPN Server Logs
Description
The primary source for detecting anomalous login activity.
Context
Ingest into SIEM for correlation and alerting.
Type
network_traffic_pattern
Value
Logins from multiple geolocations for a single user in a short time
Description
Indicates potential credential stuffing or account takeover.
Context
VPN logs, Identity and Access Management (IAM) logs.
Type
url_pattern
Value
/api/v1/remediation (example for a specific CVE)
Description
Exploit attempts often target specific, vulnerable API endpoints on VPN devices.
Context
Web Application Firewall (WAF) logs, web server logs on the VPN appliance.
Type
process_name
Value
w3wp.exe or httpd spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe
Description
A web server process on the VPN appliance spawning a shell could indicate successful RCE.
Context
EDR logs on the VPN appliance (if available).

Detection & Response

  • VPN Log Analysis: Continuously monitor VPN logs for failed login spikes, successful logins from suspicious IPs or countries, and impossible travel scenarios (D3-UGLPA: User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis).
  • Network Baselining: Establish a baseline of normal traffic patterns for VPN user activity. Alert on significant deviations, such as a user accessing unusual internal resources or transferring large amounts of data.
  • Endpoint Monitoring: Monitor endpoints for signs of lateral movement originating from the VPN user pool, such as widespread use of PsExec or WMI.

Mitigation

  • Urgent Patching: Prioritize and accelerate the patching of all internet-facing edge devices, especially VPN concentrators. Subscribe to vendor security advisories (D3-SU: Software Update).
  • MFA on VPN: Ensure that MFA is enabled for all VPN users. While some exploits can bypass MFA, it remains a critical defense against credential-based attacks (D3-MFA: Multi-factor Authentication).
  • Network Segmentation: Do not treat the VPN user network as fully trusted. Implement network segmentation to limit which resources VPN users can access, restricting lateral movement opportunities post-compromise (D3-NI: Network Isolation).
  • Reduce Attack Surface: If possible, replace broad VPN access with a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution that grants access to specific applications rather than the entire network.

Timeline of Events

1
July 22, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Aggressively patch VPNs and other internet-facing devices to close known vulnerability-based entry points.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Implement MFA on all VPN connections to protect against credential theft and brute-force attacks.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Isolate VPN user networks and restrict access to only necessary resources to contain the blast radius of a compromise.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

RansomwareNCC GroupVPN SecurityQilinInitial AccessFortinet

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