A new ransomware group, tracked as PAYLOAD, has been observed employing a novel and highly disruptive technique that leverages Active Directory Group Policy for domain-wide impact without encrypting files. According to a report from Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team, an investigation in April 2026 at a manufacturing firm in the Middle East revealed this "encryptionless extortion" tactic. After gaining domain administrator-level privileges, the attackers created a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) to deface every Windows workstation with a ransom note wallpaper. This attack was coupled with data exfiltration, creating a dual-threat scenario of business disruption and data leakage for extortion purposes.
The incident represents a tactical evolution in ransomware attacks, moving away from the resource-intensive process of file encryption on individual endpoints. The PAYLOAD actors instead targeted a central management system—Active Directory—to achieve maximum visibility and psychological impact with minimal effort. After compromising the domain, the threat actors created a GPO named "PAYLOAD" and linked it to the root of the Active Directory domain. This ensured the policy was enforced across all user and computer objects. The GPO's primary function was to modify a registry key to change the desktop wallpaper on all domain-joined systems to an image containing their ransom demand. While this action did not deny access to data, it served as a powerful and visible demonstration of the attackers' control over the entire network. The extortion leverage was amplified by the confirmed exfiltration of data from file servers, which was later published on the dark web.
The core of this attack is the abuse of a legitimate administrative feature for malicious purposes. The technique is a direct implementation of MITRE ATT&CK T1484.001 - Group Policy Modification.
T1078.002 - Domain Admin Accounts).PAYLOAD. They configured this GPO to alter the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper registry value on targeted machines, pointing it to a UNC path where the ransom note image was stored.T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol). This completes the double-extortion model.This "encryptionless" approach is efficient for attackers as it avoids potential detection from EDR/antivirus solutions that look for mass file encryption behavior. Instead, it masquerades as a legitimate administrative action.
While avoiding file encryption, the impact of this attack method is still severe:
No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) such as IP addresses, domains, or file hashes were mentioned in the source articles.
Security teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect GPO hijacking:
objectClass: groupPolicyContainer.GptTmpl.inf (Security Settings) and Registry.pol (Registry Settings).\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Detecting malicious GPO modification requires focused monitoring of Active Directory.
Write permission for groupPolicyContainer objects. Use a SIEM to alert on GPO modifications that occur outside of planned change management windows or are performed by accounts not associated with GPO administration. This is a form of D3-DAM: Domain Account Monitoring.Registry.pol.Harden Active Directory by restricting permissions for GPO creation/linking to a small, highly monitored group of administrators. Implement change control processes for all GPO modifications.
Strictly control and monitor the use of Domain Admin accounts. Use tiered access models and just-in-time (JIT) privileges to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.
Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team investigates the encryptionless extortion incident at a manufacturing organization.
Details of the PAYLOAD ransomware's GPO hijacking technique are publicly reported.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.