Elastic Security Labs has identified a new malvertising campaign, REF8372, that utilizes malicious Google Ads to distribute a previously unseen malware loader called OXLOADER. This loader is engineered with sophisticated evasion techniques and serves as a delivery vehicle for CastleStealer, a .NET-based infostealer. The attack chain begins with a user searching for legitimate software, clicking a malicious ad, and being led to a fraudulent site that initiates the infection. The malware notably includes checks to avoid infecting systems in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), strongly suggesting Russian-speaking, financially motivated threat actors are behind the campaign.
The REF8372 campaign is a classic malvertising operation with a modern twist. The attackers target users searching for popular developer tools, in this case, "lts version of node.js". A malicious Google Ad, published under a verified but likely fraudulent name, directs the user to a convincing but fake website (node-js[.]prentiva99[.]info).
Instead of a direct executable download, the site prompts the user to download a batch script hosted on Storj, a decentralized cloud storage platform. Using decentralized storage helps the attackers evade domain-based reputation filters and takedowns. This script initiates a multi-stage infection process, ultimately leading to the execution of the OXLOADER payload with elevated privileges, which then deploys the final CastleStealer payload.
The infection chain is designed for stealth and evasion:
T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Link).T1548.002 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control)..reloc section abuse: It abuses the Windows PE file .reloc section to stage shellcode, a non-standard technique to evade detection.T1480.001 - Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying).T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores).A successful infection by CastleStealer can lead to significant personal and corporate data loss. The impact includes:
The targeting of developers is particularly concerning, as their machines often contain high-value credentials like API keys and access tokens for cloud environments.
domainnode-js[.]prentiva99[.]infomalwareOXLOADERmalwareCastleStealerSecurity teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect related activity:
command_line_patternpowershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Filelog_sourcenode-js[.]prentiva99[.]info.process_name%TEMP% or %APPDATA%registry_keyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runnodejs.org).D3FEND Techniques:
URL Analysis (D3-UA): Analyzing URLs from search ads to identify suspicious patterns or domains before a user clicks.Dynamic Analysis (D3-DA): Executing downloaded files in a sandbox to observe their behavior (like UAC bypass attempts or C2 communication) before allowing them on a live endpoint.D3FEND Techniques:
Executable Allowlisting (D3-EAL): Prevents the unknown OXLOADER binary from running.User Account Permissions (D3-UAP): Enforcing the principle of least privilege to limit the impact of a compromise.Using web filters to block malicious ads and known malicious domains.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Training users to identify malicious search results and to download software only from official sources.
Using application control to prevent the execution of unauthorized scripts and binaries from user download folders.
Google removes the malicious advertiser account and associated ad campaigns.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats
Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.