"Operation HookedWing": Persistent Phishing Campaign Steals Over 2,000 Credentials from Critical Sectors

Report Details "Operation HookedWing," a Four-Year Phishing Campaign Targeting 500+ Organizations

HIGH
May 10, 2026
May 11, 2026
m read
PhishingThreat ActorCyberattack

Impact Scope

People Affected

Over 2,000 user credentials stolen

Industries Affected

Critical InfrastructureGovernmentFinanceEnergyTechnologyTransportationLegal Services

Related Entities(initial)

Organizations

Microsoft

Products & Tech

GitHub

Other

SOCRadar

Full Report(when first published)

Executive Summary

A long-running and adaptive phishing campaign, dubbed "Operation HookedWing," has been systematically targeting organizations in critical sectors for over four years. A new report from threat intelligence firm SOCRadar reveals the campaign has compromised more than 500 organizations and stolen over 2,000 sets of user credentials. The operation demonstrates persistence and sophistication, evolving its infrastructure and lures over time to maintain effectiveness. The attackers have shown a strategic interest in high-value targets across aviation, government, energy, and finance, indicating a goal that may extend beyond simple credential theft to espionage or enabling more significant future attacks.

Threat Overview

"Operation HookedWing" has been active since at least 2022, targeting a wide array of industries with high geopolitical significance. The campaign's primary objective is credential harvesting, specifically targeting Microsoft Outlook and other corporate login credentials.

The attackers' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have evolved:

  • 2022-2024: The campaign primarily used GitHub domains for hosting phishing pages, with English-language lures themed around Microsoft and Outlook.
  • 2024-2025: The operation expanded to include French-language content, broadening its target base.
  • 2025-Present: The actors have diversified their infrastructure beyond GitHub, using obfuscated domain names and a wider variety of phishing themes.

SOCRadar has identified two dozen command-and-control (C2) servers and over 100 GitHub domains associated with the campaign's infrastructure.

Technical Analysis

The attack chain for Operation HookedWing is a classic, yet effective, phishing flow:

  1. Lure: Victims receive a spear-phishing email designed to create a sense of urgency or authority, often impersonating an internal department like HR. This aligns with T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Link.
  2. Redirect: The email contains a link that directs the user to an intermediary site, often a GitHub repository or a compromised server.
  3. Credential Harvesting: The final landing page is a high-fidelity clone of a Microsoft Outlook login portal. It is often personalized with the victim's company logo or email address to enhance legitimacy, a technique known as T1598.003 - Phishing for Information: Spearphishing via Service.
  4. Exfiltration: Once the victim enters their credentials, the data (email, password, IP address, geolocation) is captured and sent to an attacker-controlled C2 server.

The use of legitimate services like GitHub for hosting phishing kits is a common tactic (T1584.004 - Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services) to bypass security filters that block known-bad domains.

Impact Assessment

The theft of over 2,000 credentials from 500+ organizations in critical sectors has significant implications:

  • Initial Access for Major Attacks: Stolen credentials are a primary vector for initial access into corporate networks. They can be used to facilitate ransomware attacks, business email compromise (BEC) fraud, or state-sponsored espionage.
  • Data Breaches: Valid credentials grant attackers access to sensitive corporate data, including emails, intellectual property, and customer information stored in cloud services like Microsoft 365.
  • Lateral Movement: Once inside a network, an attacker can use the compromised account to move laterally, escalate privileges, and gain deeper access.
  • Monetization: The stolen credentials can be sold on dark web marketplaces to other cybercriminals.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

No specific technical Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) such as domains or IP addresses were provided in the summary articles.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

  • Network Traffic: Monitor for outbound connections from the network to newly registered or uncategorized domains, which are often used for phishing C2.
  • GitHub Access: While legitimate, a sudden spike in employees accessing diverse or unusual GitHub pages (especially *.github.io domains) could warrant investigation.
  • Email Gateway Logs: Search for emails with common phishing keywords related to password expiry, account verification, or shared documents, especially those containing links to URL shorteners or public code repositories.
  • Login Auditing: Look for a pattern of successful logins from unusual geographic locations or IP ranges shortly after a user clicks on a link in an email.

Detection & Response

  • Email Security: Employ advanced email security solutions that can analyze links at time-of-click (URL rewriting) and detect impersonation attempts.
  • User Training (D3FEND: D3-UT - User Training): Continuously train users to identify and report phishing emails. Emphasize skepticism towards urgent requests for credentials, even if they appear to come from an internal source.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) (D3FEND: D3-MFA - Multi-factor Authentication): MFA is the single most effective defense against credential theft. Even if an attacker steals a password, they cannot access the account without the second factor.
  • Credential Exposure Monitoring: Use services to monitor dark web marketplaces and paste sites for company credentials that may have been stolen and put up for sale.

Mitigation

  • Enforce MFA: Mandate the use of phishing-resistant MFA (like FIDO2) for all users, especially for access to critical systems and cloud services like Microsoft 365.
  • Block Access to Uncategorized Websites: Configure web proxies and firewalls to block access to websites that have not been categorized by a reputation service, as these are often used in phishing campaigns.
  • Regular Phishing Simulations: Conduct regular phishing simulation exercises to test and improve user awareness and reporting.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure user accounts only have access to the data and systems necessary for their job function, limiting the potential damage if an account is compromised.

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2022
Approximate start of the 'Operation HookedWing' phishing campaign.
2
May 10, 2026
SOCRadar publishes a report detailing the full scope of the campaign.
3
May 10, 2026
This article was published

Article Updates

May 11, 2026

New technical details emerge for 'Operation HookedWing' phishing campaign, revealing custom phishing kits, dynamic C2 infrastructure, and use of Vercel for hosting malicious pages, alongside GitHub.io.

Further analysis of the 'Operation HookedWing' phishing campaign reveals advanced technical details. Threat actors utilize a custom phishing kit with dynamically loaded C2 server locations via external JavaScript, making detection more challenging. In addition to GitHub.io, the campaign leverages Vercel for hosting malicious landing pages. The phishing emails now impersonate Google alongside Microsoft, and the custom kit exfiltrates not only credentials but also the victim's IP address and detailed geolocation information using a PHP form. This indicates a highly sophisticated and adaptive threat actor, potentially acting as a credential or initial access broker.

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2022

Approximate start of the 'Operation HookedWing' phishing campaign.

2
May 10, 2026

SOCRadar publishes a report detailing the full scope of the campaign.

Sources & References(when first published)

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

Credential TheftCritical InfrastructureGitHubOperation HookedWingPhishingSOCRadar

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