28,414
OneDigital Investment Advisors, a financial advisory firm, has begun notifying 28,414 individuals about a data breach that compromised their sensitive personal information, including names and Social Security numbers. The security incident was a supply-chain attack that occurred in August 2025. The point of entry was a vulnerability in the Drift online chat tool, which was integrated with OneDigital's former CRM platform, Salesloft. The breach was only discovered when the firm's current CRM provider, Salesforce, detected suspicious activity. The eight-month delay between the breach and the notification underscores the persistent and latent risks associated with third-party software integrations and the challenges organizations face in maintaining visibility across their entire software supply chain.
This incident is a clear example of a cascading supply-chain compromise. The vulnerability was not in OneDigital's own systems but in a third-party application integrated into another third-party platform they were using.
Timeline of Events:
The compromised data includes highly sensitive PII:
OneDigital is offering 12 months of credit monitoring services to the victims, acknowledging the high risk of identity theft and fraud associated with the stolen data.
The attack vector was a vulnerability in a third-party component, a common pattern in supply-chain attacks.
T1195.002 - Compromise Software Supply Chain - The attackers targeted Drift, a component in OneDigital's software stack, rather than OneDigital itself.T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application - The vulnerability was likely in the web-facing components of the Drift chat application or its integration APIs.T1213 - Data from Information Repositories - The goal was to access and steal data from the CRM, a key information repository.T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts - The exploit may have granted the attacker access via the service account or API keys used to connect Drift to Salesforce.Detecting such an attack requires deep visibility into API traffic and third-party application behavior.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| log_source | Salesforce Event Monitoring Logs | Look for anomalous API activity from the service account associated with the Drift/Salesloft integration, such as accessing an unusually large number of records. |
| api_endpoint | *.salesforce.com/services/data/vXX.X/query |
Monitor for SOQL queries from the integrated app that are broader than necessary (e.g., SELECT Name, SSN__c FROM Contact) when the app should only be accessing names. |
| user_account_pattern | API key usage from unknown IPs | If the integration's API key is used from an IP address not associated with Drift or Salesloft's infrastructure, it is a major red flag. |
D3-CSM: Cloud Service Monitoring.D3-ACH: Application Configuration Hardening.Apply the principle of least privilege to API integrations, ensuring third-party apps cannot access sensitive data they don't need.
Implement a robust third-party risk management program that includes security assessments of all integrated software.
To prevent supply-chain breaches like the one at OneDigital, organizations must adopt a proactive SaaS Security Posture Management (SSPM) strategy. This goes beyond initial vendor vetting. For the Salesforce environment, an SSPM tool should be used to continuously scan for misconfigurations and excessive permissions granted to integrated third-party apps like Drift/Salesloft. The tool should have immediately flagged that a chat application had been granted API access to a field containing Social Security Numbers (SSN__c). This is a critical policy violation. A proper SSPM program would automatically alert security teams to this 'privilege creep' and provide a workflow for remediation, which involves modifying the integration's permission set in Salesforce to remove access to all sensitive fields. This automated, continuous governance is essential to managing the risk of dozens or hundreds of interconnected SaaS applications.
For detective control, continuous Cloud Service Monitoring is vital. OneDigital should have been ingesting Salesforce Shield Event Monitoring logs into their SIEM. Specifically, the ApiEvent and DataExportEvent log types are critical. A detection rule should have been in place to monitor the service account associated with the Drift integration. This rule would baseline normal activity (e.g., 'accesses 10-20 contact records per hour, never reads SSN__c field') and alert on any significant deviation. The attacker's activity—accessing over 28,000 records and specifically querying the SSN field—would have represented a massive anomaly. A well-configured detection rule, such as 'Alert if service account svc_drift accesses more than 100 records in an hour OR if ApiEvent.Query contains SSN__c', could have detected the breach in August 2025, rather than relying on a notification from another vendor months later.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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