ESET researchers have uncovered a sophisticated, ongoing supply-chain attack orchestrated by the North Korean state-sponsored group ScarCruft (also known as APT37, Reaper, or Ricochet Chollima). The campaign, which began in late 2024, involves the compromise of a gaming website, sqgame[.]net, popular with the ethnic Korean community in China's Yanbian Prefecture. The threat actors trojanized the platform's Windows and Android game installers, embedding them with a previously undocumented Android variant of their BirdCall spyware. This malware is a powerful surveillance tool designed to harvest a vast amount of data from a victim's device, including contacts, SMS, call logs, and even ambient audio recordings. The campaign's specific targeting suggests a clear espionage and surveillance motive aimed at individuals who may be of interest to the North Korean government, such as defectors or their contacts.
The attack vector is a classic supply chain attack, where a trusted software distribution channel is compromised to deliver malware to unsuspecting users.
sqgame[.]net: ScarCruft gained control over the distribution mechanism of the gaming website.AndroidManifest.xml file to ensure the backdoor code runs before the actual game starts.The Android variant of BirdCall (internally named "zhuagou") is a fully-featured spyware implant. Its capabilities include:
T1432 - Access Stored Application Data)T1425 - Record Audio)T1428 - Capture Screenshot)The use of legitimate cloud services for C2 is a common APT tactic (T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols) designed to make detection and blocking difficult. Network traffic to services like pCloud or Yandex is often permitted and not closely inspected, allowing the exfiltrated data to blend in with normal user activity.
T1475 - Bypassing User Consent: Malware is bundled with a legitimate app, tricking the user into granting permissions.T1446 - System-level Modifications: Modification of the AndroidManifest.xml to control execution flow.T1409 - Contact List: Harvesting the user's contact list.T1410 - Call Log: Stealing the device's call history.T1412 - SMS Messages: Accessing and exfiltrating SMS messages.T1425 - Record Audio: Using the microphone for eavesdropping.T1533 - Data from Cloud Storage: Using cloud storage for C2 and data exfiltration.This campaign poses a severe threat to the targeted community. For the individuals spied upon, the consequences could be dire, potentially leading to harassment, abduction, or harm to themselves or their families, given the nature of the North Korean regime. The attack demonstrates ScarCruft's continued focus on surveillance and intelligence gathering against defectors, activists, and other individuals deemed a threat. The use of a gaming platform popular within a specific demographic shows a high degree of target knowledge and operational planning.
sqgame[.]net to check for malicious modifications or the presence of the BirdCall backdoor code.sqgame[.]net. Users of the platform should cease using it until the operators confirm they have removed the malicious files and secured their infrastructure.Users should uninstall applications from untrusted sources, especially those that request excessive permissions.
In a corporate environment, block access to unauthorized cloud storage providers on mobile devices to prevent data exfiltration.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Educate users about the dangers of installing applications from third-party stores and the importance of reviewing app permissions before installation.
ScarCruft likely began the supply-chain attack and development of the 'zhuagou' Android malware.
ESET notified the operators of sqgame[.]net about the compromise.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.