Cybersecurity firm CYFIRMA has identified and analyzed a new ransomware strain named Altair. This malware specifically targets Windows operating systems and employs a double-extortion strategy. The ransomware encrypts files, appends a custom extension (e.g., .altair19), and exfiltrates sensitive data before deploying a ransom note. The note, RANSOM_NOTE.html, pressures victims with a 72-hour contact deadline, after which the ransom demand increases and the stolen data is threatened to be leaked. Altair leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for stealth and execution, indicating a degree of sophistication. This discovery adds another active threat to the already crowded ransomware landscape, emphasizing the need for robust endpoint protection and data backup strategies.
Altair is a file-encrypting ransomware that follows a now-standard double-extortion playbook. Its attack chain can be summarized as follows:
.altair19 to each file (T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact).RANSOM_NOTE.html) on the system, providing instructions for contact and payment.The use of WMI is a key technical feature of Altair. WMI provides a powerful interface for managing and monitoring Windows systems, and its abuse by malware is common. Attackers use it for:
By leveraging WMI, Altair can operate with a lower footprint, making it harder to detect with traditional signature-based antivirus. The double-extortion model is not technically novel but remains highly effective, as it pressures victims with two distinct threats: loss of access to their data and public exposure of their sensitive information.
CYFIRMA researchers predict that Altair will evolve to include more advanced features, such as targeting backups and databases for destruction or encryption, and incorporating stronger anti-analysis and defense evasion techniques.
The impact of an Altair ransomware attack is severe, combining operational disruption with significant data breach risks.
No specific file hashes, IP addresses, or domains were listed as Indicators of Compromise in the source articles.
To detect potential Altair activity, security teams can hunt for the following patterns:
RANSOM_NOTE.html*.altair19wmic.exewmic.exe, especially those related to process creation or remote execution.wmic.exe spawning other processes like powershell.exe or cmd.exe.wmic.exe for malicious purposes.RANSOM_NOTE.html file or the widespread modification of files with the .altair19 extension.Use EDR or similar tools to monitor for and block malicious behaviors, such as mass file encryption or suspicious WMI usage.
To counter threats like Altair that abuse legitimate system tools, organizations must move beyond signature-based detection. Implementing robust process analysis via an EDR solution is key. This involves monitoring the parent-child relationships of processes. For Altair, a critical detection would be to alert on wmic.exe spawning suspicious processes or executing commands related to discovery or lateral movement. For example, wmic.exe being used to launch PowerShell scripts or to query system information across multiple hosts in a short timeframe is highly anomalous. By baselining normal WMI usage in the environment, security teams can create high-fidelity alerts for these outlier behaviors, enabling them to detect and terminate the ransomware execution chain before encryption begins.
A highly effective, though challenging, mitigation is the implementation of application allowlisting. In environments with standardized software, such as servers with specific roles, an allowlisting policy can prevent any unauthorized executable, including the Altair ransomware payload, from running. This approach shifts the security model from 'block known bad' to 'allow known good'. While a full implementation across an entire enterprise can be complex, starting with critical servers can provide a significant security uplift. This would force an attacker to use more advanced fileless techniques or live-off-the-land binaries that are permitted, narrowing the attack surface and making detection easier.
CYFIRMA publishes a report on the discovery of the Altair ransomware.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
CyberNetSec.io uses automation to assist source monitoring, deduplication, observable extraction, and structured intelligence generation. Published analysis follows human-defined editorial standards and adds defensive context including MITRE ATT&CK, D3FEND, STIX, and Sigma where applicable. Read our editorial policy.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats
Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.