Honeywell Report: 87% of Maritime Orgs Hit By Cyberattacks

87% of Maritime Firms Hit by Cyberattacks in Past Year: Report

INFORMATIONAL
September 28, 2026
5m read
Industrial Control SystemsThreat IntelligencePolicy and Compliance

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Executive Summary

A new benchmark report from Honeywell paints a stark picture of the cybersecurity posture within the global maritime industry. The 2026 Operational Technology (OT) Cybersecurity Benchmark Report found that an alarming 87% of maritime organizations surveyed experienced at least one significant OT cybersecurity incident in the last 12 months. The report exposes critical deficiencies in fundamental security practices, including asset management and security monitoring, which are leading to significant operational downtime and financial losses. As the maritime sector becomes more digitized and connected, these security gaps represent a major risk to global trade and supply chains.


Threat Overview

The Honeywell report, based on a survey of over 600 leaders across critical infrastructure sectors, highlights a crisis of cybersecurity maturity in the maritime industry. The findings indicate that the sector is both heavily targeted and poorly defended.

Key Findings for the Maritime Sector:

  • Incident Rate: 87% of organizations suffered at least one significant OT cyber incident in the past year.
  • Asset Inventory: Only 21% have a complete inventory of their OT assets. This means nearly 80% of organizations do not have a full understanding of what they need to protect.
  • Security Monitoring: Only one-third (33%) have integrated their OT systems into a centralized Security Operations Center (SOC), and a mere 20% continuously monitor their connected IoT equipment for threats.

This lack of visibility and monitoring capability is a critical failure, as defenders cannot protect what they cannot see.

Technical Analysis

The challenges identified in the report are not about sophisticated zero-day attacks but about a failure to implement foundational cybersecurity controls in an OT environment.

  • Lack of Asset Inventory (M1016 - Vulnerability Scanning): Without a complete asset inventory, it is impossible to implement a patch management program, identify unauthorized devices, or understand the attack surface. This is the first and most fundamental step in any security program.
  • Poor Segmentation and Monitoring (M1030 - Network Segmentation): The low rate of SOC integration means that IT security teams have little to no visibility into the OT network. This IT/OT convergence gap allows threats to move undetected between the two environments. The lack of continuous IoT monitoring is particularly concerning as the use of satellite-connected devices expands the attack surface beyond the physical confines of the vessel.
  • Increased Connectivity: The growing use of IoT and satellite communications in maritime operations, while improving efficiency, also exposes legacy OT systems—which were often designed without security in mind—to the public internet and new attack vectors.

Impact Assessment

The consequences of these security failures are tangible and severe.

  • Operational Downtime: The report found that major OT incidents caused an average of 16.2 hours of downtime. For a large shipping vessel or port, this level of disruption can have massive logistical and financial knock-on effects.
  • Financial Losses: In the most severe cases, Honeywell estimated that downtime could cost up to $500,000 per hour. This includes lost revenue, repair costs, and potential fines.
  • Supply Chain Disruption: The maritime industry is the backbone of global trade. A significant cyberattack on a major port or shipping line, like the NotPetya attack on Maersk in 2017, can cause widespread disruption to global supply chains.
  • Physical Safety: In an OT environment, a cyberattack can have physical consequences, potentially affecting a ship's navigation, propulsion, or safety systems, endangering the crew and the environment.

These findings are consistent with other reports, such as one from NCC Group, which identified the industrial sector as the most targeted by ransomware in August 2026.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

This article is a summary of a report and does not contain specific Indicators of Compromise.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

For maritime organizations looking to improve their security posture, hunting should start with gaining visibility:

Type
other
Value
Passive network scanning tools
Description
Use passive scanning tools designed for OT environments to build an asset inventory without disrupting sensitive systems.
Type
log_source
Value
Firewall logs between IT and OT networks
Description
Analyze logs for any unauthorized communication between the corporate (IT) and operational (OT) networks.
Type
network_traffic_pattern
Value
Outbound traffic from vessel control systems
Description
Any direct internet traffic from critical vessel control systems should be investigated, as these systems should typically be isolated.

Detection & Response

  1. Build an Asset Inventory: The first step is to know what you have. Use a combination of passive and active discovery tools to build a comprehensive inventory of all OT assets. This is a prerequisite for any other security control.
  2. Establish a Baseline: Once you have an inventory, baseline the normal network behavior of your OT environment. What devices talk to each other? What protocols do they use? This baseline is essential for anomaly detection. This is the foundation of D3FEND Network Traffic Analysis (D3-NTA).
  3. Bridge the IT/OT Gap: Integrate OT security monitoring into your existing SOC. This may require specialized tools and training, but it is essential for unified visibility and response.

Mitigation

  1. Network Segmentation: Implement strict segmentation between IT and OT networks. Use firewalls and unidirectional gateways to ensure that a compromise in the IT network cannot spread to critical operational systems.
  2. Secure Remote Access: Implement secure, MFA-protected remote access solutions for any vendors or operators who need to manage OT systems. All access should be logged and monitored.
  3. Vulnerability Management for OT: Develop a risk-based vulnerability management program tailored for OT. Since patching can be difficult, this may involve compensating controls like network isolation or virtual patching with an IPS.

Timeline of Events

1
September 28, 2026
This article was published

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

Given that 80% of maritime organizations lack a complete asset inventory, the first and most crucial step is to gain visibility. Deploying passive network traffic analysis tools designed for OT environments is essential. These tools can build an accurate asset inventory by listening to network traffic without actively probing sensitive systems. Once an inventory is established, the same tools can be used to baseline normal communication patterns. This allows the security team to detect anomalies such as a new device appearing on the network, a programmable logic controller (PLC) communicating with an unauthorized host, or the use of unexpected protocols. This provides the foundational visibility needed to implement any further security controls.

A fundamental principle for securing OT environments is strong network segmentation. The IT network (for business operations) and the OT network (for vessel control systems) must be strictly separated. This can be achieved by implementing firewalls at the IT/OT boundary with a default-deny rule set, only allowing explicitly required and monitored traffic to pass. For higher security needs, a unidirectional gateway can be used to ensure that data can flow from the OT network to the IT network for monitoring purposes, but no traffic can ever flow back into the OT network. This isolation prevents a compromise on the less secure IT network (e.g., from a phishing email) from spreading to and impacting critical vessel operations.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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maritime securityOT securityICS securityHoneywellasset inventorycritical infrastructure

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