CISA, FBI Warn of Active SafePay Ransomware Attacks

Advisory Warns of Prolific SafePay Ransomware Targeting Critical Infrastructure

HIGH
October 21, 2026
5m read
RansomwareThreat ActorCyberattack

Impact Scope

People Affected

Employees and customers of ~600 organizations

Industries Affected

Critical Infrastructure

Geographic Impact

United States (global)

Related Entities

Organizations

CISA FBI U.S. Secret Service

Other

SafePay

Full Report

Executive Summary

On October 20, 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and other international partners released a joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) as part of the #StopRansomware initiative. The advisory details the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the SafePay ransomware group. This group has been highly active since at least August 2024, compromising approximately 600 organizations globally. Their targets span multiple critical infrastructure sectors across North America, South America, Europe, and Australia. The advisory provides defenders with actionable intelligence and mitigation recommendations to combat this prolific threat.

Threat Overview

The SafePay ransomware group has established itself as one of the most active ransomware operations in 2026. The advisory highlights that the group does not rely on sophisticated zero-day exploits but rather on common and effective intrusion methods. Their typical attack lifecycle follows a well-established pattern:

  1. Initial Access: SafePay actors gain entry into victim networks through a variety of methods, including:

    • Password guessing and credential stuffing against exposed services.
    • Exploiting known, unpatched vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems like VPNs and remote desktop protocol (RDP).
    • Phishing campaigns designed to steal user credentials.
  2. Persistence and Lateral Movement: Once inside, the actors create new user accounts or hijack existing ones to maintain access. They then use legitimate administrative tools (living-off-the-land techniques) to move laterally across the network, escalating privileges and identifying high-value data.

  3. Defense Evasion: Before deploying the ransomware, the group attempts to disable or uninstall security software on endpoints to avoid detection.

  4. Impact: The final stage involves encrypting files across the network and deploying a ransom note demanding payment for a decryptor.

Technical Analysis

While the advisory does not list specific IOCs, it details the group's TTPs, which map to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Impact Assessment

The SafePay group has demonstrated its ability to impact a wide range of organizations, including those in critical infrastructure. With approximately 600 victims in just over two years, the operational tempo of the group is high. A successful attack results in significant business disruption, financial costs associated with recovery and potential ransom payments, reputational damage, and potential regulatory scrutiny. The targeting of critical infrastructure raises concerns about public safety and the stability of essential services.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

The source articles do not contain specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) such as file hashes, domains, or IP addresses.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

Based on the described TTPs, security teams can hunt for the following generic but relevant patterns:

Type
event_id
Value
4625
Description
Monitor for high volumes of Windows Event ID 4625 (An account failed to log on), which can indicate password guessing or spraying attacks.
Type
log_source
Value
VPN Logs
Description
Look for successful logins from unusual geographic locations or multiple failed login attempts followed by a success from a single IP.
Type
process_name
Value
vssadmin.exe
Description
Monitor for the execution of vssadmin.exe delete shadows, a common ransomware precursor to prevent recovery.
Type
command_line_pattern
Value
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
Description
An alternative command to delete volume shadow copies.

Detection & Response

  • Log Monitoring: Collect and analyze authentication logs from domain controllers, VPNs, and other internet-facing systems. Alert on brute-force attempts and impossible travel scenarios. Reference D3FEND technique Authentication Event Thresholding.
  • Endpoint Detection: Deploy EDR to detect common ransomware behaviors, such as the disabling of security tools, deletion of volume shadow copies, and rapid file modification/encryption. Reference D3FEND technique File Content Rules.
  • Network Segmentation: Monitor traffic between network segments. A workstation attempting to connect to a domain controller via RDP could be a sign of lateral movement and should be investigated.

Mitigation

The advisory provides several key mitigation strategies to defend against SafePay and other ransomware threats:

  1. Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all services, especially for remote access (VPNs), privileged accounts, and email. This is one of the most effective controls against credential-based attacks. Reference D3FEND Hardening technique Multi-factor Authentication.
  2. Prioritize Vulnerability Patching: Maintain a rigorous patch management program, prioritizing known exploited vulnerabilities, particularly on internet-facing systems. Reference D3FEND Hardening technique Software Update.
  3. Maintain and Test Backups: Keep multiple copies of data backups, with at least one copy stored offline and immutable. Regularly test backup and restoration procedures to ensure they work in an emergency.
  4. Segment Networks: Implement network segmentation to separate critical systems from the general corporate network. This can contain a ransomware infection and prevent it from spreading to high-value assets.
  5. User Training: Conduct regular security awareness training to educate users on how to identify and report phishing attempts.

Timeline of Events

1
August 1, 2024
SafePay ransomware group begins its operations.
2
October 20, 2026
CISA, FBI, and partners release a joint cybersecurity advisory on SafePay.
3
October 21, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Enforce MFA on all accounts, especially for remote access and administrative privileges, to mitigate credential theft.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Prioritize patching of known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems to block a key initial access vector.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Segment the network to contain ransomware spread and prevent attackers from moving from workstations to critical servers.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Train employees to recognize and report phishing attempts, a common initial access method for ransomware groups.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The most effective countermeasure against the credential-based initial access methods of SafePay is the ubiquitous enforcement of phishing-resistant Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). This control must be applied to all user accounts, without exception. Priority should be given to: 1) Remote access solutions like VPNs and RDP gateways. 2) All administrative and privileged accounts. 3) Cloud services, including email and collaboration platforms. By requiring a second factor for authentication, MFA effectively neutralizes the threat of password guessing, credential stuffing, and basic phishing, which are the primary ways SafePay gains its initial foothold. Organizations should move away from SMS-based MFA towards more secure methods like FIDO2 security keys or authenticator apps.

To limit the blast radius of a potential SafePay ransomware attack, organizations must implement robust network segmentation and isolation. This involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated zones based on business function and trust levels. For example, critical servers (like domain controllers and database servers) should be on a separate network segment from the general user workstation VLAN. Firewall rules between these segments should follow a default-deny policy, only allowing required traffic on specific ports and protocols. This strategy directly counters the threat actor's ability to move laterally using tools like RDP. If an initial workstation is compromised, segmentation can prevent the ransomware from spreading to the entire enterprise, containing the incident to a smaller, more manageable scope.

A critical component of ransomware resilience is the ability to restore encrypted data without paying the ransom. This requires a well-architected backup and recovery strategy. Organizations must follow the 3-2-1 rule: maintain at least three copies of data, on two different media types, with at least one copy stored offline and immutable. 'Offline' can mean air-gapped tapes or logically isolated cloud storage with object lock/immutability enabled. It is crucial to regularly test the restoration process to ensure backups are viable and that recovery time objectives (RTOs) can be met. Since SafePay actively disables security tools and deletes shadow copies, relying solely on local backups is insufficient. A tested, offline backup is the ultimate safety net against a destructive ransomware attack.

Timeline of Events

1
August 1, 2024

SafePay ransomware group begins its operations.

2
October 20, 2026

CISA, FBI, and partners release a joint cybersecurity advisory on SafePay.

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

RansomwareSafePayCISAFBICritical InfrastructureStopRansomware

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