JetBrains has released an urgent security update to address a critical unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in its TeamCity On-Premises CI/CD platform. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-63077, has a CVSS score of 9.8 and affects all versions of the self-hosted product. An attacker with HTTP(S) access to a vulnerable server can exploit a flaw in the agent polling protocol to completely bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands with the permissions of the TeamCity server process. This poses a catastrophic risk to software development pipelines, potentially allowing attackers to steal source code, inject malicious code into build artifacts, and launch widespread supply chain attacks. JetBrains has released patched versions and a security plugin and strongly advises all on-premises customers to update immediately.
The vulnerability exists in the way TeamCity servers handle requests from build agents. The flaw is located in the agent polling protocol endpoint. By sending a specially crafted request to this endpoint, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can circumvent all security checks. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the TeamCity server. The commands run with the same privileges as the TeamCity server process, which is often a highly privileged account.
A successful exploit gives an attacker full control over the TeamCity server, which is a 'crown jewel' asset in any software development organization. The potential for follow-on supply chain attacks is extremely high.
Patched Versions:
2025.11.72026.1.3For users unable to upgrade immediately, a security patch plugin is available for TeamCity versions 2017.1 and newer. TeamCity Cloud instances have already been patched by JetBrains and are not vulnerable.
At the time of disclosure on July 27, 2026, JetBrains was not aware of any public exploits or in-the-wild exploitation. However, given the critical nature of the flaw (unauthenticated RCE with a 9.8 CVSS score) and the high value of TeamCity servers as targets, it is highly probable that threat actors will rapidly develop and deploy exploits. Organizations should assume exploitation is imminent.
A compromise of a TeamCity server is a worst-case scenario for a development organization. The impact includes:
No specific Indicators of Compromise were mentioned in the source articles.
Security teams should hunt for the following patterns to identify potential exploitation:
/app/rest/agents/ or similar paths, especially from IP addresses that are not known build agents.java.exe) spawning unexpected child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, /bin/bash, curl, or wget. This is a strong indicator of RCE..xml) or the creation of suspicious executable files.2025.11.7 or 2026.1.3). This is an urgent requirement. This aligns with M1051 - Update Software.Immediately upgrade TeamCity to a patched version or apply the security plugin.
Restrict network access to the TeamCity server, ensuring it is not exposed to the public internet.
Use a WAF to filter traffic to the TeamCity server and apply virtual patching rules.
Security researcher Antoni Tremblay privately discloses the vulnerability to JetBrains.
JetBrains releases a security advisory and patches for CVE-2026-63077.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
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