Cybersecurity firm Guardz has released its 2026 State of MSP Threat Report, revealing that threat actors are leveraging Artificial Intelligence to dramatically increase the speed and scale of attacks against Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and their Small and Medium-sized Business (SMB) customers. The report finds that an alarming nine out of ten SMBs have compromised users. Key findings include a significant increase in financial losses from Business Email Compromise (BEC) and the widespread abuse of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect, which has become the primary vector for supply chain attacks targeting MSPs.
The report paints a picture of an evolving threat landscape where AI allows attackers to operate at a pace that outstrips human-led security teams. The financial impact is stark: confirmed losses from BEC incidents now range from $140,000 to $1.5 million, a huge jump from the $40,000 average in early 2025.
A critical and growing threat is the abuse of RMM tools. These legitimate tools, used by MSPs to manage client systems, are being turned into weapons by attackers. The report found that RMM tool abuse was the single largest endpoint threat campaign, accounting for 26% of all detections. Attackers were observed using tools such as ScreenConnect, AteraAgent, and MeshAgent to gain unauthorized, persistent access to client networks. This represents a severe supply chain attack vector, as compromising a single MSP's RMM tool can grant an attacker a foothold in the networks of hundreds or thousands of downstream clients.
Attackers are leveraging AI and legitimate tools to bypass traditional defenses and achieve their objectives.
T1219 - Remote Access Software).T1078 - Valid Accounts). From there, they can push malicious scripts or gain interactive access to any client managed by that MSP (T1021.004 - Remote Services: SSH).The impact on MSPs and SMBs is profound. For SMBs, a breach can be an existential threat. For MSPs, a supply chain compromise can destroy their reputation and business. The widespread nature of the problem (9 in 10 SMBs with compromised users) indicates a systemic weakness in the ecosystem. Guardz's threat hunting team predicts that these MSP-focused supply chain attacks will intensify in the second half of 2026. The report also highlights the necessity of AI in defense, noting that AI-driven detection achieved a 92.4% accuracy rate, far surpassing the 67% for human analysts alone.
No specific Indicators of Compromise were provided in the source articles.
MSPs and their clients should hunt for signs of RMM tool abuse:
ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe) should not be spawning processes like mimikatz.exe or powershell -enc.Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all MSP administrative accounts and RMM platforms.
Continuously audit RMM logs for suspicious activity, such as off-hours access or commands.
Use EDR to detect and block malicious behaviors, even when they originate from a trusted RMM process.
Apply the principle of least privilege to RMM access, ensuring technicians only have the access they need.
MSPs must treat their RMM platform logs as a critical source of security telemetry. By implementing Resource Access Pattern Analysis, an MSP can baseline normal administrative behavior. This involves analyzing which technicians access which clients, at what times, and from which IP addresses. The system can then alert on deviations, such as a technician who normally only services healthcare clients suddenly accessing a financial client, or an RMM session being initiated at 3 AM from an unrecognized IP. This behavioral approach is essential for detecting the abuse of legitimate credentials and tools like ScreenConnect.
Mandatory, phishing-resistant Multi-factor Authentication is the single most important control for protecting RMM platforms. MSPs should disable all legacy authentication methods and enforce the use of FIDO2 security keys or similar strong authenticators for all administrative staff. This control directly mitigates the risk of credential theft via phishing, which is a primary entry vector for attackers. By making it impossible for an attacker to log in with just a stolen password, the entire supply chain attack chain can be broken at the first step.
On the client endpoint, EDR tools must be configured to perform deep process analysis on the RMM agent itself (e.g., ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe). While the agent is a trusted process, its child processes are not. EDR rules should be created to alert on or block the RMM agent from spawning suspicious child processes like powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, or any known credential dumping tools. This 'parent-child process relationship' analysis is key to detecting 'Living Off the Land' attacks where the attacker is using the RMM tool's own functionality to execute malicious commands.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.