Millions of customers
The Everest ransomware group, a threat actor with reported links to Russia, has published 343 GB of data allegedly exfiltrated from the systems of Under Armour. The data was leaked on the group's dark web site on January 24, 2026, after the apparel company presumably refused to pay an extortion demand. The leaked data is said to contain a significant volume of personally identifiable information (PII) belonging to millions of Under Armour customers. This incident is a classic example of the double extortion model, where the threat of public data exposure is used as the primary lever for payment, regardless of whether systems were encrypted. The breach poses a significant risk of fraud and identity theft for the affected customers.
This incident highlights the continued targeting of large, consumer-facing brands by ransomware groups. These organizations are attractive targets due to the vast amounts of customer data they hold, which can be monetized or used for extortion.
While the specific vector for the Under Armour breach is unknown, Everest and similar groups use a variety of TTPs to gain access and exfiltrate data.
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application: Exploiting vulnerabilities in web servers, VPNs, or other internet-facing systems is a common entry point.T1078 - Valid Accounts: Using credentials purchased from dark web markets or obtained via phishing/infostealers.T1567.002 - Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Using tools like rclone to transfer large volumes of stolen data to attacker-controlled cloud storage accounts.T1003 - OS Credential Dumping: Dumping credentials from memory to escalate privileges and move laterally to access data servers.T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact: While the focus here is the leak, Everest is a ransomware group and may have also encrypted systems.The public release of 343 GB of customer data could have devastating consequences for Under Armour and its customers:
To detect data exfiltration on this scale, security teams should monitor for:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| network_traffic_pattern | Sustained, high-volume egress traffic | A continuous, large data transfer from a database or file server to an external IP over hours or days is a major red flag. |
| command_line_pattern | tar -czf or zip -r |
Use of archiving commands on production servers to package large amounts of data before exfiltration. |
| process_name | rclone.exe, megasync.exe |
Execution of popular cloud sync tools on servers where they have no business purpose. |
| log_source | Database Audit Logs | A high volume of read operations from a single service account across multiple tables could indicate data dumping. |
D3-UDTA: User Data Transfer Analysis is designed for this purpose.Implement strict egress filtering to prevent large-scale data exfiltration.
Apply the principle of least privilege to data stores to limit what an attacker can access with a compromised account.
To combat the threat of massive data exfiltration as seen in the Under Armour breach, organizations must implement User Data Transfer Analysis. This involves using a combination of Network Detection and Response (NDR) and Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools to baseline normal data transfer patterns and detect significant deviations. For a retail company like Under Armour, this means establishing what a normal day of data flow from customer databases looks like. An alert should be triggered if the system detects a transfer of 343 GB of data to an unknown external IP address over a 24-hour period, as this is a massive anomaly. The analysis should focus on both volume and destination, prioritizing alerts for large transfers to non-corporate cloud services or unfamiliar autonomous systems.
Implement a strict outbound traffic filtering policy on the firewall and network segments protecting critical data, such as Under Armour's customer databases. By default, these servers should not have open access to the internet. All outbound connections should be denied unless there is an explicit and documented business need. This 'default-deny' stance makes it significantly harder for attackers to exfiltrate data. Even if they compromise the server, their malware or tools like rclone will be unable to connect to their external C2 or cloud storage buckets. This control effectively contains the breach and prevents the data leak, which is the primary point of leverage for extortion groups like Everest.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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