Everest Ransomware Group Claims Attack on Japanese Manufacturer Hosokawa Micron

Everest Ransomware Lists Japanese Tech Firm Hosokawa Micron as Victim, Threatens to Leak 30 GB of Data

HIGH
February 6, 2026
5m read
RansomwareThreat ActorCyberattack

Impact Scope

Affected Companies

Hosokawa Micron Corporation

Industries Affected

Manufacturing

Geographic Impact

Japan (national)

Related Entities

Threat Actors

Organizations

Other

Hosokawa Micron Corporation

Full Report

Executive Summary

The Everest ransomware group has publicly claimed a successful cyberattack on Hosokawa Micron Corporation, a prominent Japanese manufacturer specializing in powder and particle processing technology. In a post on their data leak site, the group announced they had exfiltrated approximately 30 GB of confidential and sensitive data. The threat actors are employing a double-extortion tactic, threatening to publish the stolen data unless a ransom is paid. This attack is consistent with Everest's known modus operandi, which includes targeting industrial and financial sectors globally. The group is also a known initial access broker (IAB), suggesting this compromise could also lead to further attacks by other threat groups who might purchase the access.


Threat Overview

  • Threat Actor: Everest is a financially motivated cybercrime group known for its ransomware operations and for selling access to compromised networks. Their primary tactic is double extortion.
  • Victim: Hosokawa Micron Corporation, a global leader in industrial technology for pharmaceutical, food, and plastics industries, headquartered in Japan.
  • Attack Type: This is a classic ransomware attack involving both data encryption and data exfiltration (T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact and T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel).
  • Extortion: The group has threatened to leak 30 GB of stolen data, which likely includes intellectual property, financial records, and employee information, to pressure the company into payment.

According to analysis by CYFIRMA, the Everest group has been expanding its targeting to new sectors and geographies. While their primary focus has been on the United States, Italy, Germany, the UK, and the UAE, this attack shows their continued reach into the Asia-Pacific region.


Technical Analysis

While the specific TTPs for this attack are not detailed, Everest's typical attack chain involves several common techniques:

  1. Initial Access: Everest often gains initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities in public-facing devices, such as VPNs and firewalls (T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application), or through stolen credentials purchased from other criminals.
  2. Persistence and Discovery: Once inside, the group establishes persistence and conducts network reconnaissance to identify high-value targets like domain controllers, file servers, and backup systems.
  3. Credential Access: They use tools like Mimikatz to dump credentials and escalate privileges, allowing them to move laterally across the network (T1003 - OS Credential Dumping).
  4. Data Exfiltration: Before deploying the ransomware, the group exfiltrates large volumes of sensitive data to their own servers. This data becomes the leverage for the second part of their extortion.
  5. Impact: Finally, they deploy the Everest ransomware payload across the network, encrypting servers and workstations to cause maximum disruption.

Impact Assessment

The impact on a manufacturing company like Hosokawa Micron can be devastating.

  • Intellectual Property Theft: The exfiltration of 30 GB of data could include proprietary designs, chemical formulas, and manufacturing processes, the loss of which could severely damage the company's competitive advantage.
  • Operational Downtime: Encryption of systems controlling manufacturing processes and enterprise resource planning (ERP) can halt production, leading to significant financial losses and an inability to fulfill customer orders.
  • Reputational Damage: A public breach can damage the company's reputation with its partners and customers in the sensitive pharmaceutical and food industries.
  • Supply Chain Implications: As a key technology supplier, downtime at Hosokawa Micron could have a ripple effect on its customers who rely on their equipment and services.
  • Financial Loss: The company faces costs from the ransom demand, incident response, recovery efforts, and potential regulatory fines.

IOCs

No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were provided in the source articles.


Detection & Response

Detecting Everest's activity before they deploy ransomware is crucial.

  1. Monitor for Lateral Movement: Use an EDR solution to monitor for signs of lateral movement, such as the use of PsExec or RDP connections between unusual hosts. This is an application of D3-RAPA: Resource Access Pattern Analysis.
  2. Credential Dumping Detection: Create alerts for the execution of tools like Mimikatz or access to the LSASS process memory, which are strong indicators of credential theft attempts.
  3. Data Exfiltration Alerts: Monitor network traffic for large, unexpected data uploads from internal servers to external IP addresses. Set up alerts for data transfers that exceed normal baselines.

Mitigation

Defending against ransomware groups like Everest requires a defense-in-depth strategy.

  • Patch Public-Facing Systems: Aggressively patch all internet-facing devices, especially VPNs and firewalls, to close the initial access vectors commonly used by Everest. This aligns with M1051 - Update Software.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA on all remote access services and for all privileged accounts to protect against the use of stolen credentials (M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication).
  • Immutable Backups: Maintain offline, air-gapped, or immutable backups of all critical data. This is the most effective way to recover from the encryption portion of the attack without paying a ransom (M1053 - Data Backup).
  • Network Segmentation: Segment the network to prevent attackers from moving easily from a compromised workstation to critical manufacturing systems or domain controllers (M1030 - Network Segmentation).

Timeline of Events

1
February 6, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Patch internet-facing systems to prevent initial access via exploitation.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Maintain immutable backups to ensure recovery from the encryption attack.

Enforce MFA on all remote access points to protect against stolen credential usage.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The core of Everest's double-extortion model is data exfiltration. Detecting and blocking this activity is key to reducing their leverage. Organizations, especially manufacturers like Hosokawa Micron with valuable IP, should implement strict Outbound Traffic Filtering. This involves configuring perimeter firewalls to deny all outbound traffic by default and only allowing connections to known-good destinations on expected ports. More importantly, deploy a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solution or a next-gen firewall with content inspection capabilities to monitor for large volumes of data being uploaded from critical internal servers to external destinations. Alerting on any transfer over a certain threshold (e.g., 1 GB in an hour) can provide an early warning of an exfiltration attempt in progress, allowing the security team to intervene before 30 GB of data leaves the network.

To contain ransomware groups like Everest, it's crucial to limit their ability to move laterally and escalate privileges. Enforcing the principle of least privilege through strict User Account Permissions is a fundamental control. Domain user accounts should not have local administrator rights on workstations. Administrative accounts used for managing servers and domain controllers should be separate, highly privileged accounts that are never used for daily activities like reading email or browsing the web. By segmenting privileges, an attacker who compromises a standard user account via phishing will be contained to that single workstation. They will be unable to easily dump credentials from LSASS or use tools like Mimikatz to escalate privileges and spread to critical servers, effectively stopping the attack chain in its early stages.

Sources & References

Weekly Intelligence Report – 06 February 2026
CYFIRMA (cyfirma.com) February 6, 2026
Everest Ransomware Strikes Hosokawa Micron Group
DeXpose (dexpose.io) February 1, 2026

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

EverestRansomwaredouble extortionmanufacturingHosokawa Micron

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