A new study from Black Book Research indicates a fundamental shift in how European hospital leaders perceive cybersecurity threats. The risk has evolved from being primarily about data theft and privacy breaches to a direct and immediate threat to patient care delivery and safety. The Pre-HIMSS26 Europe Copenhagen Cybersecurity Demand Pulse Survey found that an overwhelming 82% of 284 hospital executives rate their concern about cyberattacks as "very high or extreme." This heightened awareness is reshaping cybersecurity investment priorities, moving from basic prevention to ensuring clinical and operational resilience during and after an attack.
The survey highlights a critical disconnect between perceived risk and operational readiness. While 74% of hospital leaders believe a major cyber event is likely this year, their confidence in safely managing patient care during extended downtime is alarmingly low.
This "resilience gap" is the central finding of the report. It suggests that while awareness of the threat is high, the practical ability to withstand a prolonged cyberattack, such as a ransomware incident that locks up critical systems for days or weeks, is severely lacking. This has profound implications for patient safety, as disruptions to medication administration, lab result access, and surgical planning can have life-threatening consequences.
The study's findings are applicable to hospitals and health systems across Europe. The report notes that attackers are specifically targeting the unique pressures of this sector, which include:
In response to this shifting threat landscape, the survey reveals a change in cybersecurity spending priorities. Hospitals are moving beyond basic compliance and breach prevention to focus on technologies and strategies that support clinical continuity. Key investment areas now include:
The direct impact of a cyberattack on patient care cannot be overstated. When EHRs, imaging systems (PACS), and lab information systems (LIS) are unavailable, hospitals are forced to revert to manual, paper-based processes. This leads to:
The study confirms that the primary damage from a modern healthcare cyberattack is not the stolen data, but the disruption to the core mission of providing care.
Based on the study's findings, hospital boards and health technology leaders should take the following actions:
Implement and regularly test a comprehensive data backup and recovery plan. Backups should be immutable and stored offline or on a segmented network.
Restrict administrative privileges and segment networks to limit the blast radius of a ransomware attack.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Train clinical and administrative staff on business continuity and downtime procedures to ensure they can operate safely during a cyber incident.
Given the study's finding that only 14% of hospitals are confident in operating after a 72-hour outage, a robust and tested Data Backup strategy is paramount. Hospitals must move beyond simple nightly backups. They should implement the 3-2-1 backup rule: three copies of data, on two different media types, with one copy off-site. For ransomware resilience, this 'off-site' copy must be either offline (air-gapped) or immutable (write-once, read-many). This prevents attackers who gain network access from deleting or encrypting the backups. Most importantly, recovery procedures must be tested quarterly, at minimum. This includes not just restoring data, but restoring entire critical systems like the EHR, PACS, and LIS in a test environment to validate RTOs (Recovery Time Objectives). The goal is to be able to restore service within the 24-hour window where clinical confidence remains high, directly addressing the resilience gap identified in the Black Book report.
To counter the threat of attacks spreading across nationally connected health networks and aging infrastructure, hospitals must prioritize Network Isolation and segmentation. This involves dividing the hospital's network into smaller, isolated zones. For example, critical medical devices (like infusion pumps and MRI machines) should be on a separate network segment from the general corporate IT network (used for email and web browsing). The EHR system should reside in its own protected enclave. Access between these segments should be controlled by strict firewall rules, following a principle of least privilege. This 'zero-trust' approach contains the damage from a breach. If a phishing attack compromises a workstation on the corporate network, segmentation prevents the attacker from easily moving laterally to the medical device network or the EHR servers. This directly mitigates the risk of an IT incident becoming a patient care crisis, which is the core concern highlighted by the European hospital leaders.
The study's most alarming statistic is the collapse in operational confidence after 24 hours. This points to a failure in Downtime Planning. IT and clinical leadership must collaborate to create and drill comprehensive downtime procedures. This goes beyond IT's disaster recovery plan. It must include clinical workflows: How will nurses document medication administration on paper? How will the lab communicate critical results to the emergency department? How will surgeons access pre-op imaging? These paper-based workflows must be printed and stored in physical 'downtime kits' on every ward. Furthermore, hospitals should invest in 'read-only' downtime viewers. These are simple, secure appliances that hold a recent, read-only copy of the EHR. During an attack, clinicians can use these viewers to safely access patient histories, allergies, and medication lists, drastically reducing the risk of medical errors that occur when working from incomplete paper records. Regular, unannounced downtime drills are essential to ensure staff are prepared and plans are effective.
Black Book Research releases the Pre-HIMSS26 Europe Copenhagen Cybersecurity Demand Pulse Survey.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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