Metabase Battles CVSS 10.0 Zero-Day Flaw Under Active Exploit

Metabase Zero-Day (CVSS 10.0) Actively Exploited for Admin Access

CRITICAL
August 9, 2026
4m read
VulnerabilityCyberattackData Breach

Impact Scope

Affected Companies

FrameworkTally

Industries Affected

TechnologyManufacturing

Related Entities

Products & Tech

Other

CVE Identifiers

Not Assigned
CRITICAL
CVSS:10

Full Report

Executive Summary

Metabase, an open-source business intelligence (BI) platform, is grappling with a critical zero-day vulnerability that is being actively exploited in the wild. The flaw is an unauthenticated SQL injection with a CVSS score of 10.0, the highest possible severity. It allows a remote attacker to gain complete administrator privileges on a vulnerable Metabase instance without any prior authentication. The attack vector is the /api/session/reset_password endpoint. Attackers are leveraging this access to steal credentials for connected databases and exfiltrate sensitive corporate and customer data. Metabase has released patches for all affected versions and is strongly urging all self-hosted customers to upgrade immediately. Several organizations, including Framework and Tally, have already confirmed they were compromised via this vulnerability.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability is a classic, yet highly impactful, unauthenticated SQL injection. It exists in the code responsible for handling password reset requests.

  • Vulnerability Type: Unauthenticated SQL Injection
  • Attack Vector: Network
  • Prerequisites: Access to the Metabase instance's web interface.
  • Affected Endpoint: /api/session/reset_password

An attacker can send a specially crafted request to this endpoint, injecting malicious SQL commands into the token parameter of the password reset process. Because the application fails to properly sanitize this input before using it in a database query, the attacker's SQL code is executed by the Metabase application's backend database. This allows the attacker to manipulate the password reset process for any user, including the administrator account, and gain control of the instance.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects multiple versions of the self-hosted Metabase product. Metabase Cloud instances were patched by the company.

  • Affected Versions:
    • x.58.0 and above
  • Patched Versions:
    • x.58.24
    • x.59.21
    • x.60.17
    • x.61.11
    • x.62.9
    • x.63.5

Organizations running any self-hosted version of Metabase from x.58.0 onwards should assume they are vulnerable and take immediate action.

Exploitation Status

This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild as a zero-day. Metabase themselves detected the attacks against their own cloud platform around August 3, 2026. The public disclosure on August 8, 2026, came after patches were made available. The ease of exploitation and the high value of the potential data access mean that widespread automated scanning and exploitation is highly likely.

Once an attacker gains administrator access, they can perform a number of malicious actions:

  1. Steal Database Credentials: Access the Metabase admin settings to view and copy connection strings for all configured databases.
  2. Exfiltrate Data: Use the BI tool's legitimate functionality to query and export sensitive data from all connected databases.
  3. Maintain Persistence: Create new administrator accounts or modify system settings.

Impact Assessment

The impact of this vulnerability is catastrophic. A CVSS score of 10.0 reflects the worst-case scenario: an unauthenticated, remote attacker can gain full control of the application and, by extension, gain read access to potentially all data the organization analyzes. For companies like Framework and Tally, this led to the exposure of customer PII. For others, it could mean the theft of financial data, intellectual property, or strategic business intelligence. The reputational damage and potential regulatory fines (e.g., under GDPR or CCPA) are also significant.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

No specific IP addresses, domains, or file hashes were provided in the source articles.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

The following patterns may help identify vulnerable or compromised systems:

Type
url_pattern
Value
/api/session/reset_password
Description
Requests to this endpoint, especially those with unusual or long token parameters, should be heavily scrutinized.
Type
log_source
Value
Web server access logs (Nginx, Apache, etc.)
Description
Look for POST requests to the vulnerable endpoint from unknown or suspicious IP addresses.
Type
log_source
Value
Metabase application logs
Description
Audit for unexpected password resets, particularly for administrator accounts, or for newly created admin users.
Type
log_source
Value
Database audit logs
Description
Monitor for queries originating from the Metabase service account that appear unusual, such as selecting from system tables or exporting large datasets.

Detection Methods

Security teams should take the following steps to detect potential compromise:

  1. Scan Web Logs: Immediately search all historical web server and load balancer logs for POST requests to /api/session/reset_password. Analyze the source IP addresses and user agents for any suspicious patterns.
  2. Audit Metabase Users: Log into your Metabase instance and check for any unfamiliar administrator accounts. Review the audit log for all user creations and permission changes.
  3. Review Metabase Logs: Examine application logs for errors related to the password reset function or for successful password changes for admin accounts that were not initiated by your team.
  4. Monitor Database Activity: Check the logs of your connected data warehouses and databases for any unusual queries originating from the Metabase user account, especially queries that run at odd hours or access an unusually large number of tables or rows.

For detection, D3FEND's Network Traffic Analysis (D3-NTA) and Log Analysis are critical.

Remediation Steps

  1. Patch Immediately: The most critical step is to upgrade your Metabase instance to a patched version as listed above. This is the only way to fully remediate the vulnerability.
  2. Temporary Mitigation: If patching is not immediately possible, block all external access to the /api/session/reset_password endpoint at your web application firewall (WAF) or reverse proxy. This is a temporary measure and should not be considered a substitute for patching.
  3. Assume Compromise: If you were running a vulnerable version, you must assume you have been compromised. Initiate your incident response plan.
  4. Rotate All Credentials: After patching, rotate the credentials for ALL databases and data sources connected to Metabase. Attackers likely stole the old credentials.
  5. Review for Persistence: Thoroughly audit all users, settings, and configurations within Metabase to ensure attackers have not left backdoors.

Timeline of Events

1
August 3, 2026
Metabase discovers attacks against its own cloud platform exploiting the zero-day.
2
August 8, 2026
Metabase publicly discloses the vulnerability and the availability of patches.
3
August 9, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

The primary and most effective mitigation is to apply the security patches provided by Metabase.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

As a temporary measure, block access to the vulnerable endpoint at the network edge (WAF/reverse proxy).

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Audit

M1047enterprise

Review application, web server, and database logs for signs of compromise.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

After patching, immediately rotate all credentials stored in or connected to Metabase.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The most critical and immediate action is to apply the security patches released by Metabase. Given that this is a CVSS 10.0 vulnerability under active, widespread exploitation, patching should be treated as an emergency. Organizations must identify all self-hosted Metabase instances within their environment, including shadow IT deployments, and upgrade them to a patched version (x.58.24, x.59.21, x.60.17, x.61.11, x.62.9, or x.63.5). Use asset inventory systems and network scanning to locate all instances. The update process should be followed by a verification step to confirm the new version is running and the instance is functional. Deferring this action carries an unacceptable level of risk of complete system and data compromise.

As a temporary emergency mitigation while planning the patch deployment, or for defense-in-depth, use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or reverse proxy to block all POST requests to the /api/session/reset_password endpoint. This can disrupt the known public exploit chain. A more robust WAF rule could be created to inspect the token parameter for SQL injection patterns. However, this should not be relied upon as a primary defense, as attackers may find ways to bypass WAF rules. This filtering provides a crucial window of time to perform the necessary software updates in a more controlled manner, but it does not fix the underlying vulnerability. Once patched, the WAF rule can be removed or kept for virtual patching.

In the context of the Metabase application, this involves continuous monitoring of the application's user accounts. Security teams must assume compromise and actively hunt for unauthorized accounts. This can be done by regularly querying the Metabase core_user table in its backend database and comparing the list of users, especially those with administrator privileges, against a known-good list of authorized admins. Automated scripts can perform this check and alert on any discrepancies, such as the creation of a new user with is_superuser=true. This is a critical incident response and hunting activity to detect if an attacker has already used the exploit to establish persistence within the application itself.

Timeline of Events

1
August 3, 2026

Metabase discovers attacks against its own cloud platform exploiting the zero-day.

2
August 8, 2026

Metabase publicly discloses the vulnerability and the availability of patches.

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

MetabaseZero-DaySQL InjectionCVSS 10.0Data BreachBusiness Intelligence

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