A critical vulnerability has been discovered and patched in kaniko, a widely-used open-source tool from Google for building container images from a Dockerfile within a container or Kubernetes cluster. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-105769, has a CVSS score of 9.3, indicating its extreme severity. The vulnerability resides in a faulty regular expression used for validating Azure registry hosts, which can be exploited to steal Azure access tokens during the image build process. This could grant an attacker extensive access to a victim's cloud environment. A patch has been released, and immediate upgrade is strongly recommended.
The vulnerability is caused by an unanchored regular expression that kaniko uses to identify Azure container registry hostnames. An attacker can craft a Dockerfile that references a base image from a malicious registry with a lookalike hostname (e.g., attacker.com/my.azurecr.io/base-image).
When kaniko attempts to pull this base image, the flawed regex incorrectly identifies the host as a legitimate Azure registry. As a result, kaniko attaches the build environment's Azure authentication token to the request it sends to the attacker's server. The attacker captures this token, which can then be used to access the victim's Azure resources.
CVE-2026-105769kaniko tool prior to 1.25.20 are affected.This vulnerability is particularly dangerous in CI/CD environments where automated builds are performed on Dockerfiles from various sources, including public or third-party repositories. A compromised build pipeline could lead to the theft of highly privileged credentials.
There is no public information about active exploitation in the wild at this time. However, given the simplicity of the exploit and the high value of the potential reward (cloud credentials), it is highly likely that threat actors will attempt to leverage this vulnerability against unpatched systems.
The impact of a successful exploit is catastrophic. The stolen Azure access token could have permissions to manage virtual machines, access and exfiltrate data from storage accounts, modify network configurations, and deploy malicious resources within the victim's Azure subscription. In a worst-case scenario, this could lead to a full compromise of an organization's cloud infrastructure, resulting in a major data breach, significant financial loss, and widespread operational disruption.
The following patterns may help identify vulnerable systems or exploitation attempts:
command_line_pattern/kaniko/executor --dockerfile=...kaniko executor is being run.log_sourcenetwork_traffic_patternkaniko pod to a domain not on your allowlist of trusted registries should be investigated.log_sourcekaniko older than version 1.25.20.kaniko to connect to an unauthorized domain should trigger a high-priority alert. This is an application of D3FEND's Outbound Traffic Filtering (D3-OTF).kaniko to version 1.25.20 or later. This should be treated as an emergency change in all CI/CD environments. This is a direct application of D3FEND's Software Update (D3-SU).kaniko build environments, especially if you have built Dockerfiles from untrusted sources.Upgrading kaniko to the patched version is the most direct and effective mitigation.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Implement strict egress filtering in build environments to only allow connections to trusted container registries.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.