ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After M365 Tenant Compromise

ConnectWise Disables Cloud Services After Supply Chain Attack on M365

CRITICAL
October 19, 2026
October 26, 2026
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Supply Chain AttackCloud SecurityCyberattack

Related Entities(initial)

Organizations

ConnectWiseHuntressMicrosoft

Products & Tech

Microsoft 365SkyKick

Other

Managed Service Provider

Full Report(when first published)

Executive Summary

On October 17, 2026, IT management software provider ConnectWise suspended its Cloud Backup services in response to a significant supply chain attack. Threat actors exploited a compromised application credential associated with the ConnectWise Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 tenants. This allowed the attackers to bypass standard user authentication, including MFA, and inherit the application's broad permissions to access sensitive data. The incident has impacted Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and their downstream customers, prompting ConnectWise to disable multiple application identities to contain the threat. The initial access vector for the credential compromise remains under investigation.

Threat Overview

The attack began around October 15, 2026, when an unknown threat actor started using a compromised OAuth application credential for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application (App ID: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). By authenticating as this trusted application, the attackers circumvented user-level security controls and gained access to Microsoft 365 environments with the permissions granted to the app. These permissions often include access to emails, SharePoint, Teams, and other sensitive directory data.

Security firm Huntress reported observing unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants, originating from the IP address 144.172.64.128. The attack is a classic example of abusing the trust model of third-party application integrations in cloud environments, turning a legitimate, highly-privileged application into a powerful attack tool.

Technical Analysis

The attack chain leverages the inherent trust between a Microsoft 365 tenant and its integrated third-party applications. The threat actor's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) include:

  1. Initial Access - Steal Application Access Token (T1528): The attackers obtained the credentials for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application. The method of this initial compromise is currently unknown.
  2. Defense Evasion - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004): By using the legitimate, albeit stolen, application credentials, the attackers' sign-ins appeared as legitimate service-to-service communication, bypassing user-centric defenses like MFA.
  3. Privilege Escalation & Persistence - Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.001): In at least one observed case, the attackers used the initial access to elevate the privileges of a related ConnectWise Cloud Management application to Global Administrator. They then added new client secrets to other applications within the tenant, creating multiple backdoors for persistent access.
  4. Collection - Email Collection (T1114.002): With access to the tenants, the attackers had the capability to access and exfiltrate data from various Microsoft 365 services, including Outlook, SharePoint, and Teams.

This attack highlights the critical risk posed by over-privileged OAuth applications in enterprise environments.

Impact Assessment

The business impact of this supply chain attack is severe. For MSPs, it erodes trust and creates a significant security liability for all their downstream customers. The suspension of Cloud Backup, SaaS Security, and Cloud Management services causes operational disruption, preventing new backups and security management tasks. For affected customers, the breach means potential exposure of all data within their Microsoft 365 environment. Since the attack bypasses user MFA, organizations that believed they were secure are vulnerable. The costs of incident response, forensic analysis, and potential data loss are substantial for all parties involved.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

Type
ip_address_v4
Value
144.172.64.128
Description
Source IP of unauthorized sign-ins observed by Huntress.
Type
other
Value
506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae
Description
Application ID of the compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup application.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

Security teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect related activity:

  • Azure AD Sign-in Logs: Search for all sign-ins (interactive and non-interactive) where the appId is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae and the source IP is not from a known service range.
  • Azure AD Audit Logs: Hunt for privilege escalation activities. Filter for operations like Add-AzureADApplicationOwner, Add service principal credential, or Add owner to application where the initiating user/principal is an application, especially one related to ConnectWise.
  • Anomalous Application Behavior: Look for applications granting themselves or other applications new Application.ReadWrite.All or Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions.

Detection & Response

Defenders should implement the following detection and response strategies:

  1. Audit Application Permissions: Regularly review all applications integrated into your Microsoft 365 tenant, paying close attention to those with high-level permissions like Mail.ReadWrite.All, Files.ReadWrite.All, or Directory.ReadWrite.All. Use Microsoft's built-in tools or third-party solutions to assess application risk.
  2. Monitor Sign-in Logs: Implement SIEM rules to alert on suspicious sign-in patterns for service principals, such as sign-ins from unusual IP addresses, locations, or an impossible travel scenario. This can be achieved through Network Traffic Analysis (D3-NTA).
  3. Track Privilege Changes: Create high-priority alerts for any event where an application elevates its own privileges or modifies the credentials of another application. This is a strong indicator of compromise. This involves Domain Account Monitoring (D3-DAM).
  4. Incident Response Playbook: If a compromised application is detected, the playbook should include steps to immediately disable the application, revoke its credentials and permissions, and initiate a forensic investigation to determine the scope of the breach.

Mitigation

To mitigate the risk of similar attacks, organizations should adopt a defense-in-depth approach to cloud application security:

  1. Least Privilege Principle: When granting consent to third-party applications, only approve the minimum permissions necessary for the application to function. Avoid blanket approvals for highly permissive scopes. This is a form of Application Configuration Hardening (D3-ACH).
  2. Vendor Risk Management: Thoroughly vet the security practices of any third-party vendor before integrating their applications into your environment. This includes reviewing their security certifications and incident response plans.
  3. Conditional Access Policies for Applications: Where possible, apply Conditional Access policies to service principals to restrict access based on IP range or other factors. This can help limit the blast radius if an application credential is compromised.
  4. Regular Audits: Conduct quarterly or semi-annual reviews of all enterprise applications and their permissions. Remove any applications that are no longer in use or have excessive permissions.

Timeline of Events

1
October 15, 2026
Unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 tenants begins.
2
October 17, 2026
ConnectWise confirms unauthorized access and disables seven application identities, suspending Cloud Backup services.
3
October 19, 2026
ConnectWise continues its investigation with no timeline for service restoration.
4
October 19, 2026
This article was published

Article Updates

October 20, 2026

ConnectWise confirms services remain suspended, has reset credentials, and provides more technical details on the OAuth application credential compromise.

ConnectWise has confirmed that its Cloud Backup, SaaS Security, and Cloud Management services remain suspended following the supply chain attack. The company has taken further action by resetting credentials for the compromised multitenant OAuth application. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has also confirmed it is tracking the activity, noting the threat actor likely abused previously granted permissions. Technical analysis now specifies the compromise involved a 'client assertion' within the OAuth 2.0 client credentials flow, allowing attackers to bypass user-level MFA. The incident continues to impact MSPs and their customers, with ongoing efforts to restore operations and mitigate risks.

October 26, 2026

Microsoft attributes ConnectWise supply chain attack, impacting 173 M365 tenants, to threat actor Storm-0940.

New information reveals that Microsoft has attributed the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply chain attack to the threat actor group Storm-0940. This group leveraged a compromised application credential to gain unauthorized access to 173 Microsoft 365 customer and partner environments between October 15-16, 2026. Attackers were observed attempting to establish persistence within compromised tenants by adding new credentials to other trusted applications, a technique identified as T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials). This update reinforces the critical nature of the incident and provides specific threat actor attribution, highlighting the ongoing risk of third-party application compromises in cloud environments.

Timeline of Events

1
October 15, 2026

Unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 tenants begins.

2
October 17, 2026

ConnectWise confirms unauthorized access and disables seven application identities, suspending Cloud Backup services.

3
October 19, 2026

ConnectWise continues its investigation with no timeline for service restoration.

Sources & References(when first published)

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

Cloud SecurityCredential CompromiseMSPMicrosoft 365OAuthSupply Chain Attack

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