On October 17, 2026, IT management software provider ConnectWise suspended its Cloud Backup services in response to a significant supply chain attack. Threat actors exploited a compromised application credential associated with the ConnectWise Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 tenants. This allowed the attackers to bypass standard user authentication, including MFA, and inherit the application's broad permissions to access sensitive data. The incident has impacted Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and their downstream customers, prompting ConnectWise to disable multiple application identities to contain the threat. The initial access vector for the credential compromise remains under investigation.
The attack began around October 15, 2026, when an unknown threat actor started using a compromised OAuth application credential for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application (App ID: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). By authenticating as this trusted application, the attackers circumvented user-level security controls and gained access to Microsoft 365 environments with the permissions granted to the app. These permissions often include access to emails, SharePoint, Teams, and other sensitive directory data.
Security firm Huntress reported observing unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants, originating from the IP address 144.172.64.128. The attack is a classic example of abusing the trust model of third-party application integrations in cloud environments, turning a legitimate, highly-privileged application into a powerful attack tool.
The attack chain leverages the inherent trust between a Microsoft 365 tenant and its integrated third-party applications. The threat actor's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) include:
T1528): The attackers obtained the credentials for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application. The method of this initial compromise is currently unknown.T1078.004): By using the legitimate, albeit stolen, application credentials, the attackers' sign-ins appeared as legitimate service-to-service communication, bypassing user-centric defenses like MFA.T1098.001): In at least one observed case, the attackers used the initial access to elevate the privileges of a related ConnectWise Cloud Management application to Global Administrator. They then added new client secrets to other applications within the tenant, creating multiple backdoors for persistent access.T1114.002): With access to the tenants, the attackers had the capability to access and exfiltrate data from various Microsoft 365 services, including Outlook, SharePoint, and Teams.This attack highlights the critical risk posed by over-privileged OAuth applications in enterprise environments.
The business impact of this supply chain attack is severe. For MSPs, it erodes trust and creates a significant security liability for all their downstream customers. The suspension of Cloud Backup, SaaS Security, and Cloud Management services causes operational disruption, preventing new backups and security management tasks. For affected customers, the breach means potential exposure of all data within their Microsoft 365 environment. Since the attack bypasses user MFA, organizations that believed they were secure are vulnerable. The costs of incident response, forensic analysis, and potential data loss are substantial for all parties involved.
144.172.64.128506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644aeSecurity teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect related activity:
appId is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae and the source IP is not from a known service range.Add-AzureADApplicationOwner, Add service principal credential, or Add owner to application where the initiating user/principal is an application, especially one related to ConnectWise.Application.ReadWrite.All or Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions.Defenders should implement the following detection and response strategies:
Mail.ReadWrite.All, Files.ReadWrite.All, or Directory.ReadWrite.All. Use Microsoft's built-in tools or third-party solutions to assess application risk.To mitigate the risk of similar attacks, organizations should adopt a defense-in-depth approach to cloud application security:
ConnectWise confirms services remain suspended, has reset credentials, and provides more technical details on the OAuth application credential compromise.
ConnectWise has confirmed that its Cloud Backup, SaaS Security, and Cloud Management services remain suspended following the supply chain attack. The company has taken further action by resetting credentials for the compromised multitenant OAuth application. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has also confirmed it is tracking the activity, noting the threat actor likely abused previously granted permissions. Technical analysis now specifies the compromise involved a 'client assertion' within the OAuth 2.0 client credentials flow, allowing attackers to bypass user-level MFA. The incident continues to impact MSPs and their customers, with ongoing efforts to restore operations and mitigate risks.
Microsoft attributes ConnectWise supply chain attack, impacting 173 M365 tenants, to threat actor Storm-0940.
New information reveals that Microsoft has attributed the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply chain attack to the threat actor group Storm-0940. This group leveraged a compromised application credential to gain unauthorized access to 173 Microsoft 365 customer and partner environments between October 15-16, 2026. Attackers were observed attempting to establish persistence within compromised tenants by adding new credentials to other trusted applications, a technique identified as T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials). This update reinforces the critical nature of the incident and provides specific threat actor attribution, highlighting the ongoing risk of third-party application compromises in cloud environments.
Unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 tenants begins.
ConnectWise confirms unauthorized access and disables seven application identities, suspending Cloud Backup services.
ConnectWise continues its investigation with no timeline for service restoration.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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