Security researchers from Unit 42 have detailed a series of sophisticated cyberattacks conducted by threat actors affiliated with the 'Com' cybercrime ecosystem. These campaigns primarily utilize vishing (voice phishing) and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to compromise user accounts, steal sensitive data from cloud environments, and extort victim organizations. The activity, attributed to the threat actor Bling Libra and newly identified clusters CL-CRI-1264 and CL-CRI-1274, has accelerated since August 2026, targeting data-rich industries like healthcare, finance, and legal services in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
Attackers pose as internal IT support to trick employees into authenticating through malicious proxy servers, capturing credentials and MFA session tokens in real-time. Post-compromise, they establish persistence by enrolling their own MFA devices, exfiltrate data from Microsoft 365 services like SharePoint and OneDrive using automated scripts, and in some cases, deploy a malicious browser extension for remote control and credential theft. The campaign culminates in extortion demands delivered via internal communication channels like Microsoft Teams.
Since early 2026, Unit 42 has observed and responded to numerous data theft and extortion incidents linked to Com-affiliated groups. These actors have refined a playbook that combines social engineering with technical exploits to systematically breach corporate networks and cloud tenants.
Pixel 10a) to the compromised account. This ensures they maintain access even if the user's password is changed. In other cases, they replay a persistent "keep me signed in" session token.python-httpx and python-requests User-Agent strings) to access and download large volumes of data from Microsoft SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange Online.Pixel 10a for persistence.python-requests and the Microsoft Graph SDK for data collection.UNC6671, was observed deploying a malicious browser extension as an alternative method for credential theft and persistence.The technical tradecraft observed demonstrates a deep understanding of cloud authentication mechanisms and enterprise security gaps.
During an investigation linked to CL-CRI-1192, a malicious browser extension masquerading as Google Chrome (manifest version 1.6.111) was discovered. Key characteristics include:
oskeysetup[.]com.oskeysetup[.]com.This extension provides a powerful persistence and data theft mechanism, operating within the trusted context of the user's browser to evade some endpoint security controls.
T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Voice: Attackers use vishing calls to initiate the attack chain.T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle: Malicious proxy servers are used to intercept credentials and session cookies.T1078 - Valid Accounts: The entire post-compromise phase relies on the use of stolen user credentials.T1556.006 - Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication: Attackers enroll their own MFA devices to establish persistence.T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie: Replaying session cookies is a key method for bypassing MFA.T1185 - Browser Extensions: A malicious browser extension is used for persistence and credential theft.T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection: Data is exfiltrated from Microsoft 365 mailboxes.T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object: Attackers target data stored in OneDrive and SharePoint.The impact of these campaigns is severe, particularly for the targeted industries. Healthcare, financial, and legal organizations manage vast quantities of sensitive and regulated data, including Protected Health Information (PHI) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII). A breach of this data can lead to:
The attackers' focus on high-value data and their double-extortion tactic (threatening to leak stolen data if the ransom is not paid) places immense pressure on victim organizations.
oskeysetup[.]compython-httpxpython-requests/2.34.2Pixel 10aThe following patterns could indicate related activity and may be used for threat hunting:
python-httpx or python-requests/*--enable-logging) for chrome.exe or msedge.exe.oskeysetup[.]com.onion links or extortion-related keywords.Defenders should focus on detecting the key stages of this attack chain:
MFA Tampering: Create high-priority alerts for any new MFA device enrollments, especially those occurring outside of business hours or from anomalous locations. This can be achieved by monitoring Microsoft Entra ID audit logs for User registered security info. See D3FEND technique D3-DAM - Domain Account Monitoring.
Anomalous Cloud Access: Implement User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) rules to detect scripted access to cloud data. A user account suddenly accessing SharePoint via a python-requests user agent is highly suspicious. Baseline normal API usage and alert on significant deviations. See D3FEND technique D3-NTA - Network Traffic Analysis.
Browser Extension Abuse: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to query for browsers running with developer-mode flags. Monitor for the creation of files in browser extension directories, particularly for extensions not signed by a trusted publisher. See D3FEND technique D3-PA - Process Analysis.
Network-Level Detection: Ingress and egress traffic filtering should be used to block known malicious domains like oskeysetup[.]com. While Tor traffic is encrypted, blocking connections to known Tor entry nodes from non-essential corporate assets can reduce risk.
Train users to recognize and report vishing and social engineering attempts.
Implement phishing-resistant MFA (e.g., FIDO2) to prevent session hijacking and AiTM attacks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Use application control policies to block the installation of unauthorized browser extensions.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Regularly audit cloud and identity logs for signs of compromise, such as anomalous MFA enrollments or data access patterns.
Filter network traffic to block connections to known malicious C2 domains and restrict outbound connections to services like Tor.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Harden identity configurations to restrict how and where new authentication methods can be registered.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Unit 42 began responding to data theft and extortion attempts attributed to Com-affiliated threat actors.
Campaigns by Com-affiliated actors accelerated significantly.
Unit 42 identified a new activity cluster, CL-CRI-1264, targeting healthcare and medical organizations.
Unit 42 identified another new activity cluster, CL-CRI-1274, using similar vishing tactics.
A public write-up by researcher Kevin Pham detailed an investigation into a malicious browser extension used in these attacks.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.