4,585 wallet addresses
An estimated $88.6 million worth of Bitcoin has been stolen from 4,585 wallet addresses, with the theft strongly linked to a critical firmware vulnerability in COLDCARD hardware wallets. The flaw, an integration error in the device's random number generation (RNG) process, was introduced in 2021. It caused affected wallets to generate recovery seeds using a weak, deterministic software-based pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) instead of the intended secure hardware RNG. This significantly reduced the seed's entropy, making it possible for attackers to predict and reconstruct the private keys offline. The largest theft, a $70.2 million sweep, occurred just 30 hours before the manufacturer, Coinkite, publicly disclosed the bug. Users who created wallets on affected devices are at extreme risk and must take immediate action to secure their funds.
The core of the vulnerability was a coding error that affected the generation of wallet recovery seeds. Instead of using the secure STM32 hardware-based RNG, the firmware defaulted to a PRNG known as Yasmarang. This software-based generator is not cryptographically secure and produces a predictable sequence of numbers.
Once a match is found, the attacker can reconstruct the private key and has full control to "sweep" or transfer the funds to their own wallet. This explains the automated, large-scale nature of the theft.
The vulnerability was actively and successfully exploited on a massive scale. Digital asset research firm Galaxy Research tracked the on-chain activity, identifying three major waves of theft:
The timing of the largest attack, just before public disclosure, suggests the attacker may have independently discovered the flaw or learned of it through non-public channels. The attacker's tools appeared to prioritize wallets with the highest balances first.
This incident has a severe impact on the victims and the broader cryptocurrency community.
This is a catastrophic failure of a core security promise. Simply updating the firmware is not a fix for affected users. The original sin was the creation of a weak seed, and any funds associated with that seed remain vulnerable forever until moved.
No specific attacker-controlled wallet addresses or other indicators were provided in the source articles.
For security researchers analyzing this event, the primary observables are on the blockchain itself:
otherotherotherFor users, detection is about determining if their wallet was created with the flawed firmware.
Updating the firmware alone is NOT sufficient. The recovery seed itself is compromised.
Total stolen Bitcoin from Coldcard wallet flaw now exceeds $100M, with multiple hacking groups exploiting the vulnerability. New details reveal entropy reduced to 40 bits.
The estimated financial loss from the Coldcard wallet vulnerability has increased significantly, now ranging from $100 million to $130 million. Further technical analysis reveals the flaw, a build configuration error, critically reduced the seed phrase entropy from 128 bits to just 40 bits, making private key brute-forcing feasible. Exploitation is now attributed to multiple distinct hacking groups, indicating a broader attack surface and impact, including high-profile victims. This update highlights the escalating severity and wider scope of the incident.
The faulty RNG integration was introduced into COLDCARD firmware.
The largest wave of theft occurs, with attackers sweeping over $70 million in Bitcoin in 41 minutes.
Coinkite, the manufacturer of COLDCARD, publicly discloses the vulnerability, approximately 30 hours after the main attack.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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