On February 14, 2026, a patch was released for a high-severity vulnerability, codenamed ClawJacked, in the popular OpenClaw AI agent. The flaw allowed a malicious website to hijack a developer's local OpenClaw agent instance via its WebSocket connection. By tricking a user into visiting a specially crafted webpage, an attacker could silently register a new device and gain control of the agent, enabling them to execute commands, manipulate its reasoning through prompt injection, and potentially exfiltrate data. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed, and a fix was promptly made available in version 2026.2.13.
ClawJacked is a WebSocket hijacking vulnerability that exploits the trust relationship between the OpenClaw agent and local connections. The attack scenario is as follows:
ws://localhost:1337). This is a form of Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWH).localhost. It would silently approve the new device registration from the malicious website's script without requiring user confirmation. This effectively gave the attacker's script control over the agent.An additional vector of abuse involved the agent's ability to read its own logs for troubleshooting. An attacker could potentially inject malicious content into the logs, which the agent would then process. This could be used for indirect prompt injection, manipulating the agent's behavior or tricking it into revealing sensitive information.
2026.2.13.2026.2.13.The impact of the ClawJacked vulnerability is severe for an affected developer:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
network_traffic_pattern |
WebSocket connections to localhost |
Monitor for unexpected WebSocket connections to local ports from browser processes, especially if the origin of the web page is an external domain. |
process_name |
openclaw-agent |
Monitor the agent process for unusual activity, such as accessing sensitive files or making outbound connections that are not part of its normal operation. |
log_source |
OpenClaw agent logs | Review agent logs for unexpected device registrations or commands being executed that were not initiated by the legitimate user. |
Detection:
openclaw-agent process for suspicious file access or network connections that result from malicious commands sent via the hijacked WebSocket.Response:
openclaw-agent process and the browser session.Immediate Action:
2026.2.13 or newer. This is a critical application of Software Update (D3-SU).Strategic Improvements:
localhost. The fix for ClawJacked likely involved implementing a proper Origin header check to ensure that WebSocket connections can only be initiated from trusted, whitelisted web pages, not arbitrary ones. This is a form of Application Configuration Hardening (D3-ACH).New patch version 2026.2.25 released for 'ClawJacked' vulnerability in OpenClaw AI agent, explicitly addressing password bypass via WebSocket hijacking.
The primary mitigation is to update the OpenClaw agent to the patched version 2026.2.13 or newer.
Developers of local applications should implement strict origin checks for all network requests, including WebSockets.
The immediate and most effective defense against the 'ClawJacked' vulnerability is to update the OpenClaw AI agent to the patched version, 2026.2.13. This version contains the fix that prevents the WebSocket hijacking. All developers and users of OpenClaw must prioritize this update. This action directly closes the security hole that allows malicious websites to connect to and control the local agent. Maintaining an up-to-date inventory of software and enabling automatic updates where appropriate are crucial security hygiene practices that this incident underscores.
The root cause of 'ClawJacked' was a failure in configuration—specifically, relaxing security checks for connections from localhost. The long-term fix, which was likely implemented in the patch, is to harden the application's configuration. Any server application, even one running locally, must validate the 'Origin' header of incoming WebSocket requests. This ensures that only scripts from an allowed list of web pages (e.g., the legitimate OpenClaw web UI) can connect. By default, connections from all other origins should be rejected. This prevents the cross-site attack vector and is a fundamental principle for securing web-connected applications.

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