Speaking at the FedTalks conference on November 17, 2026, Nick Andersen, the acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), highlighted that recent widespread technology failures underscore the urgent need for operational resilience. Pointing to events like global Microsoft Outlook outages and airline ground stops, Andersen argued that the ultimate goal of security and IT operations should be to ensure the continuity of essential services, regardless of the cause of disruption. His comments signal a strategic emphasis from CISA on building systems that are resilient by design, capable of withstanding not only malicious cyberattacks but also technical glitches, bad patches, and other non-malicious failures.
Andersen's remarks outline a strategic perspective for government and industry, shifting the focus from a singular obsession with cyberattack prevention to a broader concept of operational resilience. He stated that from a national security standpoint, the outcome—the continuous delivery of services—is more important than the specific cause of an outage. "Ultimately being able to prevail by being able to demonstrate resilience against disruptions, whether they occur because of things like an IT outage or a bad patch... or because of a malicious cyber incident—we want to make sure we're engineering in the resilience," Andersen said.
This philosophy encourages organizations to design and build systems with the assumption that failures will happen. The key is not just to prevent incidents but to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to them.
Andersen's message is directed at all organizations responsible for critical infrastructure and essential services, including federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector companies in sectors like technology, finance, and transportation.
This is not a formal regulation but strategic guidance. It calls for organizations to integrate resilience into their system architecture and risk management frameworks. This includes:
This strategic guidance from CISA encourages a more mature and holistic approach to risk management. By focusing on resilience, organizations can become more robust and less fragile. The impact for citizens and customers is more reliable services, whether it's the ability to access bank accounts, board a flight, or receive clean drinking water. Andersen noted that the public's primary concern is the outcome, not the technical reason for a failure. This approach moves beyond the "vulnpocalypse" mindset to address the fundamental reliability of the digital infrastructure society depends on.
To align with CISA's vision for resilience, organizations should:
In line with CISA's emphasis on resilience, organizations must have a robust and frequently tested backup and restoration strategy. This goes beyond simply having backups; it means ensuring they are immutable or air-gapped to protect against ransomware, and that the restoration process is drilled regularly. Whether an outage is caused by a malicious actor encrypting files or a bad software update corrupting data, the ability to quickly restore systems to a known-good state is the cornerstone of operational resilience. This ensures minimal downtime and supports the continuous delivery of essential services that Andersen highlighted.
Resilience against disruptions, as advocated by CISA, requires the ability to quickly revert system configurations. This is critical whether a failure is caused by a malicious change from an attacker or an erroneous change from an internal administrator. Organizations should use Infrastructure as Code (IaC) tools and version control systems (like Git) to manage system and application configurations. This allows for a full audit trail of changes and, more importantly, the ability to instantly roll back to a previous, known-good configuration. This capability dramatically shortens recovery time from 'modernization updates gone awry' and ensures system stability.
CISA Acting Director Nick Andersen speaks at the FedTalks conference about the need for resilience.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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