CISA Adds Critical Lantronix and Ubiquiti Vulnerabilities to KEV Catalog Amid Active Exploitation

CISA Mandates Urgent Patching for Actively Exploited Flaws in Lantronix and Ubiquiti Devices

CRITICAL
June 25, 2026
6m read
VulnerabilityThreat IntelligenceIndustrial Control Systems

Related Entities

Organizations

CISA Lantronix Ubiquiti Forescout Vedere Labs

Products & Tech

Lantronix EDS5000 SeriesUbiquiti UniFi OSOperational Technology

CVE Identifiers

CVE-2025-67038
CRITICAL
CVSS:9.8
CVE-2026-34908
CRITICAL
CVSS:10
CVE-2026-34909
CRITICAL
CVE-2026-34910
CRITICAL
CVSS:10

Full Report

Executive Summary

On June 24, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added four critical vulnerabilities affecting Lantronix and Ubiquiti networking equipment to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This action confirms that threat actors are actively exploiting these flaws in the wild. The vulnerabilities include CVE-2025-67038, a 9.8 CVSS score command injection flaw in Lantronix EDS5000 series devices, and a chain of three flaws (CVE-2026-34908, CVE-2026-34909, CVE-2026-34910) in Ubiquiti UniFi OS, which collectively achieve a 10.0 CVSS score for unauthenticated remote code execution. Given the active exploitation and the critical role these devices play in network infrastructure, CISA has mandated that Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies patch these vulnerabilities by June 26, 2026. This advisory underscores the urgent need for all organizations using these products to take immediate remedial action to prevent system compromise.


Vulnerability Details

Lantronix EDS5000 Series: CVE-2025-67038

This critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) is a command injection flaw within the HTTP RPC module of Lantronix EDS5000 series serial-to-IP device servers. Research from Forescout's Vedere Labs, part of their "BRIDGE:BREAK" study, revealed that the application insecurely concatenates a username into a shell command when logging failed authentication attempts. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can craft a malicious username containing shell commands. When an authentication attempt with this username fails, the server executes the injected commands with root privileges. This provides the attacker with complete control over the device.

Ubiquiti UniFi OS: CVE-2026-34908, CVE-2026-34909, CVE-2026-34910

This set of three vulnerabilities, when chained together, allows for unauthenticated remote code execution with a maximum CVSS score of 10.0. The attack chain works as follows:

  1. CVE-2026-34908 (Improper Access Control): Allows an attacker to bypass authentication checks.
  2. CVE-2026-34909 (Path Traversal): Enables the authenticated (or bypass-authenticated) attacker to read and write arbitrary files on the system.
  3. CVE-2026-34910 (Improper Input Validation): Allows the attacker to inject malicious commands, which can be executed via the file write capability from the path traversal flaw.

Together, these flaws enable a remote attacker to gain a reverse shell with root privileges, effectively taking full control of the UniFi OS device.


Technical Analysis

Threat actors are leveraging these vulnerabilities to establish initial access and persistence within target networks. The attack patterns align with common tactics for compromising edge devices.

Lantronix Attack Vector

The exploitation of CVE-2025-67038 is a classic example of T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application. The attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to the device's web interface, targeting the login function. The username field is the injection point. For example, a username like ';/bin/sh -c "<malicious_command>";' would be executed by the system's shell. This allows for direct T1059.004 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell execution.

Ubiquiti Attack Vector

The Ubiquiti exploit chain is more complex, demonstrating a multi-stage compromise. After bypassing authentication, attackers use the path traversal flaw to write a script or webshell to a predictable location on the device. They then use the input validation flaw to trigger the execution of this script. Reports of attackers creating rogue administrator accounts suggest a post-exploitation objective of T1078.001 - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts or creating new local accounts for persistence.


Impact Assessment

The impact of compromising these devices is severe. Lantronix EDS5000 servers are often used as communication bridges in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT) environments. A breach could lead to disruption of physical processes, data exfiltration from sensitive industrial networks, or serve as a pivot point for wider attacks on corporate infrastructure. The potential for physical disruption elevates the risk beyond typical IT security incidents.

Ubiquiti UniFi devices are central management points for enterprise networks, controlling Wi-Fi, switching, and routing. A compromise of a UniFi controller grants an attacker a god-like view of the network, enabling widespread lateral movement, man-in-the-middle attacks, and deployment of ransomware across the entire organization. The reported creation of rogue admin accounts confirms that attackers are establishing long-term persistence, making remediation more difficult.


Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

The following patterns could indicate related activity:

Type
url_pattern
Value
POST / with unusual username field
Description
For Lantronix, monitor HTTP POST requests to the login page for shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, `
Type
log_source
Value
Lantronix device logs
Description
Review authentication failure logs on EDS5000 devices for usernames containing command syntax.
Type
process_name
Value
sh, bash, wget, curl
Description
On Lantronix devices, look for unexpected child processes spawned by the web server process.
Type
log_source
Value
UniFi OS logs
Description
Monitor for the creation of new administrator accounts, especially those created outside of normal business hours or by an unfamiliar source IP.
Type
file_path
Value
/tmp/, /var/tmp/
Description
On UniFi devices, monitor for unexpected file creation or modification in temporary directories by the web server user.
Type
network_traffic_pattern
Value
Outbound connections from UniFi device
Description
Look for unexpected outbound connections (e.g., reverse shells) from the UniFi device to external IP addresses.

Detection & Response

Security teams should prioritize detection of both exploitation attempts and post-compromise activity.

  • Network Traffic Analysis (D3-NTA): Implement network monitoring to detect anomalous traffic to and from Lantronix and Ubiquiti devices. For Lantronix, create rules to alert on HTTP requests containing shell metacharacters in POST bodies. For Ubiquiti, baseline normal administrative traffic and alert on connections from untrusted IP ranges or attempts to establish outbound connections.
  • Log Analysis: Forward logs from these devices to a central SIEM. For Lantronix, search for failed login events with suspicious usernames. For Ubiquiti, create alerts for User Account Creation events, especially for administrative accounts.
  • File Integrity Monitoring: If possible, deploy file integrity monitoring on Ubiquiti devices to detect the creation of unauthorized files or webshells in web-accessible directories.
  • Incident Response: If a compromise is suspected, immediately isolate the affected device from the network to prevent lateral movement. Preserve logs, memory dumps, and disk images for forensic analysis. Assume any credentials stored on or passed through the device are compromised and initiate a full credential rotation.

Mitigation

Immediate patching is the most effective mitigation. However, if that is not possible, compensating controls are critical.

  1. Patch Immediately: Apply the latest firmware updates from Lantronix and Ubiquiti that address these vulnerabilities. This is the primary and most effective mitigation. (D3FEND: D3-SU - Software Update)
  2. Restrict Network Access: Limit access to the management interfaces of these devices. They should not be exposed to the public internet. If remote access is required, it should be strictly controlled via a VPN with MFA. (D3FEND: D3-ITF - Inbound Traffic Filtering)
  3. Network Segmentation: Isolate these devices in a segmented network zone to limit the blast radius in case of a compromise. This is especially critical for Lantronix devices in OT environments. (D3FEND: D3-NI - Network Isolation)
  4. Regular Audits: Regularly audit device configurations and user accounts. Remove any unauthorized or suspicious administrator accounts on Ubiquiti devices.

Timeline of Events

1
April 1, 2026
Forescout's Vedere Labs discloses CVE-2025-67038 as part of the 'BRIDGE:BREAK' research.
2
May 1, 2026
Ubiquiti releases patches for the three vulnerabilities affecting UniFi OS.
3
June 24, 2026
CISA adds all four vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-67038, CVE-2026-34908, CVE-2026-34909, CVE-2026-34910) to its KEV catalog.
4
June 25, 2026
This article was published
5
June 26, 2026
Deadline for U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to apply patches.

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Applying the latest security patches from vendors is the most direct way to remediate the underlying vulnerabilities.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Restricting network access to the management interfaces of these devices prevents external attackers from reaching the vulnerable services.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Placing critical devices in isolated network segments contains the impact of a potential compromise, preventing lateral movement.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Audit

M1047enterprise

Implementing robust logging and auditing allows for the detection of exploitation attempts and post-compromise activities like rogue account creation.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

Organizations must prioritize the immediate deployment of patched firmware for affected Lantronix EDS5000 and Ubiquiti UniFi OS devices. This is the most critical and effective defense. Establish an emergency patching process that allows for out-of-band updates for critical, internet-facing systems like these. Use asset inventory systems to rapidly identify all vulnerable devices across the enterprise and OT environments. For Ubiquiti devices, the update can be initiated through the UniFi Network Application. For Lantronix, firmware must be downloaded from their support site and applied via the device's web interface. Before deployment, test the patch in a non-production environment to ensure operational stability, but accelerate this testing given the active exploitation. Post-patch, verify the new firmware version is correctly reported by the device to confirm successful remediation.

As a crucial compensating control, strictly filter all traffic destined for the management interfaces of Lantronix and Ubiquiti devices. These interfaces should never be exposed directly to the public internet. Configure perimeter firewalls and access control lists (ACLs) to deny all inbound connections to these devices from external IP addresses. If remote administration is essential, it must be routed through a secure VPN gateway with multi-factor authentication. Create explicit allow rules for only trusted internal management subnets or jump hosts. For the Lantronix flaw, consider implementing WAF rules that inspect HTTP POST bodies for shell metacharacters (';', '|', '&') in the username field to block exploitation attempts, even from internal sources.

Specifically for the Ubiquiti compromise, where rogue administrator accounts are a key indicator, implement robust monitoring of account management activities. Forward UniFi OS system and audit logs to a SIEM. Create high-priority alerts for any new local account creation, especially those with administrative privileges. The alert logic should trigger on events indicating a new user has been added to the 'admin' or equivalent group. Correlate these events with source IP and time of day; an account created from an external IP or outside business hours is highly suspicious. Regularly run automated scripts to audit the user list on all UniFi controllers against a known-good baseline of authorized administrators. Any deviation should trigger an immediate investigation.

Timeline of Events

1
April 1, 2026

Forescout's Vedere Labs discloses CVE-2025-67038 as part of the 'BRIDGE:BREAK' research.

2
May 1, 2026

Ubiquiti releases patches for the three vulnerabilities affecting UniFi OS.

3
June 24, 2026

CISA adds all four vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-67038, CVE-2026-34908, CVE-2026-34909, CVE-2026-34910) to its KEV catalog.

4
June 26, 2026

Deadline for U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to apply patches.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

KEVCISALantronixUbiquitiRemote Code ExecutionRCEOT SecurityNetwork SecurityCVE-2025-67038CVE-2026-34908

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