On March 16, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a vulnerability affecting Wing FTP Server to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, mandating that federal agencies patch the flaw by March 30, 2026. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-47813, is a medium-severity information disclosure flaw that is now confirmed to be actively exploited by threat actors.
The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve the full local installation path of the server software. While path disclosure is not as severe as remote code execution, its inclusion in the KEV catalog highlights that attackers are actively using it as a crucial first step in their attack chains. This information helps them tailor subsequent exploits against the target system. A patch has been available from the vendor since May 2025, and all organizations using Wing FTP Server are strongly urged to update immediately.
CVE-2025-47813loginok.html page containing an overly long value in the UID cookie. The server fails to handle this input properly and responds with an error message that contains the full, absolute file path of the server's installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Wing FTP Server\).7.4.4.CISA has confirmed that CVE-2025-47813 is being actively exploited in the wild. Attackers are using this vulnerability for reconnaissance purposes. The information disclosure provides them with valuable intelligence about the target environment, such as the operating system (inferred from the path structure) and the exact location of server files. This knowledge can be used to facilitate more complex attacks, such as exploiting a file upload vulnerability to place a webshell in a known location or targeting other vulnerabilities that require knowledge of the server's file structure.
On its own, this vulnerability has a limited impact. It does not grant the attacker access to data or the ability to execute code. However, its true danger lies in its role as an enabler for more serious attacks. By revealing the server's installation path, it lowers the barrier for an attacker to:
C:\... vs. /var/www/...) instantly tells the attacker if the server is running on Windows or Linux, allowing them to focus their efforts with OS-specific exploits.Its addition to the KEV catalog means that CISA has credible evidence that this reconnaissance step is part of an active attack chain leading to greater compromise.
Detection should focus on anomalous requests to the server's web interface.
url_pattern*/loginok.htmlnetwork_traffic_patternUID cookie valueUID cookie with a value significantly longer than normal (e.g., > 1024 bytes).log_sourceUID cookie in requests to the Wing FTP Server web interface. Block any requests with an abnormally long value.loginok.html page, especially if originating from the same source IP address. This could indicate scanning or exploitation attempts.7.4.4 or later.7.4.4 or newer. The patch has been available since May 2025.UID cookie value sent to loginok.html). This is a temporary compensating control and not a substitute for updating the software.Updating Wing FTP Server to version 7.4.4 or later fully remediates the vulnerability.
Restricting access to the FTP server's web interface from the internet can prevent external attackers from reaching the vulnerable component.
Using an IPS or WAF to detect and block the specific exploit signature provides a layer of defense, especially if patching is delayed.
A patch for CVE-2025-47813 is made available in Wing FTP Server version 7.4.4.
CISA adds CVE-2025-47813 to its KEV catalog due to evidence of active exploitation.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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