On October 30, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an alert adding two new vulnerabilities affecting Ivanti Connect Secure to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog. The inclusion of CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 is based on confirmed evidence of active, in-the-wild exploitation by malicious actors. These vulnerabilities, which can be chained to achieve privilege escalation and arbitrary file upload, represent a significant risk to organizations relying on Ivanti's VPN solution for secure remote access. In accordance with Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, CISA has mandated that all Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies remediate these flaws by a specified deadline.
The two vulnerabilities can be used in concert to compromise an affected device:
CVE-2026-111357: A missing authentication for critical function vulnerability. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges locally on the Ivanti Connect Secure appliance.
CVE-2026-118527: A flaw related to the generation of predictable numbers or identifiers. This allows a remote, authenticated attacker to upload arbitrary files to a known location on the device's filesystem.
The attack chain involves an attacker with initial authenticated access first using CVE-2026-111357 to gain higher privileges. With these elevated rights, they can then exploit CVE-2026-118527 to upload a webshell or other malicious payload, effectively gaining persistent control over the VPN appliance. CISA also noted these can be chained with a third flaw, CVE-2026-104935, for a more significant compromise.
CISA has confirmed that threat actors are actively exploiting this vulnerability chain in the wild. Vulnerabilities in perimeter devices like VPN concentrators are highly prized targets for attackers, as they provide a direct entry point into an organization's internal network. The active exploitation status elevates the urgency for all organizations to apply patches or mitigations.
A successful exploit of these chained vulnerabilities could have severe consequences. By gaining control over an Ivanti Connect Secure appliance, an attacker can:
For federal agencies and other organizations, this poses a direct threat to sensitive data and critical operations. The mandate from CISA underscores the significant risk these flaws present to national security and enterprise integrity.
The following patterns may help identify vulnerable or compromised systems:
/api/v1/license/keys-status/data/runtime/tmp/ or similar temporary directoriesD3-FA: File Analysis: Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on Ivanti appliances to detect the creation of unauthorized files, particularly in web-accessible directories, which could indicate a webshell has been planted.D3-ITF: Inbound Traffic Filtering: If patching cannot be done immediately, restrict access to the management interface of the Ivanti appliance to a limited set of trusted IP addresses. This is a compensating control and not a substitute for patching.Threat actor UTA0576 identified exploiting Ivanti zero-days. Affected versions/patches released. Post-exploitation: credential theft, AD reconnaissance. Ivanti's integrity checker ineffective.
The most effective mitigation is to apply the security patches provided by Ivanti to all affected Connect Secure appliances.
As a compensating control, restrict network access to the management interface of the Ivanti appliance to a limited set of trusted administrative hosts.
Given that CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 are being actively exploited, the most urgent and effective countermeasure is to apply the patches provided by Ivanti. Organizations must treat this as an emergency change. A comprehensive asset inventory should be used to identify all Ivanti Connect Secure appliances, with priority given to those that are internet-facing. The patching process should not be delayed. After applying the update, security teams must verify that the patch has been installed correctly and that the appliance is no longer vulnerable. Because these are perimeter devices, failing to patch leaves a direct and exploitable entry point into the corporate network for threat actors.
As a critical compensating control for the Ivanti vulnerabilities, organizations should immediately implement network isolation for the management interface of all Connect Secure appliances. This interface should never be exposed to the public internet. Access should be strictly limited via firewall rules to a dedicated management network or a small set of authorized bastion hosts or administrator workstations. This action directly mitigates the risk of a remote attacker reaching the vulnerable components. Even though the exploit chain requires initial authentication, preventing broad access to the login interface severely restricts the attacker's ability to attempt credential stuffing or exploit any potential pre-authentication flaws. This significantly reduces the attack surface while the patching process is being planned and executed.
CISA adds CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
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