On February 25, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added two vulnerabilities impacting Cisco networking products to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The inclusion confirms that both flaws are being actively exploited in the wild by malicious actors. The vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-20127 and CVE-2022-20775, affect Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN products and could allow attackers to bypass authentication or access sensitive files. In accordance with Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01, U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies are required to remediate these vulnerabilities promptly. CISA strongly urges all organizations to prioritize patching to mitigate the risk of compromise.
Organizations should consult the official Cisco security advisories for a complete list of affected product versions and software releases.
Both CVE-2026-20127 and CVE-2022-20775 have been added to the KEV catalog because CISA has reliable evidence of active exploitation in the wild. This means threat actors are actively targeting unpatched devices, elevating the urgency for remediation. Attackers frequently target vulnerabilities in edge networking devices like SD-WAN controllers as they are often internet-exposed and provide a gateway into an organization's network.
Security teams can hunt for signs of exploitation by looking for specific patterns in web server logs on their Cisco SD-WAN devices:
..%2F or ..\. For example, a request to /cgi-bin/..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd.D3-NTA - Network Traffic Analysis.D3-SU - Software Update.Cisco confirms CVE-2026-20127 (CVSS 10.0) actively exploited, chained with CVE-2022-20775 for root access. CISA issues Emergency Directive. Zero-day exploitation since 2023.
The primary mitigation is to apply the security patches released by Cisco immediately.
Restrict network access to the management interfaces of SD-WAN devices to only trusted IP addresses.
The most critical and effective defense against the active exploitation of CVE-2026-20127 and CVE-2022-20775 is to apply the security patches provided by Cisco. Given that these vulnerabilities are in the CISA KEV catalog, they are under active attack. Organizations must prioritize these updates, especially on internet-facing SD-WAN controllers and managers. A risk-based patching policy should place KEV vulnerabilities at the highest priority level, with a mandate to patch within days, not weeks. Automating the patching process for network infrastructure where possible can ensure timely and consistent application, closing the window of opportunity for attackers.
As a vital compensating control, the management interfaces of all Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN devices should be isolated from general network traffic and especially from the public internet. These interfaces should reside on a dedicated, out-of-band management network. Access to this network should be strictly controlled via firewall rules, allowing connections only from a limited set of administrator workstations or a bastion host. This practice of network isolation dramatically reduces the attack surface, preventing an external attacker from ever reaching the vulnerable interface, even if it remains unpatched. This is a fundamental principle of secure network architecture.
To detect exploitation attempts against CVE-2022-20775, organizations should use network traffic analysis. Ingest web server logs from Cisco SD-WAN devices into a SIEM and create detection rules that search for path traversal sequences in the URL, such as ../, ..\, or their URL-encoded variants (%2E%2E%2F). A Web Application Firewall (WAF) can also be configured with rules to block these patterns in real-time. For the authentication bypass (CVE-2026-20127), monitor for any successful access to administrative pages from IPs that are not on an established allowlist, which could indicate a bypass of normal login procedures.
CISA adds CVE-2026-20127 and CVE-2022-20775 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.