Evasive Panda APT Hijacks DNS to Deploy MgBot Backdoor in Multi-Country Espionage Campaign

Chinese APT 'Evasive Panda' Uses DNS Poisoning and Adversary-in-the-Middle Attacks to Deliver MgBot Backdoor

HIGH
December 26, 2025
5m read
Threat ActorCyberattackMalware

Related Entities

Threat Actors

Evasive Panda Bronze HighlandDaggerflyStormBamboo

Products & Tech

SohuVAiQIYI VideoIObit Smart DefragTencent QQ

Other

MgBotChina

Full Report

Executive Summary

On December 26, 2025, details emerged of a protracted cyber-espionage campaign orchestrated by the Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group Evasive Panda (also tracked as Bronze Highland, Daggerfly, and StormBamboo). The campaign, observed from November 2022 to November 2024, targeted organizations in Türkiye, China, and India. The threat actor employed adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) techniques, primarily DNS poisoning, to intercept and manipulate traffic from legitimate software update servers. This allowed the group to deliver a modular backdoor known as MgBot to victims, enabling extensive data exfiltration and system monitoring. The attack's reliance on network-level interception rather than user-initiated actions like phishing demonstrates a high level of sophistication and potential compromise of network infrastructure, such as ISPs or routers.

Threat Overview

The campaign's core strategy involved compromising the DNS resolution process for popular software applications, including SohuVA, Baidu's iQIYI Video, IObit Smart Defrag, and Tencent QQ. By poisoning DNS requests for domains like dictionary.com, Evasive Panda redirected victims to attacker-controlled servers tailored to their specific geographic location and Internet Service Provider (ISP). This redirection was used to serve a malicious executable disguised as a legitimate software update.

The primary payload is the MgBot backdoor, a known tool in Evasive Panda's arsenal. Its deployment in this campaign showcases the group's ability to evolve its delivery mechanisms while reusing tested and effective malware. The ultimate goal of the operation is cyber-espionage, focused on harvesting sensitive files, credentials, and other confidential information from compromised systems.

Technical Analysis

The attack chain is a multi-stage process designed for stealth and evasion:

  1. Initial Access & Redirection: The attack begins with an T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle attack, specifically through T1568.002 - DNS Manipulation. The threat actor poisons DNS records, causing victims attempting to download software updates to connect to a malicious server instead of the legitimate one.

  2. First-Stage Loader: The victim downloads and executes a malicious file masquerading as a legitimate update. This file acts as a first-stage loader.

  3. Second-Stage Payload Delivery: The loader executes shellcode that performs an T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer. It sends an HTTP request to a compromised (but otherwise legitimate) domain to fetch a second-stage payload. This payload is often disguised as a PNG image file to bypass basic network filtering. The request includes the victim's Windows version, indicating the attacker tailors the payload to the target environment.

  4. Backdoor Injection: The final payload, the MgBot backdoor, is decrypted from the second-stage file and injected into a legitimate svchost.exe process using process injection techniques like T1055.001 - Dynamic-link Library Injection. This allows the malware to operate under the guise of a trusted system process, making it difficult to detect.

  5. Espionage and C2 Communication: Once active, MgBot establishes communication with its command-and-control (C2) server. It can perform a wide range of espionage functions:

    • File and directory enumeration and exfiltration.
    • Keystroke logging.
    • Clipboard data capture.
    • Audio stream recording via the microphone.
    • Credential theft from web browsers.

Impact Assessment

The business impact of this campaign is primarily related to data confidentiality and long-term strategic compromise. By targeting government entities and other organizations in strategically important regions, Evasive Panda's operations likely support the intelligence-gathering objectives of the Chinese state. The theft of sensitive documents, intellectual property, and government communications can lead to significant geopolitical and economic disadvantages for the affected nations and organizations. The compromise of network infrastructure like ISPs suggests a widespread and persistent threat that is difficult for individual organizations to mitigate on their own, posing a systemic risk to entire regions.

Cyber Observables for Detection

Security teams should hunt for the following patterns:

Type Value Description
log_source DNS Query Logs Monitor for requests to legitimate software update domains (e.g., for SohuVA, iQIYI) that resolve to unexpected or non-official IP addresses.
network_traffic_pattern HTTP/HTTPS Look for HTTP requests fetching files with a .png extension that contain executable code or unusually large file sizes.
process_name svchost.exe Monitor for svchost.exe processes making outbound network connections to unusual IP addresses or domains, especially if they were not spawned by services.exe.
command_line_pattern Any Suspicious command-line activity originating from common software update processes.

Detection & Response

  • DNS Monitoring: Implement robust DNS logging and analytics. Use D3FEND's D3-NTA: Network Traffic Analysis to baseline normal DNS resolution patterns and alert on anomalies, especially for critical software update domains. Threat intelligence feeds can help identify known malicious resolver IPs.
  • Network Traffic Analysis: Deploy SSL/TLS inspection where possible to analyze encrypted traffic. Monitor for suspicious file downloads, such as executable content being delivered from unexpected sources or disguised as other file types (e.g., PNG images). Outbound C2 traffic from sensitive processes like svchost.exe should be a high-priority alert.
  • Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Utilize EDR solutions to detect process injection attempts against svchost.exe. Monitor for the execution of unsigned code or shellcode from untrusted processes. Use D3FEND's D3-PA: Process Analysis to correlate process parent-child relationships and identify anomalous behavior.

Mitigation

  • DNS Security: Implement DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation on recursive resolvers to protect against DNS poisoning and spoofing. Utilize DNS over HTTPS (DoH) or DNS over TLS (DoT) to encrypt DNS queries, making them harder to intercept and manipulate.
  • Network Segmentation: Employ a defense-in-depth strategy by segmenting networks. This can limit an attacker's ability to perform AitM attacks across the entire enterprise. This aligns with D3FEND's D3-NI: Network Isolation.
  • Application Whitelisting: Use application control solutions to restrict the execution of unauthorized software, including malicious loaders disguised as updates. This corresponds to D3FEND's D3-EAL: Executable Allowlisting.
  • Firewall and Proxy Filtering: Configure outbound traffic filtering to block connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses. Restrict or monitor downloads of certain file types from non-trusted websites.

Timeline of Events

1
November 1, 2022
Start of the observed Evasive Panda campaign activity.
2
November 30, 2024
End of the observed Evasive Panda campaign activity.
3
December 26, 2025
Security researchers publish a report detailing the campaign.
4
December 26, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Use web filtering to block access to known malicious or untrusted domains that may host payloads.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Implement strict network traffic filtering and egress controls to prevent malware from communicating with C2 servers.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Deploy and maintain endpoint protection solutions to detect and block known malware like MgBot and its components.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Audit

M1047enterprise

Enable comprehensive logging for DNS, network traffic, and process creation to support threat hunting and incident investigation.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

To counter the DNS poisoning used by Evasive Panda, organizations must implement continuous Network Traffic Analysis, focusing on DNS and HTTP/S protocols. Security teams should establish a baseline of normal DNS resolution patterns for commonly used software update domains within their environment. Configure SIEM or network monitoring tools to generate high-priority alerts when these domains resolve to IP addresses outside of the known-good or expected ranges. Furthermore, analyze HTTP/S traffic for anomalies such as files with a .png extension that have content types or sizes inconsistent with image files, as this was a key TTP for payload delivery. SSL/TLS inspection should be deployed on outbound traffic from critical assets to detect the initial C2 beaconing and payload download, even when encrypted. This technique directly addresses the core delivery mechanism of the attack by identifying the malicious redirection and payload transfer before the endpoint is fully compromised.

Given that MgBot is injected into svchost.exe, robust Process Analysis on endpoints is critical for detection. EDR solutions should be configured to monitor for process injection techniques, specifically targeting svchost.exe. A key indicator is a svchost.exe instance that is not a child of services.exe or one that initiates outbound network connections to unusual, non-Microsoft domains. Security teams should create detection rules that correlate process creation events with subsequent network activity. For example, an alert should be triggered if a process spawned from a software update executable later results in a svchost.exe process making a connection to a low-reputation IP. Baselining normal svchost.exe behavior, including loaded DLLs and network destinations, is essential for identifying the malicious injected process.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

Evasive PandaMgBotDNS PoisoningAitMCyber EspionageAPTChina

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