ESET Research has uncovered a surveillance campaign conducted by a China-aligned Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known as SlippyNunchucks. The group is abusing the widely-used Sogou Input Method editor, a product of Tencent, to distribute its DarkVigil malware. The attack leverages a vulnerability, now tracked as CVE-2026-120422, where the application used insecure HTTP for updates. By performing DNS hijacking, SlippyNunchucks was able to intercept a request from the application's SGTool.exe component and serve a malicious configuration file, leading to malware deployment. The campaign has targeted organizations and Chinese-speaking individuals across Asia and Europe. In response to ESET's findings, Tencent has patched the vulnerability in version 16.10 of the application.
The threat actor, SlippyNunchucks, is a China-aligned group focused on cyber-espionage. Their primary tool in this campaign is the DarkVigil malware ecosystem. The attack targets users of the Sogou Input Method (also known as Sogou Pinyin), one of the most popular Chinese input method editors (IMEs) for Windows.
Attack Vector: The core of the attack is a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) technique combined with a software supply chain-style abuse:
SGTool.exe component made a request over unencrypted HTTP to check for vocabulary promotions.HTTP request is redirected to an attacker-controlled server.This method is particularly insidious as it abuses a legitimate, signed application from a trusted vendor to deliver malware, making it less likely to be flagged by basic security controls.
The vulnerability, CVE-2026-120422, exists in versions of Sogou Input Method prior to 16.10. The flaw is the use of HTTP instead of HTTPS for a specific update check. This lack of encryption and certificate validation allows for the DNS hijacking attack to succeed. If HTTPS had been used, the application would have rejected the connection to the attacker's server due to an invalid TLS certificate, thwarting the attack.
The campaign demonstrates the following MITRE ATT&CK techniques:
T1557 - Man-in-the-Middle: The overarching technique, specifically through DNS hijacking, to intercept and manipulate the application's network traffic.T1199 - Trusted Relationship: Abusing the inherent trust users have in the legitimate Sogou application to deliver a malicious payload.T1204.002 - Malicious File: Tricking the user's system into executing malware by serving a malicious configuration file through the trusted application.The primary goal of the SlippyNunchucks group and its DarkVigil malware is surveillance and intelligence gathering. Victims have been identified in Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, Oman, and Sri Lanka, indicating a broad geographic focus. The impact on targeted organizations and individuals includes the theft of sensitive information, intellectual property, and personal data. By hijacking a ubiquitous application like Sogou Pinyin, the attackers can achieve widespread access within their target demographic (Chinese-speaking users).
The following patterns may help identify vulnerable or compromised systems:
SGTool.exeSGTool.exeHTTPS inspection where possible. For unencrypted traffic, create detection rules in your firewall or IDS/IPS to alert on HTTP traffic from SGTool.exe.HTTPS.HTTP traffic from endpoints where possible, favoring encrypted HTTPS communication.Updating Sogou Input Method to the patched version (16.10+) directly remediates the vulnerability by enforcing HTTPS.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
While the vulnerability is the lack of SSL/TLS, monitoring for unencrypted HTTP traffic from applications that should be using encryption can serve as a detection method.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Using secure DNS services like DNS-over-HTTPS can mitigate the risk of traditional DNS hijacking attacks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The most direct and effective defense against the SlippyNunchucks campaign is to apply the patch provided by Tencent. Organizations with users of the Sogou Input Method must ensure all instances are updated to version 16.10 or later. This can be enforced using software management and endpoint compliance tools. The patch remediates CVE-2026-120422 by migrating the vulnerable update check from HTTP to HTTPS. This enforces TLS encryption and certificate validation, making the DNS hijacking attack ineffective. Because the attack relies entirely on intercepting this unencrypted communication, patching the application completely closes this specific infection vector.
As a defense-in-depth measure, organizations should implement outbound traffic filtering to detect and block anomalous connections. Specifically for this threat, security teams can create a rule to alert on or block any outbound traffic from the process SGTool.exe over HTTP (port 80). Since the patched, legitimate application will use HTTPS (port 443), any process still attempting to communicate over HTTP is either a vulnerable version or potentially malicious. This rule acts as both a detection mechanism for unpatched software and a preventative control that can stop the initial malicious configuration file from being downloaded, even if DNS hijacking is successful. This provides a valuable safety net while the patching process is underway.
ESET Research publishes its findings on the SlippyNunchucks campaign.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
CyberNetSec.io uses automation to assist source monitoring, deduplication, observable extraction, and structured intelligence generation. Published analysis follows human-defined editorial standards and adds defensive context including MITRE ATT&CK, D3FEND, STIX, and Sigma where applicable. Read our editorial policy.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.