Cisco Talos has identified an ongoing campaign by a suspected Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, designated UAT-8837, targeting critical infrastructure in North America. The campaign, active since at least 2025, leverages a combination of zero-day exploits and open-source tooling to achieve initial access, maintain persistence, and exfiltrate data. The group has been observed exploiting CVE-2025-53690, a vulnerability in SiteCore products, to breach target networks. Post-compromise, UAT-8837 uses tools like the Earthworm tunneler to establish covert command-and-control channels. This activity aligns with a broader pattern of nation-state actors targeting vital sectors for espionage and potential disruption, posing a significant risk to national security.
UAT-8837 is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group that exhibits tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with other China-nexus actors. Their primary objective appears to be long-term intelligence gathering from high-value targets within North American critical infrastructure sectors. The group demonstrates operational flexibility, adapting its toolset to evade detection and leveraging both known and zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access.
The use of the Earthworm tool is particularly notable. Earthworm is a lightweight and versatile network tunneling utility popular among Chinese APT groups for creating SOCKS proxy connections and reverse shells. This allows attackers to pivot from a compromised external system to internal network segments, bypassing perimeter firewalls. By using such open-source tools, the group can blend in with legitimate network traffic and make attribution more challenging.
The attack lifecycle of UAT-8837 follows a methodical, multi-stage process:
Initial Access: The primary vector observed is the exploitation of public-facing web applications. The group has specifically targeted CVE-2025-53690 in SiteCore products (T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application). They also use compromised credentials, likely obtained through phishing or credential stuffing attacks (T1078 - Valid Accounts).
Execution & Persistence: After gaining a foothold, the attackers deploy various tools to execute commands and establish persistence. This includes dropping web shells on compromised servers (T1505.003 - Web Shell) and creating scheduled tasks or services to ensure their malware survives a reboot.
Defense Evasion & Command and Control: The group heavily relies on the Earthworm tool to create encrypted reverse tunnels to their C2 infrastructure. This technique, known as Protocol Tunneling (T1572 - Protocol Tunneling), helps them evade network-based detection by encapsulating malicious traffic within a legitimate-looking protocol.
Discovery & Collection: Once persistence is established, UAT-8837 conducts extensive internal reconnaissance to map the network, identify domain controllers, and locate sensitive data repositories (T1018 - Remote System Discovery). Data is then staged and prepared for exfiltration.
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 |
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Initial Access | T1078 |
Valid Accounts |
| Execution | T1059.003 |
Windows Command Shell |
| Persistence | T1505.003 |
Web Shell |
| Command and Control | T1572 |
Protocol Tunneling |
| Discovery | T1018 |
Remote System Discovery |
The targeting of critical infrastructure by a nation-state actor like UAT-8837 carries severe potential consequences:
Security teams should hunt for TTPs associated with UAT-8837:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| process_name | ew.exe, ew_for_linux |
The default filenames for the Earthworm tunneling tool. |
| network_traffic_pattern | Unusual outbound connections on high ports | Earthworm and other reverse tunnel tools often connect back to C2 servers on non-standard ports. |
| log_source | Web server logs | Look for requests exploiting CVE-2025-53690 in SiteCore or the presence of newly created ASPX/PHP files in web-accessible directories. |
| command_line_pattern | ew -s rssocks -l 1080 -e 8888 |
Example command line for starting an Earthworm reverse SOCKS proxy. Monitor for such patterns. |
Defending against a persistent threat like UAT-8837 requires a proactive and layered security approach.
Patch Management (M1051): Aggressively patch all internet-facing systems. Prioritize vulnerabilities that are known to be actively exploited by threat actors. For critical flaws like CVE-2025-53690, patching should be treated as an emergency. This maps to Software Update (D3-SU).
Restrict Web-Based Content (M1021): Implement a web application firewall (WAF) to inspect incoming traffic to web servers and block malicious requests attempting to exploit vulnerabilities. This can serve as a compensating control if a patch is not yet available. This relates to Inbound Traffic Filtering (D3-ITF).
Egress Traffic Filtering (M1037): Enforce strict egress filtering rules to prevent tools like Earthworm from establishing outbound C2 connections. Deny all outbound traffic by default and only allow connections to known-good, necessary destinations on specific ports.
Application Whitelisting (M1038): Use application control solutions to prevent the execution of unauthorized software, such as Earthworm or other hacking tools, on critical servers. This is a form of Executable Allowlisting (D3-EAL).
Promptly applying security patches to internet-facing systems like SiteCore is the most direct way to prevent exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Implement strict egress filtering to block outbound connections from servers to untrusted destinations, which can prevent C2 tools like Earthworm from functioning.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to inspect and filter malicious HTTP requests targeting web applications, providing a layer of defense against exploits.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Enforce application allowlisting on critical servers to prevent unauthorized executables, such as the Earthworm tool, from running.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The primary defense against the initial access vector used by UAT-8837 is a rigorous and timely Software Update process. For critical infrastructure organizations, this means having an asset inventory of all internet-facing applications like SiteCore and subscribing to vendor security advisories. When a critical vulnerability like CVE-2025-53690 is announced, it must be treated as an incident. The patch should be tested and deployed to production systems within the timeframe mandated by bodies like CISA (e.g., 14 days for KEVs). If patching is not immediately feasible, compensating controls must be deployed, but the ultimate goal is to eliminate the vulnerability. This proactive stance neutralizes the attacker's easiest entry point.
Inbound Traffic Filtering, implemented via a Web Application Firewall (WAF), is a crucial layer of defense against exploits like the one targeting SiteCore. The WAF should be configured in blocking mode with rulesets specifically designed to detect and stop attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities, including generic attack patterns like SQL injection and remote code execution. For CVE-2025-53690, a virtual patch rule could be created on the WAF to block the specific malicious request pattern even before the underlying SiteCore application is patched. This provides an immediate compensating control and reduces the window of exposure. This is particularly vital for critical infrastructure where uptime is paramount and emergency patching can be complex.
To defeat UAT-8837's post-compromise C2 communications via the Earthworm tool, organizations must enforce strict Outbound Traffic Filtering. Critical servers should operate under a default-deny egress policy. This means that no outbound connections are allowed unless they are explicitly permitted by a firewall rule. For a web server, this might mean allowing outbound traffic only to specific database servers on port 1433 or to known software update repositories on port 443. Any attempt by a tool like Earthworm to establish a reverse tunnel to an arbitrary external IP on a high port would be blocked by default. This control effectively severs the attacker's command-and-control channel, preventing them from performing discovery, lateral movement, or exfiltration.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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