Storm-2945 Uses Hotel Wi-Fi to Spread CornFlake RAT

'CaptiveCrunch' Campaign Targets Hotel Guests with Malware via Wi-Fi

HIGH
August 1, 2026
6m read
MalwareCyberattackPhishing

Related Entities

Threat Actors

Storm-2945APT28

Organizations

Microsoft ReliaQuest

Products & Tech

Microsoft 365 Azure Active Directory

Other

CornFlake

Full Report

Executive Summary

A new threat campaign tracked as "CaptiveCrunch" is actively targeting travelers, particularly those staying in hotels, by compromising Wi-Fi captive portals. The threat actor, identified by Microsoft as Storm-2945, uses these compromised portals to display fake browser update prompts. Unsuspecting users who download and run the fake update are infected with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) named CornFlake. This malware is designed for surveillance and credential theft, capable of capturing webcam images, logging keystrokes, and stealing access tokens for Microsoft 365 and Azure AD, which can be used to bypass multi-factor authentication. The campaign represents a significant threat to business travelers and the security of corporate data.


Threat Overview

The CaptiveCrunch campaign leverages a trusted, yet often insecure, point of entry: public Wi-Fi. The attack begins when a user connects to a compromised hotel Wi-Fi network. Instead of the legitimate login page, the user is presented with a convincing but fake browser update notification (e.g., for Chrome or Firefox) overlaid on the captive portal page. This social engineering tactic preys on users' habits of accepting prompts to get online.

If the user downloads and executes the malicious file, the CornFlake RAT is installed. The malware's capabilities include:

  • Surveillance: Capturing webcam images, recording microphone audio, and logging keystrokes.
  • Credential Theft: Stealing access and refresh tokens for Microsoft 365, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), and Web Account Manager (WAM).

Notably, the stolen tokens allow the attacker to replay a user's authenticated session, effectively bypassing MFA. The campaign has also evolved to use a novel technique where some landing pages redirect users to Microsoft's legitimate device code authentication flow. The page instructs the user to enter a code supplied by the attacker, which grants Storm-2945 an MFA-satisfied session on the user's account.

Security researchers at ReliaQuest had previously noted the infrastructure's resemblance to that of APT28 (Fancy Bear), a Russian GRU unit, though firm attribution has not been made.


Technical Analysis

The CaptiveCrunch attack chain can be mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:


Impact Assessment

The primary victims are individuals using hotel Wi-Fi, with a high risk for business travelers, executives, and government employees who may handle sensitive data. The impact includes:

  • Corporate Data Breach: Theft of M365/Azure AD tokens can grant attackers access to corporate email, SharePoint, OneDrive, and other sensitive cloud resources.
  • Espionage: The extensive surveillance capabilities of the CornFlake RAT are ideal for industrial or state-sponsored espionage.
  • Identity Theft: Stolen credentials and personal information can be used for financial fraud or identity theft.
  • Supply Chain Risk: Microsoft's finding that common equipment and management systems were used across affected hotels suggests a potential compromise of a shared service provider, indicating a supply chain vulnerability within the hospitality technology ecosystem.

IOCs — Directly from Articles

No specific Indicators of Compromise (e.g., IP addresses, file hashes, or domains) were provided in the source articles.

Cyber Observables — Hunting Hints

Security teams may want to hunt for the following patterns to detect related activity:

Type
url_pattern
Value
portal-update, network-login-update
Description
Suspicious keywords in URLs associated with captive portals that could indicate a fake update page.
Context
Web proxy logs, DNS logs
Confidence
medium
Type
log_source
Value
Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in logs
Description
Monitor for sign-ins where MFA requirement is satisfied by a claim in the token, but no corresponding MFA event is logged, especially from unfamiliar locations.
Context
SIEM, Entra ID logs
Confidence
high
Type
command_line_pattern
Value
ms-devicelogin
Description
The URI handler for Microsoft's device code flow. Unexpected browser or application invocations of this handler should be investigated.
Context
EDR telemetry
Confidence
medium
Type
network_traffic_pattern
Value
Outbound traffic from guest/hotel Wi-Fi to non-standard ports or known malicious IPs.
Description
Baseline normal traffic from guest networks and alert on anomalies.
Context
Firewall logs, Netflow
Confidence
low

Detection & Response

  • Endpoint Detection: EDR solutions should be configured to detect the installation and execution of the CornFlake RAT. Look for processes that attempt to access browser token stores, capture audio/video, or log keystrokes.
  • Cloud Account Monitoring: Use tools like Microsoft Sentinel or Entra ID Identity Protection to monitor for anomalous sign-in behavior, such as impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, or session token replay. Alerts for device code flow authentications from untrusted networks should be prioritized.
  • Network Monitoring: While difficult on public Wi-Fi, corporate VPN solutions can provide visibility. Monitor for connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.

Mitigation

  • User Training: The most critical defense. Train users to never download or install software, especially browser updates, from a captive portal pop-up. Legitimate updates are handled by the browser itself or by corporate device management.
  • Use Secure Connections: Advise employees to avoid public Wi-Fi for business purposes. Instead, they should use a corporate VPN, a personal hotspot (cellular data), or a trusted private network.
  • Enforce MFA: While this attack can bypass some forms of MFA, phishing-resistant methods like FIDO2 security keys are not vulnerable to token theft or device code abuse.
  • Device Hardening: Use application control to prevent the execution of unauthorized software. Ensure endpoint security software is installed and up-to-date on all corporate devices.

Timeline of Events

1
August 1, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Educating users to recognize and avoid social engineering tactics like fake update prompts on captive portals.

Using a VPN creates a secure, segmented tunnel for user traffic, isolating it from the potentially hostile local network.

While some MFA can be bypassed by token theft, deploying phishing-resistant MFA (like FIDO2) mitigates this risk.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The most effective personal defense against attacks like CaptiveCrunch is the mandatory use of encrypted tunnels, such as a corporate VPN or a trusted third-party VPN service. When a user connects to any untrusted network like hotel Wi-Fi, all their traffic should be immediately routed through the VPN. This encapsulates their data in a secure tunnel, making it invisible to attackers on the local network. Crucially, it also bypasses the hotel's captive portal redirection for most web traffic, preventing the user from ever seeing the malicious fake update page. For this to be effective, organizations should configure corporate laptops with 'always-on' VPN functionality that activates automatically and prevents split-tunneling, ensuring no traffic leaks onto the local network.

While CaptiveCrunch aims to bypass MFA through token theft, not all MFA is created equal. This attack highlights the need to move towards phishing-resistant MFA. Organizations should prioritize the rollout of FIDO2/WebAuthn authenticators (like YubiKeys or Windows Hello for Business). These methods tie the authentication challenge to the origin domain and use public-key cryptography, making it impossible for stolen session tokens or credentials to be replayed on a different device or by a remote attacker. The device code flow abuse seen in this campaign would also be ineffective against a FIDO2-protected account, as the attacker would not possess the required private key from the user's registered security key.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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Tags

CaptiveCrunchStorm-2945CornFlakeRATHotel Wi-FiMFA BypassAPT28

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