A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, CVE-2026-64849, in the popular open-source MLOps platform MLflow is being actively and indiscriminately exploited in the wild. The flaw, which carries a CVSS score of 9.3, allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass existing security controls and force the MLflow server to make requests to arbitrary internal network locations. Attackers are leveraging this to query cloud provider metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254) to exfiltrate access keys, tokens, and other sensitive credentials from the underlying cloud infrastructure. The vulnerability affects all MLflow versions prior to 3.15.0, and organizations are urged to upgrade immediately and ensure their instances are not exposed to untrusted networks.
The vulnerability exists within MLflow's model-registry webhook feature. This feature is designed to notify external systems about events in the model lifecycle. While MLflow includes a validation check to prevent webhooks from being configured to point directly to private or internal IP addresses, security firm watchTowr discovered that this validation can be bypassed using an HTTP redirect.
The attack proceeds as follows:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/.This classic SSRF-via-redirect technique allows an unauthenticated attacker to completely compromise the security of the cloud environment hosting the MLflow instance.
Any organization using a vulnerable version of MLflow, particularly if the MLflow Tracking Server is exposed to the internet or an untrusted network, is at high risk.
According to watchTowr, active and indiscriminate scanning for vulnerable MLflow instances began within hours of the CVE's public assignment on August 17, 2026. This indicates that multiple threat actors are now aware of the vulnerability and are actively attempting to exploit it at scale. Any exposed, unpatched MLflow server should be considered a likely target.
The impact of exploiting CVE-2026-64849 is critical. By stealing cloud credentials from the metadata service, an attacker can gain the same level of access as the role assigned to the MLflow server. In a worst-case scenario, this could be an administrative role, giving the attacker full control over the victim's cloud account. With this access, an attacker could exfiltrate or destroy data, deploy cryptocurrency miners, or pivot to other systems within the cloud environment. Given that MLflow is used to manage sensitive machine learning models and data, the compromise could also lead to intellectual property theft or model poisoning attacks.
Security teams can hunt for exploitation of this vulnerability with the following observables:
169.254.169.254)./ajax-api/2.0/mlflow/registered-models/create-webhook169.254.169.254 is highly anomalous and a strong indicator of an SSRF attack. This can be detected using VPC Flow Logs, host-based firewalls, or EDR network monitoring.Upgrade to MLflow version 3.15.0 or later to patch the SSRF vulnerability.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Do not expose MLflow Tracking Servers to the internet. Restrict access to internal, trusted networks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Enforce the use of IMDSv2 on cloud instances to mitigate the impact of SSRF vulnerabilities by requiring a session token for metadata access.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The most immediate and impactful architectural defense against this MLflow SSRF vulnerability is to implement strict inbound traffic filtering. MLflow Tracking Servers should never be exposed directly to the public internet. Instead, they should be placed in a private subnet. Access for legitimate users and systems should be brokered through a secure entry point like a VPN or an authenticated application load balancer (ALB). By configuring security groups or network ACLs to deny all traffic except from these trusted sources, the attacker is prevented from reaching the vulnerable webhook API endpoint in the first place. This network-level control provides a robust defense that is independent of the application's patch level.
To both detect and block the impact of an SSRF exploit, organizations should implement egress (outbound) traffic filtering from their cloud instances. Specifically, create a firewall rule that explicitly denies any outbound connection from the MLflow server to the cloud metadata service IP address (169.254.169.254). Since a server should almost never need to query its own metadata after initialization, this rule will have minimal operational impact but will completely block this specific exploit path. Any attempt to violate this rule should generate a high-priority security alert. This acts as a powerful compensating control, breaking the attack chain even if the SSRF vulnerability itself is successfully triggered.
CVE-2026-64849 is publicly assigned.
Reports emerge of active, widespread exploitation of the MLflow vulnerability.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
CyberNetSec.io uses automation to assist source monitoring, deduplication, observable extraction, and structured intelligence generation. Published analysis follows human-defined editorial standards and adds defensive context including MITRE ATT&CK, D3FEND, STIX, and Sigma where applicable. Read our editorial policy.
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Every tactic, technique, and sub-technique used in this threat has been identified and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for consistent, actionable threat language.
Observables and indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been extracted and cataloged. Risk has been assessed and correlated with known threat actors and historical campaigns.
Detection rules, incident response steps, and D3FEND-aligned mitigation strategies are included so your team can act on this intelligence immediately.
Structured threat data is packaged as a STIX 2.1 bundle and can be visualized as an interactive graph — relationships between actors, malware, techniques, and indicators.
Sigma detection rules are derived from the threat techniques in this article and can be converted for deployment across any major SIEM or EDR platform.