UK Regulators Issue Cyber Recovery Guide for Financial Firms

Bank of England, FCA, and PRA Jointly Publish Guide on Effective Cyber Response and Recovery for UK Financial Sector

INFORMATIONAL
October 21, 2025
4m read
Policy and ComplianceRegulatoryIncident Response

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Executive Summary

On October 20, 2025, the Bank of England (BoE), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) released a joint publication outlining effective practices for cyber response and recovery. The guidance is intended for all regulated financial firms and financial market infrastructures in the United Kingdom. It stresses that firms must be prepared for severe but plausible cyberattacks. Key recommendations include the ability to restore critical services from immutable backups, the use of segregated recovery facilities to prevent reinfection, and obtaining assurance that critical third-party vendors can meet the firm's recovery objectives. This publication signals a strong regulatory focus on operational resilience in the face of escalating cyber threats.

Regulatory Details

The joint publication is not a new set of rules but rather a collection of observations on good practices seen at the most mature firms. The regulators expect firms of all sizes to consider these principles to enhance their resilience. The core themes are:

  1. Assume Severe Disruption: Firms should plan for a scenario where their primary production environment is compromised and untrustworthy. Recovery plans should not assume that any part of the production environment can be safely reused.
  2. Recovery Capabilities: The most effective practice is the ability to completely rebuild critical applications and infrastructure in a separate, clean environment. This includes restoring data from backups that are immutable or air-gapped, ensuring they cannot be encrypted or deleted by an attacker.
  3. Segregated Environments: Mature firms utilize a separate, segregated recovery facility. This environment must be highly resistant to unauthorized access, particularly from an attacker who has control of the production network.
  4. Third-Party Resilience: Firms are explicitly reminded that they cannot outsource their regulatory responsibility. They must conduct due diligence and obtain strong assurances that their critical third-party providers (e.g., cloud service providers) have adequate resilience and can support the firm's recovery time objectives (RTOs).
  5. Testing and Communication: Firms must regularly test their recovery plans. This includes testing backup restoration, application rebuilding, and crisis communication channels. Pre-defined communication plans for internal and external stakeholders are essential.

Affected Organizations

The guidance is aimed at all firms regulated by the BoE, FCA, and PRA. This includes banks, building societies, investment firms, insurance companies, and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) operating in the UK. While the observations are drawn from large, complex firms, the regulators state that the underlying principles are applicable to all.

Compliance Requirements

While not a formal regulation, the publication sets a clear expectation for what regulators consider to be effective practice. Firms should be prepared to demonstrate to regulators how they have considered and implemented these principles. Key actions for firms include:

  • Reviewing and updating incident response and disaster recovery plans to align with a "rebuild from scratch" scenario.
  • Assessing their backup solutions to ensure they are truly immutable or logically air-gapped.
  • Evaluating the security and segregation of their recovery environments.
  • Initiating discussions with critical third-party vendors to get contractual assurances of their resilience capabilities.
  • Scheduling and conducting rigorous, scenario-based tests of their recovery plans.

Impact Assessment

For financial firms, implementing these practices will require significant investment in technology, processes, and personnel. Firms with legacy infrastructure may face challenges in creating truly segregated recovery environments. There will be increased pressure on cloud and managed service providers to offer provable resilience and transparent recovery capabilities. The guidance will likely lead to more stringent third-party risk management programs and tougher contractual negotiations with vendors. Ultimately, this will increase the baseline for operational resilience across the UK financial sector, making it more robust against systemic cyber threats like ransomware.

Compliance Guidance

  1. Gap Analysis: Conduct a gap analysis of your current recovery capabilities against the practices outlined in the publication.
  2. Backup Strategy Review: Immediately assess your backup architecture. Can an attacker with domain admin rights in your production environment delete or encrypt your backups? If so, they are not sufficiently protected. Prioritize implementing immutability or a true air gap.
  3. Third-Party Due Diligence: Update your third-party risk management questionnaire to include specific questions about their recovery capabilities, RTOs, and how they segregate customer environments.
  4. Scenario-Based Testing: Move beyond simple backup restoration tests. Conduct a full-scale exercise that simulates the complete loss of your primary data center and assumes the network is compromised. Test your ability to rebuild critical services in your recovery site without relying on anything from the production environment.

Timeline of Events

1
October 20, 2025
The Bank of England, FCA, and PRA jointly published their guide on cyber response and recovery.
2
October 21, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

This is the core recommendation, focusing on immutable or air-gapped backups to ensure data is recoverable after a destructive attack.

The guidance emphasizes having a well-defined and tested plan for rebuilding critical infrastructure from a known-good state.

The recommendation for a segregated recovery facility aligns with the principle of isolating recovery environments from potentially compromised production networks.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

In the context of the UK regulators' guidance, financial firms must elevate their file restoration capabilities to assume a worst-case scenario. This means implementing and regularly testing the restoration of entire critical systems, not just files, from immutable backups. The process should be validated within a segregated recovery environment that has no network trust or connectivity with the production environment. Firms should document the end-to-end process, from declaring a disaster to bringing critical business services back online, and present these tested plans as evidence of compliance with regulatory expectations for operational resilience.

The guidance's emphasis on a 'segregated recovery facility' is a direct call for robust network isolation. Financial firms must ensure their disaster recovery (DR) site is logically and, where possible, physically isolated from the production network. This means no shared administrative credentials, no persistent network links, and a 'dark site' approach where connectivity is only enabled during a declared disaster. All traffic entering the recovery environment, even from seemingly clean sources, must be inspected. This prevents an attacker who has compromised the production environment from pivoting to the recovery site and destroying the backups, which is a common ransomware tactic.

The regulators' focus on third-party resilience requires firms to implement a continuous vendor trust monitoring program. This goes beyond initial questionnaires. Firms should demand and review their critical vendors' SOC 2 Type II reports, penetration test results, and disaster recovery test reports. Contractual language must be updated to include specific, measurable Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for recovery (RTO/RPO) in the event of a cyberattack on the vendor. For critical cloud providers, firms should understand and test their ability to restore services into a different region or availability zone if the primary one is compromised.

Sources & References

Effective practices: Cyber response and recovery capabilities
Bank of England (bankofengland.co.uk) October 20, 2025
BoE, FCA and PRA joint publication - Effective practices: Cyber response and recovery capabilities
Global Regulation Tomorrow (globalregulationtomorrow.com) October 20, 2025

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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UKFinanceRegulatoryComplianceBankOfEnglandFCAPRAIncidentResponse

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