On October 20, 2025, the Bank of England (BoE), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) released a joint publication outlining effective practices for cyber response and recovery. The guidance is intended for all regulated financial firms and financial market infrastructures in the United Kingdom. It stresses that firms must be prepared for severe but plausible cyberattacks. Key recommendations include the ability to restore critical services from immutable backups, the use of segregated recovery facilities to prevent reinfection, and obtaining assurance that critical third-party vendors can meet the firm's recovery objectives. This publication signals a strong regulatory focus on operational resilience in the face of escalating cyber threats.
The joint publication is not a new set of rules but rather a collection of observations on good practices seen at the most mature firms. The regulators expect firms of all sizes to consider these principles to enhance their resilience. The core themes are:
The guidance is aimed at all firms regulated by the BoE, FCA, and PRA. This includes banks, building societies, investment firms, insurance companies, and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) operating in the UK. While the observations are drawn from large, complex firms, the regulators state that the underlying principles are applicable to all.
While not a formal regulation, the publication sets a clear expectation for what regulators consider to be effective practice. Firms should be prepared to demonstrate to regulators how they have considered and implemented these principles. Key actions for firms include:
For financial firms, implementing these practices will require significant investment in technology, processes, and personnel. Firms with legacy infrastructure may face challenges in creating truly segregated recovery environments. There will be increased pressure on cloud and managed service providers to offer provable resilience and transparent recovery capabilities. The guidance will likely lead to more stringent third-party risk management programs and tougher contractual negotiations with vendors. Ultimately, this will increase the baseline for operational resilience across the UK financial sector, making it more robust against systemic cyber threats like ransomware.
This is the core recommendation, focusing on immutable or air-gapped backups to ensure data is recoverable after a destructive attack.
The guidance emphasizes having a well-defined and tested plan for rebuilding critical infrastructure from a known-good state.
The recommendation for a segregated recovery facility aligns with the principle of isolating recovery environments from potentially compromised production networks.
In the context of the UK regulators' guidance, financial firms must elevate their file restoration capabilities to assume a worst-case scenario. This means implementing and regularly testing the restoration of entire critical systems, not just files, from immutable backups. The process should be validated within a segregated recovery environment that has no network trust or connectivity with the production environment. Firms should document the end-to-end process, from declaring a disaster to bringing critical business services back online, and present these tested plans as evidence of compliance with regulatory expectations for operational resilience.
The guidance's emphasis on a 'segregated recovery facility' is a direct call for robust network isolation. Financial firms must ensure their disaster recovery (DR) site is logically and, where possible, physically isolated from the production network. This means no shared administrative credentials, no persistent network links, and a 'dark site' approach where connectivity is only enabled during a declared disaster. All traffic entering the recovery environment, even from seemingly clean sources, must be inspected. This prevents an attacker who has compromised the production environment from pivoting to the recovery site and destroying the backups, which is a common ransomware tactic.
The regulators' focus on third-party resilience requires firms to implement a continuous vendor trust monitoring program. This goes beyond initial questionnaires. Firms should demand and review their critical vendors' SOC 2 Type II reports, penetration test results, and disaster recovery test reports. Contractual language must be updated to include specific, measurable Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for recovery (RTO/RPO) in the event of a cyberattack on the vendor. For critical cloud providers, firms should understand and test their ability to restore services into a different region or availability zone if the primary one is compromised.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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