Rainbow Six Siege Hacked: Attackers Flood Game with $13M in Currency, Disrupting Economy

Ubisoft's Rainbow Six Siege Suffers Major Breach; Hackers Distribute Billions in Premium Currency and Hijack Moderation Tools

HIGH
December 30, 2025
6m read
CyberattackData BreachThreat Intelligence

Impact Scope

Affected Companies

Ubisoft

Industries Affected

Media and Entertainment

Related Entities

Products & Tech

Other

CVE Identifiers

CVE-2025-14847
HIGH
CVSS:8.7

Full Report

Executive Summary

Ubisoft, a major video game publisher, experienced a significant security breach affecting its popular tactical shooter, Rainbow Six Siege. Over the weekend of December 27-28, 2025, attackers compromised the game's backend infrastructure, leading to severe disruption. The attackers distributed an estimated 2 billion R6 Credits, the game's premium currency worth approximately $13.33 million, to all player accounts. They also manipulated the game's moderation tools, issuing arbitrary bans and unbans. The incident forced Ubisoft to shut down all game servers across PC, PlayStation, and Xbox platforms to conduct a complete data rollback to a state prior to the attack. The breach highlights the vulnerability of online gaming ecosystems to attacks that can cause both economic and reputational damage. Unverified claims from attackers suggest the 'MongoBleed' vulnerability may have been the initial access vector.


Threat Overview

The attack was a multi-faceted disruption targeting the core systems of Rainbow Six Siege. The threat actors demonstrated control over several critical backend functions:

  1. Economic Disruption: By granting 2 billion R6 Credits to every player, the attackers instantly devalued the game's premium currency and crashed the in-game marketplace as players rushed to purchase rare cosmetic items.
  2. Moderation System Hijacking: The attackers seized control of administrative tools, allowing them to issue bans to random players, unban others, and manipulate the in-game ban notification ticker to display their own messages. This sowed confusion and eroded player trust in the game's governance.
  3. Data Theft (Alleged): While unconfirmed by Ubisoft, the attackers have claimed to have exfiltrated over 900 GB of data, which could include source code, development assets, and potentially player information.

The attack's scope across all platforms indicates a compromise of centralized, platform-agnostic backend services.

Technical Analysis

The exact initial access vector has not been officially confirmed by Ubisoft. However, the timing and claims made by the attackers strongly suggest a possible link to the CVE-2025-14847 'MongoBleed' vulnerability. If Ubisoft was using a vulnerable, self-hosted MongoDB instance for its game services, attackers could have used the memory leak to exfiltrate credentials or session tokens (T1005).

Once inside, the attackers likely performed the following actions:

  • Discovery: Identified and accessed the services responsible for managing player currency and moderation (T1069.003).
  • Privilege Escalation: Gained administrative privileges over the game's backend APIs or databases (T1068).
  • Impact: Executed commands or API calls to alter player data en masse, specifically targeting the R6 Credits balance (T1499.002). They also manipulated the moderation system, a form of service manipulation.

This attack demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the game's architecture, moving beyond simple cheating to a systemic disruption.

Impact Assessment

This breach has several layers of impact for Ubisoft and its player community:

  • Financial Impact: While the distributed currency was virtual, the event represents a potential revenue loss of over $13 million and required significant resources for incident response, server downtime, and data restoration.
  • Reputational Damage: The incident damages player trust in the security and stability of the game's ecosystem. The hijacking of moderation tools is particularly harmful, as it undermines the perceived fairness of the game.
  • Operational Disruption: Taking a globally popular game completely offline for a data rollback is a drastic measure that results in lost playtime for millions of users and significant operational overhead for Ubisoft's technical teams.
  • Intellectual Property Risk: If the attackers' claims of a 900 GB data theft are true, Ubisoft faces the risk of source code leaks, which could enable the development of more sophisticated cheats, or the exposure of future game content.

Detection & Response

Ubisoft's response involved a complete shutdown and rollback, indicating the breach was deep-seated and could not be surgically corrected.

Detection Strategies for Similar Incidents:

  1. Application Performance Monitoring: Monitor backend APIs and database queries for anomalous behavior. A script granting currency to all players would generate a massive, atypical spike in database write operations that should trigger alerts.
  2. Privileged Access Monitoring: (D3-LAM) Closely monitor the use of administrative accounts and tools. Any mass-banning or mass-unbanning operations outside of a planned maintenance window should be flagged for immediate review.
  3. Database Auditing: Implement and monitor database audit logs. A query updating a currency value for all records in a player table is highly suspicious and should be an immediate red flag.

Ubisoft's Response:

  • Containment: Shut down all game servers and the marketplace to prevent further damage.
  • Eradication & Recovery: Initiated a full data rollback to a known-good state before the breach. This is a 'scorched earth' approach but is effective for reversing widespread, unauthorized data modification.
  • Communication: Informed players about the situation and confirmed that no one would be punished for spending the illicitly granted credits.

Mitigation

  1. Vulnerability Management: (D3-SU) Aggressively patch all third-party software used in backend infrastructure, especially internet-facing databases like MongoDB. If the 'MongoBleed' exploit was used, this highlights a critical gap in patch management.
  2. Zero Trust Architecture: Implement a zero-trust security model where no service or user is trusted by default. Access to critical backend services (e.g., currency management, moderation) should require strong, multi-factor authentication and be strictly limited to specific, authorized microservices.
  3. Rate Limiting and Anomaly Detection: Implement rate limiting on critical API endpoints. A request to grant currency should be rate-limited per user. A script attempting to do this for millions of users should be automatically blocked and trigger an alert.
  4. Immutable Ledgers for Transactions: For in-game economies, consider using technologies like immutable ledgers or blockchain to create a tamper-evident audit trail of all transactions, making unauthorized currency generation easier to detect and trace.

Timeline of Events

1
December 27, 2025
The security breach of Rainbow Six Siege begins over the weekend.
2
December 28, 2025
Ubisoft takes all game servers offline to contain the breach and begin a data rollback.
3
December 30, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Ensuring all third-party components, such as databases (e.g., MongoDB), are patched against known vulnerabilities like 'MongoBleed'.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Audit

M1047enterprise

Implementing and actively monitoring audit logs for databases and critical applications to detect anomalous mass-update operations.

Restricting access to backend management services and databases to a minimal set of authorized internal services.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Isolating critical microservices, such as currency management, from other game services to limit the blast radius of a compromise.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

To prevent a recurrence of this economic disruption, Ubisoft should implement Resource Access Pattern Analysis on its critical backend services. This involves baselining normal transaction patterns for the R6 Credits system. A normal pattern might be one user purchasing a specific item or a single transaction granting a purchased amount of currency. The attack, which involved granting currency to all players simultaneously, represents a massive deviation from this baseline. A monitoring system should be configured to detect and automatically block such bulk operations that fall outside established parameters. For example, a rule could be set to trigger a high-priority alert and temporarily halt the transaction service if a single process attempts to modify more than 10,000 player currency balances within a one-minute window. This provides an automated defense against systemic manipulation.

Given the attackers' claims of using the 'MongoBleed' exploit, this incident serves as a critical lesson in supply chain vulnerability management for online services. Ubisoft's security teams must maintain a comprehensive and up-to-date software bill of materials (SBOM) for all backend infrastructure. An aggressive patch management program is non-negotiable. For critical vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-14847, especially those with public PoCs and active exploitation, patching should occur within hours or days, not weeks. This requires automated vulnerability scanning across all environments and a streamlined process for testing and deploying security updates to production systems without causing undue downtime. The failure to patch a known, critical vulnerability in an internet-facing system is a primary contributor to breaches of this nature.

A robust network isolation and segmentation strategy is crucial. Critical backend services, such as the database managing player currency and the moderation platform, should be in highly restricted network segments. They should not be directly accessible from the internet or from less-sensitive parts of the game's infrastructure. Access should be mediated through hardened API gateways that enforce strict authentication and authorization. For example, the currency service should only accept calls from a specific, allowlisted payment processing service, not from a generic web server. This microsegmentation approach limits the blast radius of a potential compromise. Even if one component (like a web server) is breached, the attacker cannot directly access and manipulate the core economic and administrative systems.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

UbisoftRainbow Six SiegeGamingCyberattackIn-Game EconomyData BreachMongoBleed

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