The latest APT Activity Report from ESET, covering the period of April to September 2025, paints a picture of escalating global cyber conflict driven by geopolitical tensions. The report details a marked intensification of operations by state-sponsored groups aligned with Russia and China. Russia-aligned actors, particularly the infamous Sandworm group, have ramped up destructive attacks against Ukraine, deploying data-wiping malware against critical sectors like energy, logistics, and agriculture. In parallel, China-aligned groups such as FamousSparrow have expanded their espionage campaigns, with a new strategic focus on government targets in Latin America. The report underscores a trend where cyber operations are becoming a primary tool for projecting national power and achieving geopolitical objectives.
Russian state-sponsored groups continue to use Ukraine as a primary theater of operations, with a secondary focus on its European Union allies. The activity is characterized by disruptive and destructive attacks.
China-aligned APT groups have been active in advancing Beijing's interests, with a notable strategic pivot towards Latin America.
T1566) or exploiting public-facing applications (T1190).T1485 - Data Destruction: Deployment of wiper malware to render systems and data unrecoverable. T1561 - Disk Wipe.T1204.002 - Malicious File: User tricked into running a fake ESET installer.T1090.003 - Multi-hop Proxy: Use of the Tor network to anonymize C2 traffic.T1566.002 - Spearphishing Link leading to an AiTM phishing page.T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Tokens: Intercepting authentication process to steal session cookies.T1078 - Valid Accounts).The impact varies by campaign. For Ukraine, the attacks are directly destructive, aimed at crippling critical infrastructure and government functions, with tangible effects on the nation's ability to operate. For targets in Latin America, the primary impact is espionage: the theft of sensitive government data, diplomatic communications, and strategic plans, which can undermine national security and give China a significant geopolitical advantage. The expansion of North Korean crypto-theft operations poses a direct financial threat to the global financial ecosystem and individuals in Central Asia.
D3-PA: Process Analysis.D3-UGLPA: User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis.D3-OTF: Outbound Traffic Filtering.D3-NI: Network Isolation.D3-MFA: Multi-factor Authentication.D3-FR: File Restoration.Implement phishing-resistant MFA (like FIDO2) to mitigate AiTM attacks.
Collect and analyze logs to detect suspicious login patterns and command execution.
Segment networks to contain breaches and prevent lateral movement from less critical to critical systems.
Train users to identify and report sophisticated spearphishing attempts.
To counter destructive wiper attacks from groups like Sandworm, organizations in Ukraine and allied nations must maintain a robust and tested backup strategy. This involves the 3-2-1 rule: three copies of data, on two different media types, with one copy stored offline and immutable. Immutability is key, as it prevents backups from being deleted or encrypted by the attacker. Regularly test the restoration process to ensure data integrity and to meet recovery time objectives (RTOs). This is not a preventative measure but a critical resilience capability to ensure the organization can recover and resume operations after a destructive attack.
To combat the AiTM techniques used by China-aligned groups like FamousSparrow, security teams should implement user behavior analytics that focus on login patterns. Specifically, monitor for 'impossible travel' scenarios, where a user logs in from one location and then a geographically distant location in a short time. Also, baseline normal login locations for users and alert on deviations. When an AiTM attack occurs, the final login to the cloud service (e.g., Microsoft 365) will originate from the attacker's infrastructure, not the user's. Detecting this geographic anomaly is a high-fidelity indicator of a compromised session.
To detect backdoors like Kalambur that use Tor for C2, organizations should implement strict outbound traffic filtering. By default, deny all outbound traffic and only allow connections to known-good IPs and domains on required ports (e.g., TCP 80/443). Specifically, create a deny list for all known Tor entry node IP addresses. Since the list of Tor nodes is public, it can be regularly updated. Any host attempting to connect to a Tor node is a strong signal of malicious or unauthorized activity and should trigger an immediate incident response investigation.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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