Asahi Breweries Crippled by Ransomware Attack, Shipments Plummet to 10% Ahead of Peak Holiday Season

Ransomware Attack on Asahi Breweries Disrupts Supply Chain, Forcing Manual Operations and Delaying Earnings Report

HIGH
November 12, 2025
5m read
RansomwareCyberattackSupply Chain Attack

Impact Scope

Affected Companies

Asahi Group Holdings Ltd.

Industries Affected

ManufacturingRetail

Geographic Impact

Japan (national)

Related Entities

Other

Asahi Group Holdings Ltd. Ritsumeikan UniversityAskul Corp.Nikkei Inc.Tetsutaro Uehara

Full Report

Executive Summary

Asahi Group Holdings Ltd., Japan's largest brewing company, has been severely crippled by a ransomware attack that occurred over a month ago. The attack has disabled its central online system for managing orders and shipments, leading to a catastrophic breakdown in its supply chain. The company is now operating at just 10% of its normal shipment capacity, relying on manual processes like phone calls and faxes. This disruption comes at the worst possible time, just before the peak December sales season. The incident has also forced Asahi to delay its third-quarter earnings report due to an inability to access necessary financial data. This attack serves as a stark warning about the devastating impact of ransomware on manufacturing and supply chain operations, especially for organizations reliant on a mix of modern and legacy IT systems.


Threat Overview

  • Victim: Asahi Group Holdings Ltd., a major Japanese beverage company.
  • Attack Type: Ransomware.
  • Impact: Disruption of core business operations, specifically order processing and shipment logistics.
  • Date: The attack's effects have been ongoing for over a month as of November 12, 2025.

Details about the specific ransomware group responsible or the initial access vector have not been publicly disclosed. However, the outcome is characteristic of a 'big game hunting' ransomware operation, where attackers specifically target large corporations to cause maximum disruption and extort a significant ransom. The attackers successfully compromised and disabled Asahi's internal online system, which appears to be the central nervous system of its logistics operations.


Impact Assessment

The business impact on Asahi is severe and multifaceted:

  • Operational Paralysis: Reverting to manual order processing has reduced shipment capacity by 90%. This is an almost complete shutdown of their primary logistics function.
  • Financial Loss: The attack is occurring during the lead-up to December, Asahi's most profitable month. The inability to fulfill orders will result in a massive loss of revenue and market share, with rivals likely benefiting.
  • Reputational Damage: The public nature of the disruption and the inability to supply customers (bars, restaurants, retailers) damages the brand's reputation for reliability.
  • Financial Reporting Disruption: The company has been forced to postpone its Q3 earnings report, indicating a loss of control over critical financial systems and data. This can erode investor confidence.
  • Complex Recovery: Professor Tetsutaro Uehara of Ritsumeikan University noted that Asahi's IT environment, a patchwork of older systems from various acquisitions, is complicating recovery efforts. This highlights the security debt incurred by complex, unintegrated legacy infrastructure.

This incident is a textbook example of how ransomware has evolved from simple data encryption to a tool capable of causing kinetic-like effects on physical supply chains.


Detection & Response

For organizations facing a similar attack, the response should focus on containment and recovery:

  1. Isolate Affected Systems: Immediately disconnect compromised systems from the network to prevent the ransomware from spreading further. This includes servers, workstations, and network segments. This is a key D3FEND eviction technique, Network Isolation.
  2. Activate Incident Response Plan: Engage the internal IR team and any third-party experts on retainer. The primary goal is to understand the scope of the compromise.
  3. Preserve Evidence: Take forensic images of affected systems before wiping and restoring them. This is crucial for root cause analysis.
  4. Restore from Backups: Begin restoring systems from clean, offline, and immutable backups. Test restored systems in an isolated environment before reconnecting them to the network. D3FEND's File Restoration is the core principle here.
  5. Hunt for Persistence: Assume the attackers have left backdoors. Conduct a thorough hunt for persistence mechanisms (T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution) before bringing the network back online.

Mitigation

To prevent such attacks, organizations must adopt a defense-in-depth strategy:

  1. Secure Initial Access Vectors:
  2. Network Segmentation (M1030 - Network Segmentation): Segment IT and OT networks. Prevent lateral movement by restricting communication between different network zones. A workstation compromise should not be able to reach critical manufacturing or logistics servers.
  3. Immutable Backups: Maintain multiple copies of critical data, with at least one offline and one immutable (unable to be altered or deleted). Regularly test your ability to restore from these backups.
  4. Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Deploy EDR solutions to detect and block ransomware behaviors, such as rapid file encryption or the deletion of volume shadow copies.
  5. Least Privilege: Ensure user accounts and services only have the permissions necessary to perform their roles. This can limit the impact of a compromised account.

Timeline of Events

1
October 12, 2025
Approximate time of the ransomware attack on Asahi, which has been ongoing for over a month.
2
November 12, 2025
Asahi postpones its third-quarter earnings report due to the cyberattack.
3
November 12, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

The most critical defense against ransomware is having tested, offline, and immutable backups to enable recovery without paying the ransom.

Proper network segmentation between IT and OT/manufacturing environments could have contained the blast radius and protected core operational systems.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Enforcing MFA on all remote access points is a primary defense against the common initial access vectors used by ransomware groups.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Training users to identify and report phishing emails, a common initial access vector for ransomware, is a crucial layer of defense.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

RansomwareAsahiJapanSupply ChainManufacturingCyberattack

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