Qilin Ransomware Gang Adds Business Services Firm B Dynamic to Leak Site

Qilin Ransomware Group Claims B Dynamic as New Victim in Ongoing Double-Extortion Campaign

HIGH
December 1, 2025
5m read
RansomwareThreat ActorCyberattack

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B DynamicQilin Ransomware

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Executive Summary

On December 1, 2025, the Qilin ransomware group added business services company B Dynamic to its list of victims on its dark web data leak site. This action is a hallmark of the group's double-extortion strategy, where they not only encrypt a victim's files but also exfiltrate sensitive data and threaten to publish it if the ransom is not paid. While details of the breach are not yet public, this development confirms that B Dynamic has been successfully compromised. The incident is another example of the ongoing, persistent threat posed by Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operations targeting organizations of all sizes.

Threat Overview

Qilin is a known RaaS operation that has been active for several years, targeting various industries worldwide. The group provides its affiliates with the ransomware payload, infrastructure, and a negotiation platform in exchange for a share of the profits. Their primary TTP is double extortion.

  1. Initial Access: Qilin affiliates are known to use various initial access methods, including exploiting public-facing vulnerabilities (e.g., in VPNs or other edge devices), phishing campaigns, and purchasing access from initial access brokers.
  2. Execution & Encryption: Once inside the network, the affiliates perform reconnaissance, escalate privileges, and move laterally to identify high-value data and systems. The Qilin ransomware payload is then deployed to encrypt files across the network (T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact).
  3. Data Exfiltration: Before encryption, the attackers exfiltrate large volumes of sensitive data to their own servers (T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol).
  4. Impact: A ransom note is left on encrypted systems, and the victim is listed on Qilin's data leak site. This public shaming is used as leverage to force payment (T1657 - Financial Cryptanalysis).

Technical Analysis

While specific TTPs for the B Dynamic breach are unknown, Qilin's general methodology is well-documented. Affiliates often use common post-exploitation tools like Cobalt Strike for command and control and lateral movement. They frequently abuse legitimate tools like PsExec and RDP to move across the network. Privilege escalation is often achieved by exploiting local vulnerabilities or using tools like Mimikatz to dump credentials. The ransomware itself is typically written in Go or Rust, making it more difficult to reverse engineer.

Impact Assessment

For B Dynamic, the impact is severe. The company is facing significant business disruption due to encrypted systems, coupled with the threat of a major data breach if their stolen information is released. This can lead to substantial financial costs from ransom payments, recovery efforts, regulatory fines (e.g., under GDPR or CCPA), and legal action from affected customers or employees. The public nature of the leak site causes immediate and lasting reputational damage, eroding trust with clients and partners. This incident demonstrates that no industry is immune from the threat of ransomware.

Detection & Response

  • EDR/XDR: Deploy and monitor an EDR/XDR solution to detect common ransomware behaviors, such as rapid file modification, deletion of volume shadow copies (vssadmin delete shadows), and the execution of tools like Cobalt Strike or Mimikatz.
  • Network Monitoring: Monitor for large, unexpected data egress to unknown IP addresses. This can be an early indicator of data exfiltration, occurring before the final encryption stage.
  • Decoy Accounts & Files: Use D3FEND Decoy Object techniques by creating decoy 'honeypot' files and accounts. Place fake sensitive documents on file shares and create decoy domain admin accounts. Any access to these decoys should trigger a high-priority alert, as it is a strong signal of an intruder performing reconnaissance.

Mitigation

  • Patch Public-Facing Systems: The most common entry point for ransomware is an unpatched vulnerability in an internet-facing system (e.g., VPN, firewall, web server). Maintain a rigorous patch management program, prioritizing edge devices. This is a critical application of MITRE Mitigation M1051 - Update Software.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA on all external access points (VPN, RDP) and for all privileged accounts. This prevents attackers from using stolen credentials to gain initial access. This is MITRE Mitigation M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication.
  • Immutable Backups: Maintain offline and immutable backups of all critical data. The backups should follow the 3-2-1 rule (3 copies, 2 different media, 1 offsite). Regularly test your ability to restore from these backups. This ensures you can recover your data without paying the ransom.
  • Network Segmentation: Segment your network to limit an attacker's ability to move laterally. Critical servers should be in isolated network zones with strict access controls, preventing a compromise on a workstation from spreading to the entire network. This is MITRE Mitigation M1030 - Network Segmentation.

Timeline of Events

1
December 1, 2025
The Qilin ransomware group lists B Dynamic as a victim on its data leak site.
2
December 1, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Rigorously patch internet-facing systems to close the vulnerabilities often used by ransomware for initial access.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Enforce MFA on all remote access solutions (VPN, RDP) to protect against credential-based attacks.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Segment the network to contain ransomware outbreaks and prevent lateral movement from workstations to critical servers.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Maintain regular, tested, and immutable backups to enable recovery without paying a ransom.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The ultimate defense against an impact-focused attack like Qilin ransomware is the ability to restore operations without paying the ransom. This requires a robust and well-tested backup strategy. Organizations must implement the 3-2-1 backup rule: at least three copies of data, on two different media types, with at least one copy offsite and offline/immutable. For Qilin, which actively targets and deletes backups, immutability is key. This can be achieved with cloud storage object locks (like AWS S3 Object Lock) or on-premise solutions that support write-once-read-many (WORM) storage. It is not enough to simply have backups; organizations must regularly test their restoration process. This includes full recovery drills for critical systems to ensure the backups are viable and that the IT team can meet recovery time objectives (RTOs). A proven ability to restore from backups removes the attacker's primary leverage (encryption) and turns a catastrophic event into a manageable, albeit costly, recovery effort.

To detect ransomware actors like Qilin during their reconnaissance and lateral movement phase, organizations can strategically place decoy objects throughout the network. These are honeypots designed to be attractive to attackers. For example, create a file share named 'Finance-Passwords' containing fake credential files. Place a file named '2026_M&A_Strategy.docx' in a general directory. Create a decoy domain administrator account with a simple password and no legitimate purpose. Any interaction with these decoy objects is a high-fidelity indicator of malicious activity. EDR and identity management systems should be configured to generate a top-priority alert the moment one of these decoys is accessed, read, or authenticated with. This provides an early warning that an attacker is inside the network, allowing the security team to intervene and evict the threat actor before they reach the data exfiltration and encryption stages of the attack.

To specifically detect the execution of the ransomware payload, organizations can use process-based honeypots. This technique involves creating fake processes that mimic services ransomware is known to target. For instance, a security tool could create a decoy process named sqlserver.exe on a workstation where it shouldn't exist. When the Qilin ransomware payload begins its automated encryption routine, it will likely attempt to terminate this process to unlock database files. The act of terminating this specific decoy process would trigger an immediate, high-confidence alert, signaling that an encryption routine has just begun. This can enable an automated response, such as isolating the host from the network, to contain the damage and prevent the ransomware from spreading to other systems. It's a last line of defense that can significantly limit the blast radius of a ransomware attack.

Sources & References

Qilin Ransomware Claims New Victim: B Dynamic
DigiSec (dig-sec.com) December 1, 2025
December 1, 2025 Cyber Threat Intelligence Briefing
Kroll (kroll.com) December 1, 2025

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

RansomwareQilinRaaSDouble ExtortionDark Web

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