1.2 million
An unidentified threat actor has claimed a significant data breach against the University of Pennsylvania, alleging the exfiltration of 1.2 million donor and alumni records. The attacker demonstrated their access by sending offensive emails from a university-owned mailing list on November 1st, 2025. The initial vector was reportedly a compromised employee single sign-on (SSO) account, which granted the intruder broad access to critical university systems, including Salesforce, Qlik, SAP, and SharePoint. The stolen data is said to contain extensive personally identifiable information (PII), sensitive demographic details, and financial data, posing a severe risk of fraud, identity theft, and reputational damage to the university and its community.
The incident came to light on November 1st, 2025, when students and alumni received vulgar emails from a legitimate university email platform, connect.upenn.edu, which is hosted on Salesforce Marketing Cloud. The attacker later contacted BleepingComputer, claiming to have gained "full access" via a compromised employee's PennKey SSO account. This single point of failure allegedly allowed the attacker to pivot across multiple high-value systems, including the university's VPN, Salesforce customer data, the Qlik analytics platform, the SAP business intelligence system, and internal SharePoint files. The attacker's claims were backed by screenshots and data samples, suggesting a deep and persistent intrusion into the university's digital infrastructure.
The attack chain appears to have started with the compromise of legitimate credentials, a common and effective tactic.
T1078 - Valid Accounts. By compromising an employee's SSO credentials, they bypassed perimeter defenses designed to block unauthorized users.T1087 - Account Discovery to understand the compromised account's permissions and T1018 - Remote System Discovery to map accessible systems like Salesforce, SAP, and Qlik.T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object for data held in Salesforce and SharePoint, and T1213 - Data from Information Repositories for databases associated with SAP and Qlik.T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service. The subsequent sending of offensive emails from a university system served as both a calling card and a method to maximize reputational damage, a form of T1491.002 - External Defacement.The reliance on a single factor for SSO access to such a wide array of sensitive systems represents a critical architectural flaw. The lack of multi-factor authentication on a privileged employee account was the key enabler for this breach.
The impact of this breach is multi-faceted and severe:
No specific file hashes, IP addresses, or domains were provided in the source articles.
Security teams should proactively hunt for the following activity:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| log_source | SSO/IAM Logs | Monitor for anomalous login patterns (impossible travel, multiple failed logins followed by success, logins from unusual devices/IPs). |
| log_source | Cloud Platform Logs (Salesforce, SAP) | Hunt for excessive data access or export activity from a single account, especially outside of business hours. |
| network_traffic_pattern | Large Data Egress | Monitor for unusually large data transfers from internal systems or cloud tenants to external IP addresses. |
| email_activity | Outbound Mail Logs | Analyze logs from connect.upenn.edu for unusual sending patterns or authentication events preceding the mass email. |
D3-DAM - Domain Account Monitoring.D3-MFA - Multi-factor Authentication.D3-NI - Network Isolation.Enforcing MFA on all accounts, especially privileged SSO accounts, would have likely prevented the initial access.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Implementing least privilege and just-in-time access would limit the blast radius of a compromised account.
Segmenting access to critical systems like SAP and financial databases prevents an attacker from moving freely across the network.
The University of Pennsylvania must immediately deploy and enforce phishing-resistant Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across all student, faculty, and employee accounts, with no exceptions. Priority must be given to accounts with privileged access, such as the compromised employee PennKey account. This includes access to the VPN, all cloud platforms (Salesforce, SharePoint, SAP, Qlik), and any administrative portals. Acceptable MFA methods should include FIDO2 security keys or authenticator apps with number matching, while less secure methods like SMS should be deprecated. This single control is the most effective defense against credential compromise and would have likely prevented this entire incident by stopping the attacker at the initial login, even with a valid password.
Implement a User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) solution to perform Resource Access Pattern Analysis. This system should be configured to monitor access to the high-value systems compromised in this attack: Salesforce, Qlik, SAP, and SharePoint. The system must establish a baseline of normal access for each user and role. The security operations team should configure high-priority alerts for deviations from this baseline, such as an account accessing millions of records for the first time, accessing data outside of normal working hours, or accessing multiple sensitive repositories in a rapid sequence. Such anomalous behavior would have provided an early warning of the attacker's collection activities, enabling a faster response.
The university must move away from a flat network architecture where a single compromised SSO account grants wide-ranging access. Critical data repositories, particularly the SAP and Qlik systems containing financial and analytics data, should be placed in isolated network segments. Access to these segments should be strictly controlled through internal firewalls and require separate, just-in-time authentication, even for users coming from the internal network. This 'Zero Trust' approach ensures that even if an attacker compromises a user account, they cannot automatically pivot to the organization's most sensitive data assets without overcoming additional security hurdles.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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