On October 21, 2025, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), one of the most influential financial regulators in the United States, issued formal guidance to all its regulated entities, including banks and insurance companies. The guidance reinforces the principle that financial firms are ultimately responsible for managing cybersecurity risks, even when those risks originate from third-party service providers (TPSPs). Citing the growing reliance on external vendors for critical technologies like cloud, AI, and fintech, the DFS warned that risk exposure is increasing. The regulator has placed the onus squarely on the senior leadership and boards of directors of these institutions, mandating their active engagement and sufficient expertise in overseeing third-party cyber risk. This move signals a heightened regulatory focus on supply chain security within the financial sector.
The guidance serves as a clarification and reinforcement of the existing NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR 500), specifically focusing on Section 500.11, which pertains to Third-Party Service Provider Security Policy. The key tenets of the new guidance are:
This guidance applies to all entities regulated by the NYDFS, which includes a vast array of organizations operating in or serving New York State. This scope covers:
Essentially, any financial institution under the jurisdiction of the NYDFS must review and likely enhance its third-party risk management program in light of this guidance.
To comply, affected organizations must ensure their Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) program includes, at a minimum:
The issuance of this guidance will have significant operational and strategic impacts on financial institutions:
Firms should take the following tactical steps:
Specifically, training for board members and senior officers to ensure they have sufficient cybersecurity knowledge to perform their oversight duties as required by the DFS.
Conducting regular, formal audits of third-party service providers' security controls, as well as internal TPRM processes.
Enforcing the principle of least privilege for all third-party connections to limit the potential impact of a vendor compromise.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
In the context of the NY DFS guidance, financial institutions must rigorously apply the principle of least privilege to all third-party service provider accounts. This D3FEND technique involves a meticulous review and hardening of permissions. Instead of granting broad administrative rights, firms should create highly restricted, purpose-built roles for each vendor. For example, a vendor providing support for a specific application should have an account that can only access that application's servers and logs, and nothing else. Permissions should be reviewed on a quarterly basis and automatically revoked when a contract ends. This should be implemented through a centralized Identity and Access Management (IAM) solution. This directly addresses the regulator's concern about protecting nonpublic information by ensuring a compromised vendor account has a minimal blast radius and cannot be used to access data or systems beyond its explicit function.
To meet the DFS's expectation of proactive governance, firms should implement Authorization Event Thresholding to monitor vendor activity. This goes beyond simple login alerts. It involves setting up rules in a SIEM or CASB to detect anomalous patterns of authorization and access. For instance, an alert could be triggered if a vendor account generates more than 100 'access denied' events in a 10-minute window, which could indicate a compromised account being used for reconnaissance. Another rule could alert if a TPSP account, which normally only accesses data during US business hours, suddenly starts accessing large volumes of data at 3 AM. This technique provides concrete, data-driven insights into vendor behavior, allowing the security team to detect potential incidents in near real-time and demonstrate to regulators that they are actively monitoring their third-party connections, not just relying on static, annual assessments.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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