An audit of the New South Wales (NSW) Health system in Australia has exposed a deeply rooted cultural issue that undermines its cybersecurity posture. The report reveals a "normalisation of non-compliance" among clinical staff, who routinely bypass fundamental security controls. Practices such as password sharing and using personal devices for work are reportedly commonplace, driven by a desire to save time in high-pressure clinical settings. These findings are particularly alarming given the sensitive nature of patient data and the fact that the Australian healthcare sector is under constant attack from cybercriminals, as evidenced by the recent ransomware attack on the Genea fertility clinic. The audit underscores that technical security investments are being negated by human factors and a lack of security culture.
This is not a singular incident but a systemic finding from a security audit. The core issue is the widespread and accepted practice of circumventing security policies by clinical staff at NSW Health. Key findings include:
This behavior creates a massive, uncontrolled attack surface and renders many technical security controls, such as access logging and multi-factor authentication, ineffective.
The root cause is not a technical vulnerability but a failure of process, culture, and user experience. The insecure behaviors directly enable several MITRE ATT&CK techniques:
T1078 - Valid Accounts: If one clinician's password is stolen (e.g., via phishing), the attacker effectively gains access to the accounts of every person they shared it with. This multiplies the impact of a single credential compromise.The audit highlights a critical lesson: if security controls are too cumbersome and impede critical workflows, users will find a way to bypass them. Security must be designed to be as seamless as possible, especially in high-stakes environments like healthcare.
Addressing this issue requires a multi-pronged approach that focuses on people, processes, and technology.
M1017 - User Training.M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication.Developing a security culture through continuous, role-specific training is essential to address the root cause of this non-compliance.
Enforcing strong password policies and, more importantly, implementing technical solutions that reduce the need for password entry can mitigate risks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
MFA makes password sharing much more difficult and less effective, as a second factor is required for login.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To combat the rampant password sharing at NSW Health, the organization must implement a form of Multi-Factor Authentication that is both secure and clinician-friendly. Traditional app-based MFA may be too slow in a fast-paced hospital environment. Instead, NSW Health should deploy physical, proximity-based authentication methods. This could involve issuing staff ID badges with NFC or Bluetooth capabilities that allow them to 'tap-to-log-in' at workstations. This method is fast, intuitive, and physically ties the authentication event to the person present, making password sharing impractical. This directly mitigates the risk of compromised shared credentials being used by attackers and enforces individual accountability for all system access.
NSW Health's security operations team needs to actively hunt for account sharing behavior. By implementing Domain Account Monitoring, they can analyze authentication logs in their SIEM to detect anomalies indicative of sharing. Key detection rules should include: 1) Alerting on concurrent logins for a single user account from multiple, physically separate locations (e.g., different hospital floors or buildings). 2) Correlating login times with employee shift schedules to flag account activity that occurs when the legitimate user is off-duty. 3) Baselining normal user behavior and alerting on significant deviations. These analytics provide concrete evidence of non-compliance, allowing management to address the issue with specific individuals and departments, thereby breaking the 'normalisation' of this risky behavior.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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