New 'White Lock' Ransomware Emerges, Demanding 4 Bitcoin and Threatening Data Leaks

'White Lock' Ransomware Surfaces with Double Extortion Tactics, Appends '.fbin' Extension to Files

HIGH
October 10, 2025
5m read
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White Lock

Full Report

Executive Summary

Cybersecurity researchers are tracking a new ransomware family dubbed White Lock. This emerging threat employs a double-extortion model, common among modern ransomware operations. The malware is designed to run on Windows systems, where it first exfiltrates sensitive corporate data before initiating an encryption routine. All encrypted files are appended with the .fbin extension. The attackers leave a ransom note named c0ntact.txt which details the compromise and the ransom demand: 4 Bitcoin. A short four-day deadline is given, after which the attackers threaten to leak the stolen data, sell it, and notify the victim's customers. The use of a Tor-based communication channel and the high ransom demand suggest that the operators are targeting enterprise-level organizations.


Threat Overview

White Lock represents a new and developing ransomware threat. Its core functionality is to deny access to files and extort money, but it follows the modern ransomware playbook by adding data theft to its attack chain.

Attack Flow

  1. Initial Compromise: The initial access vector is not yet confirmed but is likely standard methods such as phishing, exploiting vulnerable public-facing services, or using compromised credentials.
  2. Data Exfiltration: Before encryption, the malware scans the network for valuable data and exfiltrates it to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
  3. Encryption: The ransomware encrypts a wide variety of file types across the victim's network, appending the .fbin extension to each file.
  4. Extortion: A ransom note, c0ntact.txt, is created in each directory. It contains the ransom demand, payment deadline, and threats of data leakage. It also provides a unique client ID and a .onion URL for communication via the Tor Browser.

Technical analysis suggests the malware may also attempt to disable security software and delete Volume Shadow Copies to prevent easy recovery, a common feature of ransomware.

Technical Analysis

The malware is built for Windows environments. The .fbin extension and c0ntact.txt ransom note are the primary indicators of a White Lock infection.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Impact Assessment

A successful White Lock attack can be catastrophic for an organization. The immediate impact is operational disruption due to encrypted systems. The secondary impact comes from the data breach, which can lead to:

  • Regulatory fines for data exposure.
  • Loss of customer trust.
  • Loss of competitive advantage if data is sold to competitors.
  • Significant financial loss from the ransom payment and recovery costs.

The short deadline and high ransom demand are designed to pressure victims into paying quickly.

IOCs

Type Value Description
file_extension .fbin Appended to all encrypted files.
file_name c0ntact.txt The name of the ransom note file.
url [redacted].onion The Tor-based portal for victim communication.

Cyber Observables for Detection

Type Value Description Context Confidence
file_name c0ntact.txt Creation of the ransom note is a definitive indicator of infection. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM), EDR high
command_line_pattern vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet Command used to delete Volume Shadow Copies to inhibit recovery. EDR, Sysmon Event ID 1 high
process_name wbadmin.exe Another tool abused by ransomware to delete system backups. Monitor for suspicious usage. EDR, Sysmon Event ID 1 high
network_traffic_pattern Outbound connections to Tor entry nodes The malware may communicate with C2 infrastructure via Tor. Blocking or alerting on Tor traffic can be an effective detection strategy. Firewall logs, NIDS medium

Detection & Response

  1. Endpoint Detection: Use EDR and antivirus solutions with behavioral analysis to detect ransomware activity. Look for rapid file modification/encryption, processes that delete shadow copies, and the creation of ransom notes. This aligns with D3FEND's File Content Rules (D3-FCR).
  2. Network Monitoring: Monitor for large, unexpected outbound data transfers, which could be the data exfiltration phase. Alert on any connections to known Tor nodes from servers or critical workstations.
  3. Canary Files: Place decoy files (canaries) on file shares. Monitor these files for any modification, which can provide an early warning of ransomware activity.

If an infection is detected, immediately isolate the affected systems from the network to prevent further spread. Do not attempt to pay the ransom, as it encourages the attackers and does not guarantee data recovery.

Mitigation

The best defense against ransomware is a multi-layered, proactive approach.

  1. Data Backup and Recovery: Maintain regular, offline, and immutable backups of all critical data. This is the most important mitigation (D3FEND: Data Backup). Regularly test your recovery procedures.
  2. Patch Management: Keep all systems, especially public-facing services like VPNs and RDP, fully patched to prevent exploitation as an initial access vector (D3FEND: Software Update).
  3. Network Segmentation: Segment your network to limit the blast radius of a ransomware attack. Prevent lateral movement between different network zones.
  4. User Training: Train users to recognize and report phishing emails, a common entry point for ransomware.

Timeline of Events

1
October 10, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Maintain offline, encrypted, and immutable backups to ensure data can be restored without paying the ransom.

Use a modern EDR/antivirus solution with behavioral detection to identify and block ransomware activity.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Segment the network to contain a ransomware outbreak and prevent it from spreading to critical systems.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The cornerstone of ransomware defense is the ability to recover without paying. For a threat like White Lock that actively tries to destroy backups, standard backups are not enough. Organizations must implement immutable backups, where backup data is stored in a write-once-read-many (WORM) state for a defined period. This can be achieved with cloud storage services that support object locking (e.g., AWS S3 Object Lock, Azure Blob immutable storage) or on-premise solutions with similar capabilities. This ensures that even if an attacker gains administrative access to the backup system, they cannot delete or encrypt the backup data, guaranteeing a clean source for recovery and rendering the encryption portion of the attack moot.

To gain early warning of a ransomware attack in progress, deploy behavioral honeypots, also known as canary files or decoy systems. Scatter decoy files with enticing names like passwords.xlsx or financial_projections.docx across file shares. Use a File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) or specialized deception technology solution to place these canaries. Any interaction with these files (read, modify, encrypt) is a high-fidelity indicator of malicious activity, as no legitimate user should ever access them. Upon detection, an automated response can be triggered to isolate the affected user account or endpoint, stopping the ransomware before it can encrypt a significant portion of the network.

To prevent the initial execution of the White Lock payload, employ application control policies. While full application allowlisting can be complex, a robust denylisting approach is highly effective. Block the execution of files from user-writable locations like C:\Users\<user>\AppData\ and C:\ProgramData\. Since many ransomware droppers land in these directories via phishing emails or malicious downloads, preventing execution from these paths can stop the attack chain at the outset. This should be combined with PowerShell constraint language mode and blocking of tools frequently abused by attackers, such as PsExec and Cobalt Strike loaders, from running on standard user endpoints.

Sources & References

Weekly Intelligence Report – 10 October 2025
CYFIRMA (cyfirma.com) October 10, 2025
White Lock ransomware
PCRisk (pcrisk.com) October 2, 2025
White Lock ransomware removal [.fbin file virus].
YouTube (youtube.com) October 7, 2025

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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ransomwaredouble extortiondata exfiltrationWindows malwareTor

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