Cybersecurity researchers at CYFIRMA have identified a new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation named Sicarii Ransomware. The group, which has been active since at least late 2025, was discovered during monitoring of underground forums. The Sicarii operation is currently focused on targeting organizations in the manufacturing sector within the United States. The malware payload encrypts files using AES-GCM and appends the .sicarii extension. Notably, the malware also includes capabilities to collect system information and credentials, indicating a likely double-extortion model where data is both encrypted and exfiltrated for leverage. The emergence of a new RaaS group highlights the persistent and evolving nature of the ransomware threat.
Sicarii Ransomware operates on a RaaS model, where the core developers provide the malware and infrastructure to affiliates, who then carry out the attacks in exchange for a share of the ransom payments. This model allows for rapid scaling of attack volume.
.sicarii extension. It also has information-stealing capabilities.Initial access vectors are not specified but are likely to include common methods such as phishing, exploitation of vulnerable public-facing services (like RDP or VPNs), or purchase of access from initial access brokers.
The Sicarii malware performs several actions upon execution:
T1005 - Data from Local System and T1552 - Unsecured Credentials.T1489 - Service Stop and T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery.T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact.The inclusion of data gathering capabilities strongly suggests a double-extortion strategy. The attackers will threaten to leak the stolen data on a dedicated leak site if the ransom is not paid.
A successful attack by Sicarii Ransomware can have a devastating impact on a manufacturing organization.
Defenders should hunt for indicators associated with ransomware activity.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
file_name |
*.*.sicarii |
The file extension appended to encrypted files. The presence of files with this pattern is a definitive indicator of compromise. |
command_line_pattern |
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet |
A common command used by ransomware to delete backups. This is a high-confidence indicator. |
process_name |
(Ransomware binary) |
Monitor for the execution of new, unsigned executables in user profiles or temporary directories. |
network_traffic_pattern |
Large outbound data transfer |
A spike in outbound data transfer prior to encryption activity can indicate data exfiltration for double extortion. |
Response: Upon detection of ransomware activity, immediately isolate the affected hosts from the network to prevent its spread. Activate the incident response plan and engage with third-party experts if necessary. Do not power off the machine until a decision is made about forensic evidence collection.
Standard ransomware defenses are effective against new groups like Sicarii.
Deploy EDR solutions with behavioral anti-ransomware modules that can detect and block mass encryption activity.
Segment IT and OT networks to prevent ransomware from spreading from corporate systems to critical industrial control systems.
Enforce MFA on all remote access solutions (VPN, RDP) to protect against credential-based initial access.
Maintain and regularly test offline or immutable backups to ensure recovery without paying a ransom.
The single most important defense against any ransomware threat, including Sicarii, is the ability to restore from clean backups. For manufacturing organizations, this means having a tiered backup strategy. Critical systems controlling production (OT/ICS) and core business functions (ERP) must have regularly tested, offline, air-gapped backups. This ensures that even if the entire production network is encrypted, there is a viable path to recovery that does not involve paying the ransom. The restoration process should be documented and drilled at least twice a year to ensure that recovery time objectives (RTO) can be met. Without a reliable backup and restoration plan, a manufacturing firm is at the mercy of the attackers.
To gain early warning of a ransomware attack in progress, organizations should deploy decoy objects, also known as honeyfiles or canaries. These are files placed on network shares and servers that have no legitimate business use. For a manufacturing company, these could be files named 'production_schedule_Q3.xlsx' or 'machine_calibration_data.csv'. File integrity monitoring (FIM) or EDR solutions should be configured to generate a critical, high-priority alert the instant one of these decoy files is accessed, modified, or encrypted. Since no legitimate user or process should ever touch these files, any interaction is a high-fidelity indicator of malicious activity, likely a ransomware payload beginning its encryption routine. This can provide the security team with the crucial minutes needed to isolate the affected host and prevent the attack from spreading across the entire network.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats