A new report from cybersecurity firm Forescout has identified a critical inflection point in enterprise risk: network infrastructure devices have overtaken traditional endpoints (like servers and workstations) as the riskiest category of connected devices. The "2026 Riskiest Connected Devices" report, based on analysis of millions of devices, found that attackers are increasingly targeting core network gear like routers and switches. These devices are often poorly managed, have a high number of vulnerabilities (averaging nearly 32 per device), and provide a powerful platform for lateral movement and persistence. The report also highlights the rapid diversification of risk, with 40% of the devices on the riskiest list being new this year, including a growing number of OT, IoT, and IoMT devices.
The report's central thesis is that the focus of enterprise risk has shifted from the perimeter and endpoint to the core network itself. Attackers are exploiting the 'messy middle' of corporate networks, targeting devices that are critical for connectivity but often lack the same level of security management as traditional IT assets.
Key findings include:
Attackers target network infrastructure for several key reasons:
T1040 - Network Sniffing).T1601.002 - Modify System Image).The inclusion of devices like serial-to-IP converters and BACnet routers is particularly concerning, as these are gateways to sensitive Operational Technology (OT) and building management systems, allowing cyberattacks to have physical consequences.
Segmenting the network is crucial to limit the impact of a compromised device, whether it's IT, IoT, or OT.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
A rigorous firmware patching process for network devices is necessary to close known vulnerabilities.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Harden the configuration of network devices by changing default credentials and disabling unused services.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To address the risks highlighted in the Forescout report, organizations must aggressively pursue network segmentation and microsegmentation. The era of a flat, trusted internal network is over. A Zero Trust approach should be applied, creating distinct segments for different device types. For example, all IoT devices (like RFID readers) should be on their own VLAN, all OT devices (like BACnet routers) on another, and IoMT devices (like medication dispensers) on a third. Strict firewall policies must be enforced between these segments, allowing only the absolute minimum necessary traffic to flow. This containment strategy ensures that a compromise of a vulnerable IoT device does not automatically grant the attacker access to the corporate servers or critical OT systems.
Network infrastructure devices must be treated with the same security rigor as critical servers. This requires a dedicated platform hardening program. Key steps include: changing all default administrator credentials immediately upon deployment, disabling insecure management protocols like Telnet in favor of SSH, creating strict access control lists (ACLs) to ensure management interfaces are only accessible from a secure management network (not the general user network), and maintaining a regular firmware update schedule. These basic hygiene steps are often overlooked on network gear but are critical for reducing the attack surface that threat actors are now actively targeting.
Since EDR agents cannot be installed on most network, IoT, or OT devices, Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) becomes the primary tool for detection. By monitoring traffic flows (e.g., NetFlow, sFlow) and performing deep packet inspection where possible, NTA tools can identify signs of a compromised device. For a router or switch, a key indicator of compromise is the device itself initiating an outbound connection to an external IP address on the internet. This is highly anomalous behavior, as these devices should typically only be managed from within the network. Detecting this allows security teams to investigate a potential firmware implant or other compromise that would be invisible to endpoint-based tools.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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