On December 19, 2025, MongoDB disclosed CVE-2025-14847, a high-severity (CVSS 8.7) information disclosure vulnerability nicknamed "MongoBleed." This flaw affects MongoDB database servers that use zlib for network message compression. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted message to the server. This triggers a memory leak, causing the server to return uninitialized heap memory, which may contain sensitive data from other concurrent sessions. This leaked data can include plaintext passwords, API keys, session tokens, and other critical secrets. The vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild, and a proof-of-concept (PoC) is publicly available, dramatically increasing the risk. MongoDB has released patched versions and advises customers to upgrade immediately or implement workarounds. Due to the nature of the data leak, rotating all credentials after patching is a critical remediation step.
CVE-2025-14847, or "MongoBleed," is an unauthenticated memory leak vulnerability rooted in the way MongoDB's server handles zlib-compressed client messages.
The exploit works when an attacker sends a message to the server that is flagged for zlib decompression. The message is malformed in a way that it declares a very large uncompressed size, but the actual compressed payload is small. The server allocates a large buffer in memory based on the declared size but only fills a small portion of it with the decompressed data. When sending the response, the server incorrectly sends back the entire buffer, including the large, uninitialized portion. This uninitialized memory can contain fragments of data from other processes and sessions being handled by the server, effectively 'bleeding' sensitive information.
The vulnerability affects a wide range of MongoDB server versions where zlib is enabled for network compression:
Active exploitation has been confirmed. A public proof-of-concept (PoC) was released shortly after the disclosure, making it trivial for attackers to scan for and exploit vulnerable servers. Any publicly accessible MongoDB instance running an affected version with zlib compression enabled should be considered at extremely high risk of compromise.
The impact of MongoBleed is severe, despite being an information disclosure flaw rather than RCE:
Detecting exploitation requires monitoring for specific network patterns.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
network_traffic_pattern |
Malformed OP_COMPRESSED messages with zlib compressor ID and an unusually large uncompressed_size field. |
This requires deep packet inspection of MongoDB wire protocol traffic. |
log_source |
MongoDB Server Logs | Monitor for an increase in connection errors or unexpected session terminations, which could be a byproduct of exploit attempts. |
network_traffic_pattern |
Inbound connections to MongoDB port (default TCP/27017) from unknown or untrusted IP addresses. | Exploitation is often preceded by internet-wide scanning. |
D3FEND Reference: D3-NTA: Network Traffic Analysis
D3FEND Reference: D3-SU: Software Update, D3-CR: Credential Rotation
zlib network compression. This can be done by modifying the net.compression.compressors setting in your MongoDB configuration file to remove zlib and use other options like snappy or zstd.net:
compression:
compressors: snappy,zstd
Upgrading to a patched version of MongoDB is the primary and most effective mitigation.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Disabling zlib compression serves as a critical workaround if an immediate upgrade is not possible.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Rotating all potentially exposed credentials after remediation is a mandatory step to evict any attackers who may have stolen them.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The most critical action after patching or mitigating the MongoBleed vulnerability is to assume that all secrets in the server's memory were compromised. A full credential rotation is not optional; it is mandatory. This process must be comprehensive and include: 1) Changing all database user passwords. 2) Revoking and re-issuing all API keys and access tokens used by applications connecting to the database. 3) Rotating any cloud provider keys (e.g., AWS, Azure, GCP) if they were accessible to the database server. 4) Changing any other secrets or connection strings stored in the database or in the configuration of connected applications. Failure to perform this step means that even a fully patched server remains vulnerable to an attacker who has already harvested credentials via the MongoBleed exploit.
The definitive fix for CVE-2025-14847 is to upgrade all MongoDB instances to a patched version provided by the vendor. Given the active exploitation and public PoC, this should be treated as an emergency change. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, the workaround of disabling zlib compression by modifying the net.compression.compressors setting in the mongod.conf file should be implemented. This configuration change is non-destructive and can be applied quickly, but it may have performance implications. The long-term solution is to get onto a patched software version as soon as operationally feasible.
This incident underscores the importance of not exposing database servers directly to the internet. As a fundamental security practice, MongoDB servers should be firewalled off from public access. Inbound traffic on the default port (TCP/27017) should only be permitted from specific, known IP addresses of application servers or management hosts. All other traffic should be denied. This principle of network least privilege would have prevented unauthenticated internet-based attackers from reaching the vulnerable service in the first place. Organizations should use this event as an impetus to audit their cloud and on-premise firewall rules to ensure no database servers are inadvertently exposed.

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