29,000+ users targeted in one campaign
On February 10, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on a significant uptick in phishing activity themed around the U.S. tax season. Researchers identified multiple, distinct campaigns employing diverse tactics to compromise organizations. A primary campaign targeted over 29,000 users, attempting to trick them into installing the legitimate ScreenConnect remote access tool, which would then be abused by attackers for persistence and control. Other campaigns utilized QR code phishing ('quishing') in fake W-2 documents to steal credentials via the SneakyLog phishing kit, and highly customized lures to deploy the Energy365 Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. These attacks are not targeted at a single industry but are widespread, affecting financial services, technology, retail, manufacturing, and healthcare, signaling a broad threat to U.S. organizations.
Microsoft has identified at least three major, concurrent phishing campaigns:
ScreenConnect Abuse Campaign:
QR Code / 'SneakyLog' Campaign:
2025_Employee_W-2.docx). The document contains a QR code that, when scanned, directs the user to a credential harvesting page powered by the 'SneakyLog' phishing kit.'Energy365' PhaaS Campaign:
These campaigns demonstrate a blend of social engineering and technical abuse:
Abuse of Legitimate Software (T1219 - Remote Access Software): The ScreenConnect campaign is a prime example of attackers 'living off the land'. By tricking users into installing a legitimate, signed application, they bypass application allowlisting and antivirus signatures. The tool provides them with robust, stealthy remote access for further attacks.
QR Code Phishing ('Quishing') (T1566.001 - Spearphishing Attachment): The SneakyLog campaign uses a multi-stage attack. The email and attachment may pass initial scans, as the malicious link is obfuscated within a QR code. This requires the user to use a separate device (a phone) to scan the code, bypassing endpoint and browser security controls on the corporate workstation. The use of a Word document as a container is classic.
Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) (T1598.003 - Spearphishing via Service): The Energy365 campaign highlights the industrialization of cybercrime. PhaaS platforms provide less sophisticated actors with the tools and infrastructure to launch effective credential theft attacks, complete with customized lures and evasion techniques.
T1566.001 - Spearphishing Attachment: Used in the SneakyLog campaign with a malicious Word document.T1566.002 - Spearphishing Link: The core of all three campaigns, delivering malicious links or installers.T1219 - Remote Access Software: The abuse of ScreenConnect for command and control.T1598.003 - Spearphishing via Service: The use of the Energy365 PhaaS platform.T1204.001 - Malicious Link: User is tricked into clicking a link that initiates the attack chain.The primary impact of these campaigns is credential theft and the establishment of initial access for more severe attacks. Compromised credentials can be used to access sensitive corporate data, cloud services (Office 365, G-Suite), and financial systems. The installation of ScreenConnect provides a persistent foothold that can be leveraged for data exfiltration, lateral movement, and the eventual deployment of ransomware. The broad targeting across multiple industries means that nearly any U.S. organization is a potential victim.
| Type | Value | Description | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| process_name | ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe |
Presence of the ScreenConnect client service, especially if it is not a sanctioned remote support tool in your organization. | EDR process monitoring, Software inventory |
| network_traffic_pattern | Outbound connections to *.screenconnect.com or *.connectwise.com |
Unexpected network traffic to ScreenConnect domains from user workstations. | DNS logs, Proxy logs, Firewall logs |
| file_name | 2025_Employee_W-2.docx |
Look for email attachments with this name or similar patterns related to tax documents. | Email gateway and attachment scanning logs |
| url_pattern | URLs containing 'SneakyLog' or known 'Energy365' patterns | Use threat intelligence to block known phishing kit URLs. | Web proxy and DNS filtering logs |
D3-UA: URL Analysis at the email gateway and web proxy to block known phishing domains. Use D3-EDL: Executable Denylisting to prevent the installation of unauthorized software like ScreenConnect.Train users to identify and report phishing attempts, especially those related to timely events like tax season and those using novel techniques like QR codes.
Enforce MFA on all accounts to mitigate the impact of credential theft from phishing attacks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Use application control to prevent the installation and execution of unauthorized remote access software like ScreenConnect.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Utilize web filters and email link protection to block access to known phishing domains and credential harvesting sites.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The primary goal of the SneakyLog and Energy365 campaigns is credential harvesting. The single most effective defense against the abuse of stolen credentials is the universal enforcement of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Organizations must prioritize deploying strong MFA (e.g., FIDO2/WebAuthn, push notifications) across all internet-facing services, including email (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace), VPNs, and critical business applications. This ensures that even if a user is tricked by a sophisticated phishing lure and gives up their password, the attacker cannot gain access without the second factor. For high-risk users like finance and HR personnel, who are prime targets for tax-season scams, phishing-resistant MFA should be the standard. Implementing MFA directly neutralizes the primary threat of these credential theft campaigns.
To combat the abuse of legitimate tools like ScreenConnect, organizations should implement application control through executable denylisting or, preferably, allowlisting. Security teams must first inventory all sanctioned remote access tools. Any other tool, including ScreenConnect if it is not approved, should be added to a denylist using AppLocker or a similar EDR feature. This blocks its execution even if a user is tricked into downloading it. For a more secure posture, an allowlist should be created, defining the specific set of applications permitted to run on workstations. This proactively prevents any unauthorized software, malicious or otherwise, from being installed. This control directly counters the T1219 technique used in the ScreenConnect campaign, breaking the attack chain after the initial social engineering phase.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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