149.4 million accounts
A security researcher has uncovered a massive, unprotected database containing 149,404,754 unique login credentials. The 96 GB dataset was publicly exposed without any encryption or password protection. The data is not from a single new breach but appears to be a large compilation from various sources, primarily infostealer malware logs and previously breached data. The leak affects a vast range of services, including an estimated 48 million Gmail accounts, social media platforms like Facebook, financial institutions, and even government portals. The prolonged exposure of this data presents a severe and immediate threat to affected users, who are at high risk of account takeover, financial theft, and identity fraud. Organizations are urged to enforce multi-factor authentication and advise users to update their credentials immediately.
The incident involves the discovery of a publicly accessible cloud-based repository containing 96 GB of sensitive data. Discovered on January 21, 2026, by researcher Jeremiah Fowler, the database held 149.4 million unique records. Each record typically contained a username/email, a password in plaintext, and the URL of the service's login page.
The data's structure strongly suggests it was aggregated from multiple sources over time. The primary vector is believed to be infostealer malware, which captures saved credentials from browsers and applications on infected user devices. This is corroborated by the wide variety of services represented in the leak, from personal email and social media to highly sensitive financial and cryptocurrency accounts. The prolonged exposure, lasting nearly a month before being taken down, provided ample opportunity for malicious actors to access and exfiltrate the data for use in credential stuffing attacks, phishing campaigns, and targeted fraud.
The attack is not a breach of any single provider like Google or Facebook, but a failure to secure a data aggregation point. The threat actors responsible for compiling the data are likely operators of infostealer malware campaigns.
T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores: The core of the data collection via infostealer malware.T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie: Infostealers commonly steal session cookies alongside passwords to bypass MFA.T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: How the stolen data is sent from the victim to the attacker.T1586 - Compromise Accounts: The ultimate goal of using the leaked credentials.T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: Used for C2 communication and data exfiltration.The impact of this leak is substantial and widespread. With 48 million Gmail accounts and millions more from other services, the potential for harm is enormous.
.gov credentials poses a national security risk, potentially enabling access to sensitive government systems. The sheer volume of credentials fuels the credential stuffing ecosystem, making all online services more vulnerable.Since this is a data leak, detection focuses on identifying compromised accounts rather than an active intrusion.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| log_source | Identity Provider Logs | Monitor for high volumes of failed login attempts from disparate geolocations for single users. |
| log_source | Application Logs | Look for successful logins immediately following a password reset request from an unfamiliar IP address. |
| network_traffic_pattern | Unusual User-Agent Strings | Infostealer C2 traffic may use non-standard or suspicious User-Agent strings. |
| process_name | lsass.exe |
Monitor for unexpected processes attempting to access credentials stored in lsass.exe. |
Organizations should assume that employee credentials are part of this and similar leaks.
D3-DAM: Domain Account Monitoring are critical.Mitigation focuses on reducing the impact of compromised credentials.
D3-MFA: Multi-factor Authentication is essential.D3-UT: User Training can help prevent the initial infection.D3-SPP: Strong Password Policy should be implemented.The most effective defense against the use of stolen credentials.
Educate users to recognize and avoid phishing attempts that lead to infostealer infections.
Enforce strong, unique passwords to limit the impact of a single credential being compromised.
Deploy endpoint security to detect and block infostealer malware.
Immediately enforce phishing-resistant Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across all critical applications, especially for email, financial, and administrative accounts. Prioritize hardware tokens (FIDO2/WebAuthn) over SMS or push-based methods, as the latter are more susceptible to social engineering. For legacy systems that do not support modern MFA, implement compensating controls such as network segmentation and heightened monitoring. This directly mitigates the primary threat of this leak: attackers using stolen credentials to gain unauthorized access. By requiring a second factor, the compromised password alone becomes insufficient for account takeover.
Implement and enforce a strong password policy that prohibits password reuse across different services. Mandate the use of a corporate-approved password manager to help employees generate and store unique, complex passwords for every service. Augment this policy with credential screening services that check user passwords against known breach corpuses, like the one in this incident, and force a password change if a match is found. This reduces the blast radius of a credential leak, ensuring that the compromise of a password for a low-sensitivity site does not grant access to critical corporate resources.
Proactively monitor for signs of credential stuffing and account takeover. Configure SIEM and identity provider logs to alert on anomalous login behavior, such as 'impossible travel' (logins from multiple distant locations in a short period), multiple failed logins followed by a success from a new IP/device, or logins from IP addresses associated with TOR or malicious proxies. This allows security teams to detect and respond to account compromise attempts in near real-time, locking accounts and revoking sessions before significant damage can occur.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats