Security researchers have discovered a malicious campaign targeting users of OpenAI's ChatGPT service through deceptive Google Chrome extensions. At least 16 extensions, advertised as legitimate enhancers for ChatGPT, were found to contain malicious code. Upon installation, these extensions inject scripts into the ChatGPT web interface to steal user session tokens and authorization details. This information enables attackers to hijack user sessions, providing them with complete access to the victim's account, including their entire chat history. This could lead to the exposure of sensitive personal or corporate information that users may have discussed with the AI. The incident underscores the security risks associated with browser extensions and the need for user vigilance.
The attack preys on the popularity of ChatGPT and the desire of users to enhance its functionality. Attackers publish extensions on the Chrome Web Store that promise useful features but secretly harbor malicious intent. The core of the attack is the abuse of the permissive security model for browser extensions, which often allows them to read and modify data on websites the user visits. In this case, the extensions specifically target chat.openai.com.
The attack mechanism is a form of session hijacking facilitated by a malicious browser extension.
T1176 - Browser Extensions.T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie.T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel).The impact of a hijacked ChatGPT session can be severe. Many users input sensitive, confidential, or proprietary information into ChatGPT, including source code, business plans, personal identifiable information (PII), and internal company documents. An attacker with access to this chat history could leverage it for extortion, corporate espionage, or identity theft. They could also continue the conversations as the user, potentially tricking the user's colleagues or contacts. The breach of privacy is significant, and for corporate users, it could represent a major data leak.
chat.openai.com web page to unknown domains could indicate data exfiltration by a malicious script.chrome://extensions, carefully review each extension and its permissions, and remove any that are unfamiliar, unnecessary, or overly permissive.M1033 - Limit Software Installation).M1017 - User Training).Use enterprise policies to restrict or block the installation of browser extensions, or maintain an allowlist of approved extensions.
Train users to be cautious about the extensions they install and the data they input into public AI services.
In a corporate environment, the most effective way to prevent threats like malicious ChatGPT extensions is to implement a browser extension denylist (or a more secure allowlist). Using browser management policies (e.g., Google Chrome's ExtensionInstallBlocklist), security administrators can centrally prevent users from installing known-malicious extensions. As security researchers publish the IDs of the 16 malicious extensions, these should be immediately added to the denylist. For a more robust security posture, organizations should default to blocking all extensions and maintain a small allowlist of vetted, business-approved extensions (Executable Allowlisting, D3-EAL). This prevents not only this specific threat but also future, similar attacks that leverage rogue browser add-ons.
To detect hijacked ChatGPT sessions, organizations can perform Web Session Activity Analysis. This involves monitoring access logs for a user's OpenAI account. If a session token stolen from a user in one geographic location (e.g., New York) is suddenly used to access the account from a completely different and unexpected location (e.g., an IP address in Eastern Europe) within an impossible travel time, it is a strong indicator of session hijacking. Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB) or identity providers can often be configured to detect and alert on such impossible travel scenarios or other session anomalies, such as changes in user-agent strings. Upon detecting such activity, the system should be configured to automatically terminate the suspicious session and force a re-authentication for the user.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats