A new campaign by the Makop ransomware group, a variant of the Phobos family, has been observed deploying an updated toolset to target organizations, with a primary focus on India. According to the Acronis Threat Research Unit, the attackers' primary initial access vector remains brute-force attacks against exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services. Post-compromise, the threat actors are now using the notorious GuLoader downloader to deliver information-stealing malware such as AgentTesla and FormBook. A key evolution in this campaign is the use of specific exploits for privilege escalation, including one targeting CVE-2025-7771 in a third-party driver, to disable security solutions before the final Makop payload is executed.
The Makop ransomware operators are following a common ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) playbook but have refined their TTPs to improve their success rate.
TCP/3389).hlpdrv.sys, to gain kernel-level privileges.The most notable aspect of this campaign is the use of vulnerable drivers to achieve kernel-level privilege escalation. This 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) technique is highly effective for bypassing security controls.
ThrottleStop.sys driver allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges, effectively giving them complete control over the operating system and allowing them to disable security agents.T1110.001 - Brute Force: Password Guessing: Used against exposed RDP services.T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: GuLoader often uses PowerShell to execute its shellcode.T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation: Exploiting CVE-2025-7771 to gain kernel access.T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Using kernel-level access to terminate EDR/AV processes.T1574.006 - Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic-Link Library Injection: GuLoader uses process hollowing or injection to run its payload.T1218.011 - System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32: Often used to run malicious DLLs.T1003 - OS Credential Dumping: Use of Mimikatz.T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact: The final ransomware payload encrypts files.For affected organizations, the impact is severe, consistent with other double-extortion ransomware attacks. This includes:
ThrottleStop.sys or hlpdrv.sys. EDR solutions with specific rules for BYOVD attacks can be effective here.powershell.exe making outbound connections to download content, or for the execution of tools like NetScan and Advanced IP Scanner from unusual user accounts.Do not expose RDP to the internet. Place it behind a VPN with MFA.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Enforce MFA on all remote access solutions and sensitive accounts to prevent brute-force attacks.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The most effective countermeasure against the Makop ransomware campaign's initial access vector is to eliminate the exposed RDP attack surface. Organizations must immediately audit their internet-facing perimeter for any open RDP ports (TCP/3389) and place them behind a secure access solution. All RDP access should be brokered through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) gateway that requires multi-factor authentication (MFA). This single change removes the possibility of a successful RDP brute-force attack, which is the entry point for this entire campaign. For any RDP access that must remain, implement strong password policies and account lockout thresholds to make brute-forcing computationally infeasible.
To counter the 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) technique used by Makop to disable security tools, organizations should implement driver blocklisting. Using a technology like Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC), administrators can create a policy that explicitly blocks known vulnerable drivers from being loaded into the kernel. In this case, the policy should include ThrottleStop.sys (related to CVE-2025-7771) and hlpdrv.sys. Microsoft provides a recommended driver blocklist that can be used as a starting point. By preventing these drivers from loading, the attacker's attempt to escalate to kernel-level privileges will fail, and their subsequent efforts to terminate EDR and antivirus processes will be thwarted, keeping critical security protections active.
To detect post-compromise activity from the Makop group, security teams should focus on analyzing process creation events. Since the attackers use legitimate tools like NetScan and Advanced IP Scanner for reconnaissance, detection should be context-based. Create EDR/SIEM rules to alert when these network scanning tools are executed by user accounts that are not system administrators or when they are run outside of normal business hours. Additionally, monitor for processes accessing the LSASS process memory, which is a strong indicator of credential dumping with Mimikatz. For GuLoader, monitor for PowerShell processes that exhibit suspicious behavior, such as downloading content from the internet and executing it in memory, or for process hollowing where a legitimate process like svchost.exe is injected with malicious code.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats