Makop Ransomware Evolves, Using GuLoader and New Exploits in Attacks on India

Makop Ransomware Campaign Leverages GuLoader, AgentTesla, and Privilege Escalation Exploits

HIGH
December 13, 2025
5m read
RansomwareThreat ActorMalware

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Acronis

Products & Tech

ThrottleStopQuick Heal AV

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Full Report

Executive Summary

A new campaign by the Makop ransomware group, a variant of the Phobos family, has been observed deploying an updated toolset to target organizations, with a primary focus on India. According to the Acronis Threat Research Unit, the attackers' primary initial access vector remains brute-force attacks against exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services. Post-compromise, the threat actors are now using the notorious GuLoader downloader to deliver information-stealing malware such as AgentTesla and FormBook. A key evolution in this campaign is the use of specific exploits for privilege escalation, including one targeting CVE-2025-7771 in a third-party driver, to disable security solutions before the final Makop payload is executed.


Threat Overview

The Makop ransomware operators are following a common ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) playbook but have refined their TTPs to improve their success rate.

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: Attackers scan the internet for and brute-force credentials on exposed RDP services (TCP/3389).
  2. Reconnaissance: Once on a system, they use legitimate network scanning tools like NetScan and Advanced IP Scanner to map the internal network and identify valuable targets.
  3. Secondary Payload Deployment: The attackers use GuLoader to download and execute additional malware. GuLoader is known for its anti-analysis and shellcode-based delivery techniques. The secondary payloads are often infostealers like AgentTesla and FormBook to steal credentials and other sensitive data before encryption.
  4. Privilege Escalation: To disable security software, the attackers exploit local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities. They have been seen using an exploit for CVE-2025-7771 in the ThrottleStop driver and another vulnerable driver, hlpdrv.sys, to gain kernel-level privileges.
  5. Defense Evasion: With elevated privileges, the attackers terminate EDR and antivirus processes. They also deploy custom uninstallers for specific products like Quick Heal AV.
  6. Credential Access: Mimikatz is used to dump credentials from memory, enabling lateral movement.
  7. Impact: The Makop ransomware is executed to encrypt files across the compromised network.

Technical Analysis

The most notable aspect of this campaign is the use of vulnerable drivers to achieve kernel-level privilege escalation. This 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) technique is highly effective for bypassing security controls.

  • CVE-2025-7771: This vulnerability in the ThrottleStop.sys driver allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges, effectively giving them complete control over the operating system and allowing them to disable security agents.
  • GuLoader: This downloader is known for its multi-stage, heavily obfuscated delivery mechanism, making it difficult for static analysis tools to detect.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs


Impact Assessment

For affected organizations, the impact is severe, consistent with other double-extortion ransomware attacks. This includes:

  • Operational Disruption: Encryption of critical files and systems leads to a complete halt in business operations.
  • Data Breach: The use of infostealers like AgentTesla and FormBook means that even if the ransom is not paid, sensitive corporate and customer data may have already been stolen and could be leaked or sold.
  • Financial Loss: Costs include ransom payments, recovery efforts, regulatory fines, and lost revenue.

Detection & Response

  1. RDP Monitoring: Aggressively monitor RDP logs for failed login attempts from external IP addresses. Alert on a high volume of failures from a single IP. Better yet, do not expose RDP to the internet.
  2. Driver-Based Attacks: Monitor for the loading of known vulnerable drivers like ThrottleStop.sys or hlpdrv.sys. EDR solutions with specific rules for BYOVD attacks can be effective here.
  3. Behavioral Detections: Monitor for processes like powershell.exe making outbound connections to download content, or for the execution of tools like NetScan and Advanced IP Scanner from unusual user accounts.
  4. Credential Dumping: Use EDR and SIEM rules to detect signs of Mimikatz usage, such as direct access to the LSASS process memory.

Mitigation

  1. Secure RDP: Do not expose RDP to the public internet. If remote access is required, place it behind a VPN with multi-factor authentication (MFA).
  2. Patch Management: While the primary LPE exploit targets a third-party driver, maintaining up-to-date patches for the operating system and all applications is crucial.
  3. Driver Blocklisting: Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or similar technologies to create policies that block known vulnerable drivers from being loaded.
  4. Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that user accounts do not have local administrator privileges unless absolutely necessary. This can prevent the initial execution of some LPE exploits.

Timeline of Events

1
December 13, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Do not expose RDP to the internet. Place it behind a VPN with MFA.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Enforce MFA on all remote access solutions and sensitive accounts to prevent brute-force attacks.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Use application control to create a blocklist of known vulnerable drivers to prevent BYOVD attacks.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

The most effective countermeasure against the Makop ransomware campaign's initial access vector is to eliminate the exposed RDP attack surface. Organizations must immediately audit their internet-facing perimeter for any open RDP ports (TCP/3389) and place them behind a secure access solution. All RDP access should be brokered through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) gateway that requires multi-factor authentication (MFA). This single change removes the possibility of a successful RDP brute-force attack, which is the entry point for this entire campaign. For any RDP access that must remain, implement strong password policies and account lockout thresholds to make brute-forcing computationally infeasible.

To counter the 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) technique used by Makop to disable security tools, organizations should implement driver blocklisting. Using a technology like Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC), administrators can create a policy that explicitly blocks known vulnerable drivers from being loaded into the kernel. In this case, the policy should include ThrottleStop.sys (related to CVE-2025-7771) and hlpdrv.sys. Microsoft provides a recommended driver blocklist that can be used as a starting point. By preventing these drivers from loading, the attacker's attempt to escalate to kernel-level privileges will fail, and their subsequent efforts to terminate EDR and antivirus processes will be thwarted, keeping critical security protections active.

To detect post-compromise activity from the Makop group, security teams should focus on analyzing process creation events. Since the attackers use legitimate tools like NetScan and Advanced IP Scanner for reconnaissance, detection should be context-based. Create EDR/SIEM rules to alert when these network scanning tools are executed by user accounts that are not system administrators or when they are run outside of normal business hours. Additionally, monitor for processes accessing the LSASS process memory, which is a strong indicator of credential dumping with Mimikatz. For GuLoader, monitor for PowerShell processes that exhibit suspicious behavior, such as downloading content from the internet and executing it in memory, or for process hollowing where a legitimate process like svchost.exe is injected with malicious code.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

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MakopRansomwareGuLoaderPhobosRDPBYOVDCVE-2025-7771India

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